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Zusammenfassung
Die vorgelegte Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Bedeutung von Sampling für die Git-
terbasisreduktion und ihre Anwendungen, aufbauend auf Schnorrs Random Sampling
Reduction Algorithmus (RSR) [Sch03]. Ferner stellt die Arbeit ein neu entwickeltes
Framework für Gitterreduktionsalgorithmen vor.
Gitter sind diskrete Untergruppen des Rn. Gitterbasisreduktion hat das Ziel, zu
einem Gitter eine Basis aus möglichst kurzen Vektoren zu finden. Dies ist in der
Mathematik ein seit langem betrachtetes algorithmisches Problem, das z. B. schon von
Lagrange und Gauß im Kontext der quadratischen Formen behandelt wurde. Lange
Zeit blieb Gitterbasisreduktion ein Spezialthema der Zahlentheorie; doch nachdem
Lenstra, Lenstra und Lovász [LLL82] den polynomiellen LLL-Algorithmus vorgestellt
hatten, fanden sich rasch zahlreiche Anwendungen in der ganzzahligen Optimierung,
der Kodierungstheorie und der Kryptographie.
Die klassischen Probleme in der Gittertheorie sind NP-hard; mit Hilfe von LLL kann
man approximative Lösungen bestimmen, wobei der Approximationsfaktor exponen-
tiell in der Gitterdimension steigt. In den vergangenen 20 Jahren wurden deshalb
weitere Reduktionsalgorithmen entwickelt, die einen verbesserten Approximations-
faktor gegen längere Laufzeiten eintauschen. Der bekannteste dieser Algorithmen ist
die BKZ-Reduktion [Sch87, SE94], die – für einen vom Anwender gewählten Para-
meter k – den Approximationsfaktor um den Faktor 1/k im Exponenten verbessert,
allerdings um den Preis eines schlechtestenfalls in k superexponentiellen zusätzlichen
Rechenaufwandes.
Schnorr hat 2003 mit dem RSR-Algorithmus eine neue Technik zur Gitterbasisre-
duktion vorgestellt, die Algorithmen vom LLL-Typ mit der erschöpfenden Suche in
einer Menge von Gittervektoren kombiniert, die mit nicht vernachlässigbarer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit einen kurzen Gittervektor enthält. Schnorr kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass
RSR die bis dahin effizientesten Algorithmen um eine vierte Wurzel verbessert. Al-
lerdings basiert RSR auf zwei Annahmen hinsichtlich der Gram-Schmidt-Zerlegung
LLL-reduzierter Basen und des statistischen Verhaltens der Koordinaten von Gitter-
punkten bezüglich dieser Gram-Schmidt-Zerlegung. Aus algorithmischer Sicht kommt
dabei der sog. Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) besondere Bedeutung zu. In der
Praxis können wir bestenfalls erwarten, dass LLL-reduzierte Basen diesen Annahmen
in einem approximativen Sinne entsprechen, was Fragen hinsichtlich der Praktikabi-
lität von RSR aufwirft.
Wir geben in Kapitel 2 eine hinreichende Bedingung an, die leicht numerisch über-
prüft werden kann und die garantiert, dass Schnorrs Analyse für eine Gitterbasis
v
Zusammenfassung
zutrifft, auch wenn diese (GSA) nicht exakt erfüllt. Wir zeigen aber auch, dass schon
wenige RSR-Iterationen die (GSA)-Eigenschaft dermaßen stören, dass wir die von
Schnorr gefolgerten asymptotischen Verbesserungen in der Praxis nicht erwarten kön-
nen.
Trotz alledem ist es möglich, RSR so zu modifizieren, dass der Algorithmus auch
dann wohldefiniert ist, wenn Schnorrs Annahmen nicht zutreffen. Wir beschreiben in
Kapitel 3 eine derartige Variante und entwickeln zwei Teilalgorithmen, die entschei-
den, ob eine Suche nach kurzen Vektoren in dem jeweiligen Suchraum eine hinreichen-
de Chance auf Erfolg hat. Der erste Algorithmus setzt die in Schnorrs RSR-Analyse
entwickelte Idee algorithmisch um und berechnet eine recht grobe, meist zu pessimis-
tische Abschätzung der Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit. Der zweite, etwas aufwändigere
Algorithmus implementiert eine direkte Auswertung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion
für die Länge der Vektoren im Suchraum, basierend auf dem Faltungssatz, und ergibt
genauere Abschätzungen. Ferner stellen wir zwei Varianten der Sampling-Reduktion
vor, die zum einen darauf abzielen, die in der Sampling-Phase gefundenen Vektoren
unterdurchschnittlicher Länge auszunutzen, und die zum anderen der Störung der
(GSA)-Eigenschaft bzw. deren Konsequenzen gegensteuern.
Quantencomputer werden – wenn sie denn eines Tages zur Verfügung stehen wer-
den – in der Lage sein, Objekte, die ein gegebenes Prädikat erfüllen, in ungeordneten
Mengen mit sublinearem Aufwand zu finden. Wir machen uns dies in Kapitel 4 zu
Nutze, um eine Quanten-Sampling-Reduktion zu entwickeln, die im Vergleich zur
klassischen Variante asymptotisch um eine Quadratwurzel schneller ist.
Die experimentelle Auswertung der verschiedenen Algorithmen zur Sampling-Re-
duktion machte ein Werkzeug erforderlich, das die rasche Implementierung verschie-
dener algorithmischer Varianten ermöglicht und eine geeignete Testumgebung zur
Verfügung stellt. Wir beschreiben in Kapitel 5 das C++-Framework LaRed und die
dazugehörige Softwarebibliothek, die wir zu diesem Zweck entwickelten. Wir stellen
auch deren Anbindung an die Skriptsprache Python vor, mit deren Hilfe die inter-
aktive Kontrolle der Experimente bis hin zu Modifikationen der Algorithmen zur
Laufzeit möglich werden.
Wir schließen die Dissertation in Kapitel 6 mit Berichten über das Verhalten von
Sampling-Reduktion bei der Anwendung auf Gitterbasen ab, die sich aus kryptogra-
phischen Anwendungen ergeben: Öffentliche Schlüssel aus Micciancios Variante des
GGH Kryproverfahrens, NTRU-Gitter sowie Knapsack-Gitter. Wir stellten bei unse-
ren Experimenten fest, dass Sampling-Reduktion ermöglicht, einen deutlich kleineren
BKZ-Parameter zu wählen als bei ausschließlicher Reduktion mit BKZ. Zwar war die
Gesamtlaufzeit der Reduktion trotz des kleineren BKZ-Parameters häufig länger als
bei alleiniger Anwendung von BKZ, aber der Großteil dieser Rechenzeit wurde auf
das Sampling verwandt. Weil dieses ohne weiteres auf zahlreiche Knoten in einem
Netzwerk aus günstiger Hardware verteilt werden kann, scheint Sampling-Reduktion
einem Angreifer dennoch einen Vorteil zu bieten.
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This thesis studies the impact of sampling on lattice basis reduction and its appli-
cations, advancing on the Random Sampling Reduction (RSR) algorithm proposed
by Schnorr [Sch03], and introduces a framework for lattice reduction by sampling
algorithms.
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rn. Lattice basis reduction aims to efficiently
compute lattice bases that consist of vectors as short as possible. This algorithmic
problem goes back to Lagrange and Gauß in the context of the theory of quadratic
forms. When the polynomial LLL algorithm [LLL82] became available, lattice reduc-
tion stopped being a topic for specialists in number theory only; it was soon applied
in integer linear programming, coding theory, and cryptography.
The most important problems in lattice theory are NP-hard; the solutions com-
puted by LLL are only approximations up to an exponential factor. Over the last
twenty years, many algorithms were proposed that advance on LLL, trading better
approximations for longer computing times. The most important one is the BKZ
algorithm [Sch87, SE94] that improves the exponent of the approximation factor by
1/k for some user defined parameter k at the cost of additional worst case runtime
super-exponential in k.
Recently, Schnorr [Sch03] proposed RSR, a new lattice reduction technique that
combines LLL-like algorithms with the exhaustive search of a set of lattice points
that is likely to contain short vectors. He concluded that his new algorithm improves
on the previous most efficient algorithm by a fourth root. However, RSR depends
on two assumptions on the Gram-Schmidt decomposition of LLL reduced bases and
the coordinates of lattice points with respect to these Gram-Schmidt decompositions
where, from an algorithmic point of view, the so called Geometric Series Assumption
(GSA) is particularly crucial. In practice, we can, at best, expect LLL reduced lattice
bases to satisfy these assumptions in an approximate sense, casting doubt on the
practicality of RSR.
We give in Chapter 2 a sufficient condition that can be numerically evaluated and
that guarantees a lattice basis approximates (GSA) well enough for Schnorr’s analysis
to be valid. We show that, even if the input basis comes sufficiently close to (GSA),
few iterations of Sampling Reduction will disrupt this property, whence we cannot
expect Sampling Reduction to achieve in practice the asymptotic improvement that
follows under Schnorr’s assumptions.
Nevertheless, Sampling Reduction can be modified into a practical algorithm that
is well defined without (GSA). We describe in Chapter 3 such a variant and develop
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two subalgorithms that determine whether it is sufficiently likely that the sampling’s
search space contains a short vector. The first one implements the approach Schnorr
took in his analysis of RSR and gives a quite rough estimate of the probability.
The second, algorithmically more complex one is based on a more direct evaluation
of the probability function of the length of the sampled vectors by means of the
convolution theorem and gives a more accurate estimate. We propose two further
Sampling Reduction algorithms that aim to take advantage of the relatively short
vectors found while sampling and that allow, to some degree, to work around the
disruption of the (GSA) property.
If quantum computers become available, they will be able to search unordered sets
in sublinear time, unlike classical computers. We use this in Chapter 4 to develop
a Quantum Sampling Reduction that, asymptotically, speeds the classical reduction
up by a square root.
The empirical analysis of Sampling Reduction algorithms required a tool that eases
the implementation of various algorithmic variants and provides a testbed. We de-
scribe in Chapter 5 the C++ framework LaRed and its accompanying library we
developed for this purpose as well as its binding to the scripting language Python
that allows the interactive control of reductions and even the modification of parts
of the algorithms at runtime.
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 6 with reports on the performance of our Sam-
pling Reduction algorithms if applied to lattice basess that stem from cryptographic
applications: Public keys in Micciancio’s variant of the GGH crypto-scheme, NTRU
lattices, and knapsack lattices. We found that the BKZ parameter required for these
applications is significantly smaller with Sampling Reduction than with BKZ alone.
Even though the total runtime of Sampling Reduction was often longer than with
BKZ, most of it was spent on sampling. Since sampling can easily be distributed,
Sampling Reduction is nevertheless likely to offer an attacker an advantage.
viii
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
This thesis studies the impact of sampling on lattice basis reduction and its appli-
cations, advancing on the Random Sampling Reduction (RSR) algorithm proposed
by Schnorr [Sch03], and introduces a framework for lattice reduction by sampling
algorithms.
In this chapter we describe the topic of lattice basis reduction, report previous
results, and introduce the notation and mathematical preliminaries used in this thesis.
In Chapter 2 we outline Schnorr’s algorithm RSR and its analysis. We discuss how
two assumptions that Schnorr made affect the practicability of RSR. We develop in
Chapter 3 variants of Sampling Reduction that are well defined and feasible even
if Schnorr’s assumptions do not hold. For this we propose strategies to estimate
the probability to find a sufficiently short lattice vector in a given sample space and
evaluate modifications of the basic algorithm that aim to overcome the effects that
often make Sampling Reduction stall after few iterations. We propose in Chapter 4
a quantum algorithm variant of Sampling Reduction based on Grovers quantum
search algorithm that asymptotically gives a speed up. In Chapter 5 we describe a
framework that was developed to aid the implementation of and experimenting with
various Sampling Reduction Algorithms, both in batch-mode and in an interactive
setting. We finally show in Chapter 6 how Sampling Reduction performs in some
cryptographic applications.
1.1. Notation
Unless we explicitly say otherwise, we use the following conventions and notations.
The symbols N,Z,Q,R,C denote the set of natural, integral, rational, real, and
complex numbers, respectively, where we consider 0 ∈ N. If A is any real set, then
A+ := { a ∈ A a > 0 }. b·c stands for “rounding down”, i. e.,
bxc := max{n ∈ Z n ≤ x }
for x ∈ R. Similarly, d·e means “rounding up”
dxe := min{n ∈ Z n ≥ x }
and dxc := dx− 0.5e is rounding to the closest integer.
1
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Mn :=M ×· · ·×M is the n-fold cartesian product of the set M with itself. Rm×n
is the set of matrices A = (ai,j) over the ring R with row index i ∈ { 1, . . . ,m } and
column index j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }. Matrices operate on vectors by left multiplication,
i. e., we view vectors v ∈ Rn as column vectors. [v1, . . . ,vn] is the matrix in Rm×n
with columns v1, . . . ,vn ∈ Rm. Transposition of vectors and matrices is denoted by
a superscript t.
For any complex number z = x + ıy, its complex conjugate is z := x − ıy. The
complex vector space Cn carries the euclidean metric, i. e., the scalar product
〈x,y〉 = xty =
n∑
j=1
xjyj for x = (x1, . . . , xn)t,y = (y1, . . . , yn)t ∈ Cn
and the corresponding euclidean norm ‖x‖ = 〈x,x〉1/2. The metric on Zn, Qn, Rn,
and their subsets is induced by their embedding in Cn.
Let V ⊆ Cn be an R-module, R ∈ {Z,Q,R,C }, and letW ⊆ V be a subset. Then
linRW = { r1w1 + · · ·+ rkwk k ∈ N, rj ∈ R,wj ∈W } is the R-module spanned by
W . The orthogonal space of W is W⊥ = {v ∈ V 〈v,w〉 = 0 for all w ∈W }.
C(R) is the set of continuous functions on R, C1(R) is the set of continously
differentiable functions and so forth.
We describe the asymptotic behavior of real valued functions f, g by the Landau
notation: f ∈ O(g) means g is an asymptotic upper bound for f (in other words,
lim supn→∞ |f(n)/g(n)| is finite). If g grows faster than f (i. e., limn→∞ |f(n)/g(n)| =
0), then we write f ∈ o(g). f ∈ Θ(g) implies that f and g show the same asymptotic
behavior (i. e., f ∈ O(g) and g ∈ O(f)). And finally, f ∈ Ω(g) if and only if g is an
asymptotic lower bound for f (i. e., lim infn→∞ |f(n)/g(n)| > 0).
1.2. Preliminaries and Previous Work
Below we define lattices and state some elementary facts about them. We introduce
some classical lattice problems and mention previous work in the context of lattice
basis reduction. For proofs and further details we refer to, e. g., [MG02].
Definition 1. A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rd, d ∈ N. L is called
integral if and only if L ⊆ Zd.
Lattices turn out to be free unitary Z-modules of finite rank, i. e., for any lattice L
there is a Z-linearly independent set B = {b1, . . . ,bn }, n ∈ N, such that L = linZB
and the cardinality of any such set is invariant. Since L is discrete, B is necessarily
R-linearly independent as well.
Definition 2. Let L ⊂ Rd be a lattice. B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n is an ordered basis
of L = L(B) if and only if {b1, . . . ,bn } is R-linearly independent and spans the
Z-module L. n is then called the dimension of L. If n = d, then L is said to be fully
dimensional.
2
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We consider ordered bases of lattices only whence we drop in the following the
adjunct “ordered”. Clearly, a matrix B ∈ Rd×n is a lattice basis if and only if B has
full column rank.
Lemma 1. Two lattice bases B,B′ ∈ Rd×n generate the same lattice if and only if
there is a unimodular matrix U ∈ Zn×n (i. e., det(U) = ±1) such that B′ = BU.
Definition 3. Let L be a lattice with basis B ∈ Rd×n. The determinant of L is
det(L) := |det(BtB)|1/2.
The determinant is a lattice invariant by Lemma 1. If L is fully dimensional,
then det(L) = |det(B)|. Therefore, det(L) can be interpreted as the volume of the
parallelepiped spanned by the columns of B:
det(L) = Vol({Bx x ∈ [0, 1)n })
Definition 4. Let B ∈ Rd×n be a basis of the lattice L. The orthogonality defect of
B is defined by
odef(B) =
∏n
j=1 ‖bj‖
det(L)
.
We have odef(B) ≥ 1 for any lattice basis B with equality if and only if the columns
of B are pairwise orthogonal.
Definition 5. Let L be an n-dimensional lattice and j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }. The real number
λj(L) := min{max{ ‖v1‖, . . . , ‖vj‖ } {v1, . . . ,vj } ⊂ L linearly independent }
is named the jth successive minimum of L.
In particular, λ1(L) is the euclidean length of the shortest nontrivial vectors in
L. That poses the question how to construct such vectors. In computational lat-
tice theory, we need to represent the lattice bases in finite space and the runtime of
our algorithms is a function of the input basis size. In the following, we will there-
fore mostly consider integral lattices. The results can be carried over to lattices in
Qd by scaling with the least common denominator. Irrational lattices need to be
approximated [Buc94].
Problem 1 (Approximate Shortest Vector Problem, α-SVP). Let α ≥ 1.
Given a basis B ∈ Zd×n of the lattice L = L(B), find a lattice vector v ∈ L with
‖v‖ ≤ αλ1(B).
It was not long ago that 1-SVP was proved to be NP-hard under randomized reduc-
tions [Ajt98]. In fact, even the approximate α-SVP for α <
√
2 is NP-hard [Mic01c].
On the other hand, α-SVP cannot be NP-hard anymore for α ∈ Ω(√n/ log n) un-
less the complexity class NP is contained in coAM, which is believed to be unlikely
[GG00].
In contrast to the α-SVP, that asks for a single short vector only, the Quasi Or-
thogonal Basis Problem is to find a basis of overall minimal length:
3
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Problem 2 (Approximate Quasi Orthogonal Basis Problem, α-QOB). Let
α ≥ 1. Given a basis B ∈ Zd×n of the lattice L = L(B), find a basis B′ =
[b′1, . . . ,b′n] ∈ Zd×n of L such that
n∏
j=1
‖b′j‖ ≤ αmin
{∏n
j=1 ‖aj‖ [a1, . . . ,an] is a basis of L
}
or, equivalently, odef(B′) ≤ αmin{ odef(A) A is a basis of L }.
QOB is sometimes named Smallest Basis Problem. Other authors refer by the
Smallest Basis Problem to the task to minimize max{ ‖b1‖, . . . , ‖bn‖ } (e. g., [NS01])
whence we avoid this name. QOB is mentioned in the literature (e. g., [GGH97]), but
we are not aware of published complexity results. Wetzel [Wet98] states that 1-QOB
is NP-hard according to an unpublished result by Lovász.
The NP-hardness of 1-SVP had been conjectured for some time since the related
Closest Vector Problem was already known to be NP-hard [EB81].
Problem 3 (Approximate Closest Vector Problem, α-CVP). Let α ≥ 1.
Given a basis B ∈ Zd×n of the lattice L = L(B) and x ∈ Zd, find a lattice vector
v ∈ L subject to ‖v − x‖ ≤ αmin{ ‖w − x‖ w ∈ L }.
α-CVP stays NP-hard if α ≤ nc/ log logn for some c > 0 [ABSS97, DKRS03].
If we refer to SVP, QOB, or CVP unqualified, then we mean the non-approximate
problem with α = 1, respectively. The complexity results mentioned above are
about worst-case complexity. In fact, the hardness of α-SVP strongly depends on the
available basis. In practice, the same holds for α-CVP despite a result by Micciancio
that arbitrary preprocessing of the lattice basis does not change the NP-hardness
of CVP [Mic01a]. This gives rise to so called lattice basis reduction that aims to
compute “good” bases. In general, the shorter and the less skewed the base vectors,
the better is the basis.
Theorem 2. Let B ∈ Rd×n be a lattice basis. The decomposition B = BˆR of B into
a matrix Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn] ∈ Rd×n with pairwise orthogonal columns and a unit upper
triangular matrix R = (ri,j) ∈ Rn×n can be efficiently computed by the Gram-Schmidt
method:
bˆ1 = b1
bˆj = bj −
j−1∑
l=1
rl,jbˆl for 1 < j ≤ n
rl,j =
〈bˆl,bj〉
‖bˆl‖2
for 1 ≤ l < j ≤ n
For numerical reasons, QR algorithms based on Householder or fast Givens rota-
tions [GL96] are preferred in practice, but they result in the same decomposition.
Lattice basis reduction exploits two properties of the Gram-Schmidt decomposition:
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Lemma 3. Let B ∈ Rd×n a basis of the lattice L with Gram-Schmidt decomposition
B = BˆR, Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn]. Then
det(L) =
n∏
j=1
‖bˆj‖ and λ1(L) ≥ min{ ‖bˆ1‖, . . . , ‖bˆn‖ } .
The first lattice basis reduction algorithm goes back to Gauss [Gau01]. His reduc-
tion algorithm solves the SVP in 2-dimensional lattices. Algorithmic lattice theory
attracted interest again when Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász proposed their renowned
LLL algorithm [LLL82].
Definition 6. Let B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis with Gram-Schmidt
decomposition B = BˆR, Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn], R = (ri,j), and let δ ∈ (1/4, 1]. B is said to
be δ-LLL-reduced if and only if
|ri,j | ≤ 1/2 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and
‖bˆj+1‖2 ≥ (δ − r2j,j+1)‖bˆj‖2 for 1 ≤ j < n.
If log2 ‖bj‖ ∈ O(n) for all input basis vectors bj , then the LLL algorithm returns in
O(dn4) arithmetic steps a δ-LLL-reduced basis provided 1/4 < δ < 1. These arithmetic
steps are performed on integers of bit length O(n2). The following theorem shows
that the LLL algorithm computes approximate solutions to the SVP and QOB.
Theorem 4. Let δ ∈ (1/4, 1] and let B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n be a δ-LLL-reduced
basis of the lattice L with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR, Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn].
Set α = (δ − 1/4)−1. Then
‖b1‖ ≤ α(n−1)/4 det(L)1/n
n∏
l=1
‖bl‖ ≤ αn(n−1)/4 det(L)
and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n,
‖bi‖ ≤ α(j−1)/2‖bˆj‖ α(1−i)/2λi(L) ≤ ‖bi‖ ≤ α(n−1)/2λi(L) .
The LLL algorithm operates on the rational numbers ‖bˆj‖2 and ri,j . In practice,
these operations are expensive in exact arithmetic, whence one uses almost always
a variant due to Schnorr and Euchner [SE94] that operates on floating point num-
bers but avoids excessive floating point errors, reducing the cost of LLL to O(dn4)
arithmetic steps on integers of bit length O(n).
Wetzel proposed several algorithmic variants of LLL like iterative or modular re-
ductions and described their empirical behavior in [Wet98]. There are also parallel
reduction algorithms in, e. g., [Hec95, Wet98]. They are mostly for machines where
the computing nodes share their memory or are at least tightly coupled by a com-
munication network.
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Definition 7. Let B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n be a basis of the lattice L with Gram-
Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR, Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn]. For j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } set
Pj = [bˆ1/‖bˆ1‖, . . . , bˆj−1/‖bˆj−1‖] ∈ Rd×(j−1) .
Then
pij : Rd → Rd : x 7→ x− PjPtjx
is the orthogonal projection onto the orthogonal space Wj := {b1, . . . ,bj−1 }⊥. We
denote the projection of L onto Wj by Lj(B) := {pij(v) v ∈ L }.
Note that pij depends on the basis of L and that pi1 is the identity. Lj(B) is also a
lattice.
Definition 8. A lattice basis B ∈ Rd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR,
Bˆ = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn], R = (ri,j), is called Korkine-Zolotarev reduced if and only if
|ri,j | ≤ 1/2 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and
‖bˆj‖ = λ1(Lj(B)) for 1 ≤ j < n.
Clearly, the first vector in a Korkine-Zolotarev reduced basis is a solution to the
SVP in the generated lattice. But the remaining base vectors are also very short:
Theorem 5. Let B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n be a Korkine-Zolotarev reduced basis of
the lattice L. Then, for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n },
4
3 + j
λj(L)2 ≤ ‖bj‖2 ≤ 3 + j4 λj(L)
2 .
There are algorithms to compute Korkine-Zolotarev reduced bases [Kan83, Kan87,
LLS90], but their runtime is exponential in the lattice dimension n. Therefore,
Schnorr proposed a parameterized notion of reducedness that forms a hierarchy with
Korkine-Zolotarev at one and LLL at the other end and analyzed the approximation
factor guaranteed by this reduction [Sch87, Sch94].
Definition 9. A lattice basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rd×n is called block Korkine-
Zolotarev reduced with block size β ∈ { 2, . . . , n } (or, short, β-BKZ reduced) if
and only if Bj = [pij(bj), . . . , pij(bmin{ j+β−1,n })] is Korkine-Zolotarev reduced for
all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }.
Theorem 6. Let B ∈ Rd×n be a β-BKZ reduced basis of the lattice L, β ∈ { 2, . . . , n }
and γβ := sup{λ1(L′)2/det(L′)2/β L′ is a β-dimensional lattice } the βth Hermite
constant. Then B is also 1-LLL reduced and, for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n },
‖bj‖2 ≤ γ2(n−1)/(β−1)β
3 + j
4
λj(L)2 ≤
(
2
3
β
)2(n−1)/(β−1) 3 + j
4
λj(L)2 .
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Schnorr gives in [Sch87] a (semi) 2k-reduction that computes, for a fully dimen-
sional lattice, in O(n3kk+o(k) + n4) time an (almost) 2k-BKZ reduced basis. In prac-
tice, however, one uses the (δ, β)-BKZ reduction proposed by Schnorr and Euchner
[SE94] that relaxes the reduction such that δ‖bˆj‖2 ≤ λ1(pij(L(bj , . . . ,bmin{ j+β−1,n }))
for δ ∈ (1/4, 1). There is no proven polynomial time bound for (δ, β)-BKZ, but in prac-
tice its worst-case runtime seems to be similar to 2k-reduction.
The nearest plane algorithm by Babai [Bab86] computes in polynomial time a so-
lution to 2n/2-CVP if used with LLL. The approximation can be improved if the algo-
rithm is used in combination with Schnorr’s algorithms for BKZ reduction. [AEVZ02]
contains a survey on algorithms for solving CVP.
Koy and Schnorr extended Schnorr’s hierarchy below LLL by (strong) segment-LLL
[KS01a, KS01b, KS02]. Strong segment-LLL achieves the same SVP approximation
factor as LLL but runs in only O(n3 log n) arithmetic steps.
Another LLL-type reduction is Koy’s primal-dual reduction [Koy04] that achieves
the SVP approximation factor (k/6)n/k in O(n3kk/2+o(k) + n4) time.
Ajtai, Kumar, and Sivakumar [AKS01] developed a sieve method to solve SVP
that runs in 2O(n) time. Unfortunately, their algorithm is not practical since the
O-constant is about 30.
Schnorr [Sch03] proposed a lattice basis reduction named Random Sampling Re-
duction (RSR) that iteratively combines LLL with an exhaustive search to approx-
imate SVP up to (k/6)n/2k. He concludes that his method speeds up the fastest
previous reduction by a fourth root; however, his algorithm and analysis rely on two
assumptions. We will discuss in the following chapters how RSR can be turned into
a practical algorithm even though the two assumptions do not necessarily hold.
Schnorr also proposes variations of RSR that exploit the birthday paradox to speed
up the search for a short vector. Since the space needed for these variants is expo-
nential in the sampling parameter k, they seem not practical, though.
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Chapter 2.
Schnorr’s Random Sampling Reduction
In 2003, Schnorr [Sch03] proposed a novel Random Sampling Reduction (RSR) al-
gorithm. RSR repeatedly samples lattice points from a set of likely short candidate
vectors and subsequently LLL reduces the generating system formed by the previous
basis and a sampled short vector. Schnorr analyzed the runtime and the approx-
imation factor of RSR and concluded under two additional assumptions that RSR
outperforms all previous algorithms by a fourth root.
In the following, we state the algorithm, explain the assumptions required by RSR,
and describe the set of candidate vectors. After the groundwork is laid, we can give
an analysis of RSR in Sect. 2.5 that results in slightly stricter bounds and is more
detailed than [Sch03]. In practice, we cannot expect the input lattice bases to strictly
support the assumptions (GSA) and (RA) that the analysis is based on and that are
stated in Sect. 2.2 and 2.4. We discuss in Sect. 2.6 the impact these assumptions have
on RSR in practice and give a sufficient, easily verifiable condition that can replace
(GSA) in Schnorr’s analysis.
2.1. The RSR Algorithm
Schnorr’s Random Sampling Reduction algorithm RSR is given in Alg. 1 on the fol-
lowing page. Note that the correctness of the algorithm as stated requires both
the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA, Sect. 2.2) and the Randomness Assumption
(RA, Sect. 2.4). Here we sketch how the algorithm works; a more detailed analysis
is deferred to Sect. 2.5.
RSR operates exclusively on LLL reduced bases. In practice, one will most likely
prefer the stronger BKZ reduction to LLL. But there is no guaranteed runtime bound
for BKZ whence the analysis assumes that the initial basis reduction and every update
is done with LLL.
The algorithm takes advantage of two facts: LLL needs to compute the Gram-
Schmidt coefficient matrix R of the reduced basis anyway, so we can output it just
as well. Second, it is straightforward to modify the original LLL algorithm in such a
way that the input can be any finite generating system of the lattice. The algorithm
detects linear dependencies and removes the corresponding vectors from the system.
Therefore, the output of LLL is a basis even if the input generating system is linear
dependent.
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Algorithm 1 RSR
Input: • basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n of lattice L
• RSR parameter k such that 24 ≤ k and 3k + k ln k ≤ n
• LLL parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1)
Output: basis B′ of L such that ‖b′1‖ ≤ (k/6)(n−1)/2kλ1(L)
procedure RSR(B, k, δ)
(B, b,R)← LLL(B, δ) /∗ B = BˆR, b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∗/
while ‖bˆn‖2 < (6/k)n/k‖b1‖2 do
u←
⌈
k(k−1)
4 log2(1/qB)
⌉
+ 1
repeat
v← Sample(B,R, x) for x ∈R { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 }
until ‖v‖2 < 0.99‖b1‖2
(B, b,R)← LLL([v,b1, . . . ,bn], δ)
end while
end procedure
RSR consists of two nested loops: The inner loop samples random lattice vectors v
until v is strictly shorter than the first base vector b1. The samples are taken from
a search space specified in Sect. 2.3. Each call of the Sample algorithm takes O(n2)
time. Schnorr’s analysis shows that the chance to find such a vector within at most
2u iterations is at least 1/2 if qB ≤ (6/k)1/k. The value qB is a property of the basis
B defined by (GSA). Thus the inner loop will run for expected O(n2(6/k)k/4) time.
The outer loop prepends the short vector v to the basis and LLL reduces that
generating system. Such an LLL update can be done in O(n3) time. LLL never
replaces the first vector with a longer one, therefore ‖b1‖2 is reduced in every outer
loop iteration at least by the factor 0.99. Since LLL guarantees λ1(L)2 ≤ ‖b1‖2 ≤
(δ − 1/4)−(n−1)λ1(L)2, there can be at most O(n) outer loop iterations.
In summary, RSR computes a basis B of L such that ‖b1‖ ≤ (k/6)n/2kλ1(L) in
expected O(n3(k/6)k/4 + n4) time.
2.2. The Geometric Series Assumption
We define the Geometric Series Assumption that constrains the lengths ‖bˆj‖ of the
orthogonalized base vectors of an LLL reduced basis and we discuss its motivation.
Recall that LLL enforces
‖bˆj‖2 ≥ (δ − 1/4)‖bˆj−1‖2
for all 1 < j ≤ n and, in consequence,
‖bˆj‖2 ≥ (δ − 1/4)j−1‖b1‖2 .
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I. e., the lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors of an LLL reduced basis are bounded
from below by a geometric sequence. The same holds for BKZ reduced bases – every
BKZ reduced basis is also LLL reduced, after all. In general, one obtains stricter
bounds for BKZ reduced bases, though.
Note, these are lower bounds only. LLL does not enforce that (‖bˆj‖2)j is indeed a
geometric sequence. A simple counterexample is the LLL reduced basis
1 0 . . . 0
0 2 . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 . . . n
 . (2.1)
However, if one LLL or BKZ reduces random lattice bases (for some fuzzy definition
of “random”) then one observes in practice that the lengths of the Gram-Schmidt
vectors bˆj of the output basis in fact resemble a geometric sequence (‖bˆj‖2)j ≈
(qj−1‖b1‖2)j for some q ∈ [0, 1]. (See, for instance, the top graph in Diagram (a)
of Fig. 3.2 on page 28.) Ajtai – who constructs worst-case instances for Schnorr’s
2k algorithm that have this property – supports this observation based on heuristic
arguments [Ajt03].
The Geometric Series Assumption states that this outcome is to be expected from
the LLL or BKZ reduction of any lattice basis.
Assumption 1 (Geometric Series Assumption (GSA)). Let B ∈ Zd×n be an
LLL reduced lattice basis. Then there is qB ∈ [0, 1] such that ‖bˆj‖2 = qj−1B ‖b1‖2 for
all j = 1, . . . , n.
Under (GSA), qB is uniquely determined by the lattice basis B. We therefore call
qB the GSA coefficient of B.
2.3. The Candidate Set
Here we define the subset of L(B) where RSR samples vectors from and describe the
algorithm that is used to generate the samples.
Let v = Bx ∈ L(B) be a point in the lattice generated by the basis B ∈ Zd×n with
Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR. We can represent v in terms of the vector
space basis Bˆ as well, namely v = Bˆν with ν = (ν1, . . . , νn)t = Rx ∈ Qn. The bˆj are
pairwise orthogonal whence
‖v‖2 =
n∑
j=1
ν2j ‖bˆj‖2 . (2.2)
RSR attempts to find short lattice vectors by sampling elements of a candidate
set S ⊂ L(B). It is obvious from equation (2.2) that for a lattice vector to be short
the |νj | need to be as small as possible. However, the orthogonalized base vectors
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contribute to the overall length to different degrees; the smaller ‖bˆj‖ the more leeway
there is for νj .
If B is LLL reduced, then under (GSA) the last orthogonalized base vectors are also
the shortest ones. It is therefore plausible to assume that a vector v =
∑n
j=1 νjbˆj
such that
νj ∈

(−1/2, 1/2] if 1 ≤ j < n− u,
(−1, 1] if n− u ≤ j < n,
{ 1 } if j = n.
(2.3)
for all j = 1, . . . , n and some 1 ≤ u ≤ n is likely to be short. Thus, RSR samples
lattice vectors from the set
Su,B := {v ∈ L(B) v =
n∑
j=1
νjbˆj and all νj subject to (2.3) } (2.4)
where the parameter u is fixed in every outer loop iteration of RSR depending on qB
and the RSR parameter k. We will determine the actual probability that a vector in
Su,B is sufficiently short in Sect. 2.5.
The Gram-Schmidt coefficient matrix R of B is unit upper triangular. That enables
us to efficiently enumerate Su,B by the algorithm Sample, Alg. 2 on the facing page.
Sample is almost the same as Schnorr’s algorithm SA except that the random coin
toss in the latter is replaced by the binary digits of the integer input argument x.
Proposition 7. Let B ∈ Zd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR and u ∈
{ 1, . . . , n }. Then Sample(B,R, x) ∈ Su,B for any x ∈ { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 }.
Proof. In the algorithm, v is initialized with bn ∈ L(B). It is updated in the loop
body only where it is replaced by v + ybj ∈ L(B) for some integer y and j ∈
{ 1, . . . , n− 1 }. Therefore, the final return value v is indeed a point in L(B).
We state some of the loop invariants and show that they hold before and after each
loop iteration.
a) 0 ≤ x < 2u−n+j+1: Before the first iteration we have j = n − 1 whence
0 ≤ x < 2u = 2u−(n−j)+1 holds by assumption. In the loop body, x is replaced
by bx/2c, so from this point on 0 ≤ x < 2u−n+j . None of the variables x, u, n,
and j changes until the end of the loop body is reached where j is replaced by
j − 1. Hence, 0 ≤ x < 2u−n+j+1 is part of the loop’s postcondition.
b) v = Bˆν: The algorithm’s precondition B = BˆR implies bj = Bˆrj for all 1 ≤
j ≤ n. Thus, the invariant is satisfied when the execution reaches the loop
since then v = bn and ν = rn. Let v(old) and r(old) be the values of v and
ν, respectively, when the loop body is entered by. Similarly, let v(new) and
r(new) be the respective values at the end of the loop body. Then v(new) =
v(old) + ybj = Bˆr(old) + yBˆrj = Bˆ(r(old) + yrj) = Bˆr(new).
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Algorithm 2 Sample
Input: • unit upper triangular matrix R = [r1, . . . , rn] ∈ Qn×n,
• lattice basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition
B = BˆR,
• x ∈ { 0, . . . , 2n−1 − 1 }
Output: v ∈ L(B)
procedure Sample(B,R, x)
v← bn
ν = (ν1, . . . , νn)t ← rn /∗ νn = 1 ∗/
for j from n− 1 downto 1 do
y ← dνj − 1/2e /∗ −1/2 < νj − y ≤ 1/2 ∗/
if x = 1 mod 2 then
if νj − y ≤ 0 then
y ← y − 1 /∗ 1/2 < νj − y ≤ 1 ∗/
else
y ← y + 1 /∗ −1 < νj − y ≤ −1/2 ∗/
end if
end if
x← bx/2c
v← v − ybj
ν ← ν − yrj /∗ νj ← νj − y ∗/
end for
return v
end procedure
c) νj+1, . . . , νn satisfy (2.3): This invariant holds before the first loop iteration
because then j = n − 1 and νn = 1 due to ν = rn. The first statement in the
loop body sets the integer y such that νj − y ∈ (−1/2, 1/2]. If j < n − u, then
0 ≤ x < 2u−n+j+1 ≤ 2u−n+(n−u−1)+1 = 20 by invariant (a), i. e., x = 0 is even
and y won’t be changed in this iteration anymore. If n−u ≤ j < n, then y may
be incremented or decremented, but always in such a way that νj−y ∈ (−1, 1].
The final assignment ν ← ν − yrj does not change νj+1, . . . , νn since the kth
coefficient of rj is 0 for all j < k ≤ n. νj is replaced by νj − y because the jth
coefficient of rj is 1. Thus, νj , νj+1, . . . , νn satisfy the search space condition
(2.3). Even when the loop variable j is decremented at the end of the loop
body, the invariant still holds.
When the loop terminates we have j = 0, so all ν1, . . . , νn satisfy the search space
condition (2.3) by invariant (c). This means the return value of Sample belongs in
fact to the search space Su,B because v = Bˆν =
∑n
j=1 νjbˆj ∈ L(B) by invariant
(b).
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Proposition 8. Let B ∈ Zd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR.
The function
f : { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 } → Su,B : x 7→ Sample(B,R, x)
is a bĳection. In particular, |Su,B| = 2u.
If the matrix R is given in floating point format, then the computation of the lattice
vector Sample(B,R, x) requires O(n2) integer and floating point operations for any
admissible parameter x.
Proof. Let x, x′ ∈ { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 } and x 6= x′. Let k0 = max{ k ∈ N x = x′
mod 2k }. Say bx/2k0c is even and bx′/2k0c is odd. When computing Sample(B,R, x)
and Sample(B,R, x′), the first k0 iterations of the loop body will be exactly the same,
so νj = ν ′j for n− k0 ≤ j ≤ n. But in the subsequent iteration, x will be even and x′
will be odd. Thus, νn−k0−1 ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] whereas ν ′n−k0−1 ∈ (−1, 1] \ (−1/2, 1/2]. The
remaining iterations will not change the νj computed so far whence Sample(B,R, x) =∑n
j=1 νjbˆj 6=
∑n
j=1 ν
′
jbˆj = Sample(B,R, x′) differ. f is therefore injective.
Let v˜ =
∑n
j=1 ν˜jbˆj ∈ L(B) \ Im f . If ν˜n 6= 1, then v˜ 6∈ Su,B. Otherwise, let k1 =
1+max{ k ∈ N ∃v =∑nj=1 νjbˆj ∈ Im f : ν˜j = νj for j = n− k, . . . , n }, 1 ≤ k1 < n,
and let v ∈ Im f a vector such that the Gram-Schmidt coefficients νn−k1+1, . . . , νn of
v coincide with the corresponding coefficients of v˜. Then ν˜n−k1 = νn−k1 +y for some
integer y 6= 0 because R is unit upper triangular. In particular, ν˜n−k1 6∈ (−1/2, 1/2]
if k1 > u. Similarly, ν˜n−k1 6∈ (−1, 1] if 1 ≤ k1 ≤ u because else one could construct
v′ =
∑n
j=1 ν
′
jbˆj ∈ Im f such that ν˜j = ν ′j for j = n − k1, . . . , n in violation of the
definition of k1. (One only needs to flip the k1th bit in the preimage of v to find
the preimage of v′.) Thus, ν˜n−k1 cannot satisfy the search space condition (2.3) and
v˜ 6∈ Su,B. f is therefore surjective.
Sample performs O(n) loop iterations and each iteration is dominated by an update
of both an integer and a floating point vector of length n. So the total cost of Sample
is O(n2) integer and floating point operations.
2.4. The Randomness Assumption
The analysis of RSR treats the Gram-Schmidt coefficients of the vectors sampled by
Sample as independent uniform random variables. We formally state in this subsec-
tion the underlying assumption and discuss its validity.
Assumption 2 (Randomness Assumption (RA)). Let B ∈ Zd×n with Gram-
Schmidt decomposition B = BˆR. Consider the random functions νj, 1 ≤ j < n,
defined by
∑n
j=1 νjbˆj = Sample(B,R, x) for uniform random x ∈R { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 }.
Then the νj are statistically independent and uniformly distributed random vari-
ables in (−1/2, 1/2] if j < n− u, and in (−1, 1] if n− u ≤ j < n.
It is obvious that (RA) cannot strictly hold: Given B, νn−1 can take only two
values, so it will not pass any uniformity test in the interval (−1, 1]. Similarly, νn−2
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can take at most four values. Once we know νn−1, there are only two values left for
νn−2, so statistical tests will recognize them as not independent. How can (RA) be
justified for the analysis of RSR anyway?
The point is that only the very last νj will fail simple statistical tests. If j < n−u,
then νj can take 2u different values; if only one of the νn−u, . . . , νn−1 changes, then
νj will take a different value. Simple tests cannot tell the νj apart from independent
uniform random variables unless n− j is too small. So (RA) makes sense for νj with
j < n− u.
(RA) is used to estimate the expected length of sampled vectors. The fact that
(RA) does not really hold for νj with j near n might skew the results to some degree.
However, this failure takes place in those base columns that contribute the least
to the overall length because of (2.2) and (GSA). Therefore, the effect is negligible
provided u is not too small, say u ≥ 15.
2.5. Analysis of RSR
In this subsection we present the most important parts of Schnorr’s analysis of RSR.
In particular, we explain why, under (GSA) and (RA), the expected number of inner
loop iterations in RSR is O((k/6)k/4). We also explain in more detail than above why
RSR terminates after O(n) outer loop iterations and why its postcondition is satisfied
as soon as the loop is left.
The inner RSR loop. We estimate the probability that a single sample v, com-
puted by Sample(B,R, x) is short enough to terminate the inner RSR loop. This
enables us to determine the expected number of iterations of the loop.
Theorem 9 (Schnorr). Let k, n ∈ N such that 24 ≤ k and 3k+ 14k log2 k− 13 ≤ n.
Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis subject to (GSA) with GSA coefficient qB ≤
(6/k)1/k. Let v be uniformly sampled from Su,B where u =
⌈
k(k−1)
4 log2(1/qB)
⌉
+ 1.
Under (RA), we have
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 ] ≥ 12
(
6
k
) k−1
4
≥ 1
2
q
k(k−1)
4
B .
The probability, under (RA), that the inner RSR loop terminates after not more than⌈
2(k/6)(k−1)/4
⌉ ≤ 2u iterations is greater than 0.63 > 1/2.
In fact, our statement of Theorem 9 is slightly stronger than [Sch03, Theorem 1].
As it turns out, we can somewhat relax the upper bound on k (that Schnorr states
within his proof) and improve the reduction factor from 0.99 to 0.971. We do not
see practical consequences, though: For large k the expected running time of the
inner loop becomes soon impractical (e. g., if k ≥ 60 then u ≥ 50). And relaxing the
reduction factor to 0.99 does not yield a smaller minimal value for u, at least not
with this approach.
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Figure 2.1.: The event (Sk,r).
: possible range of ν2j for arbitrary v ∈ Su,B.
: possible range of ν2j in case of (Sk,r).
The proof can be summarized as follows: We define an event (Sk,r) and compute
in Lemma 12 the conditional mean value E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,qB) ]. In Lemma 13, the con-
ditional mean value E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ] with f(k) = (6/k)1/k ≥ qB turns out to be
shorter than 0.971‖b1‖2 under the preconditions of Theorem 9. Therefore, by elemen-
tary probability theory, 1/2Pr
[
(Sk,f(k))
]
is a lower bound for the success probability
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 ] of a single sample. From that we conclude by Lemma 14 the
stated lower bound for the number of samples we need in order to push the success
probability to 0.63.
Definition 10. Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis, 1 ≤ u < n, 1 < k < n−u, and
r ∈ [0, 1]. Let v = ∑nj=1 νjbˆj = Sample(B,R, x) for random x ∈R { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 }.
The event (Sk,r) is defined by
ν2j ≤ 14rk−j for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , k }. (Sk,r)
Recall that the definition of the search space Su,B made sure the ν2j are rather
small. I. e., we already know by (2.3) that ν2j ≤ 1/4 if 1 ≤ j ≤ k. If (Sk,r) occurs, then
the first k Gram-Schmidt coefficients of the sampled vector are particularly small
where “particular” is specified by r: The smaller r the smaller are the ν2j . (Sk,r) is
illustrated by Fig. 2.1.
Lemma 10. Let X be a random variable uniformly distributed in (−t, t] ⊂ R. Then
the probability function and mean value of X2 are
Pr
[
X2 ≤ r ] =

0 if r ≤ 0,√
r
t if 0 < r < t2,
1 if t2 ≤ r,
and E
[
X2
]
= 13 t
2 , (2.5)
respectively.
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Proof. Set I = (−t, t] and let λ denominate the Lebesgue measure. The probability
measure σ of the uniformly distributed X is σ(J) = λ(J ∩ I)/λ(I) for any J ⊂ R.
Thus,
Pr
[
X2 ≤ r ] = σ([−√r,√r]) = 2√r
2t
=
√
r
t
for 0 < r < t2 and
E
[
X2
]
=
∫
R
X2 dσ =
1
λ(I)
∫
I
X2 dλ =
1
2t
[
1
3X
3
]t
−t =
1
3 t
2 .
Lemma 11. Let B, k, u, and r as in Def. 10. Then, under (RA),
Pr [ (Sk,r) ] = r
k(k−1)
4 .
Proof. For any uniform random variable X ∈R (−t, t] and bound R ∈ [0, t2], the
probability of X2 ≤ R is √R/t2 by Lemma 10. For j ∈ { 1, . . . , k }, the νj ∈R
(−1/2, 1/2] are uniformly distributed and independent according to (RA). Hence,
Pr [ (Sk,r) ] =
k∏
j=1
Pr
[
ν2j ≤ 14rk−j
]
=
k∏
j=1
r
k−j
2 = r
k(k−1)
4 .
Lemma 12. Let B, qB, n as in Theorem 9 and let k, u ∈ N such that 1 < k <
n− u < n. Then, under (RA),
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,qB) ] = kqk−1B − (k − 1)qkB + 3qn−u−1B + 8qn−1B − 12qnB12(1− qB) ‖b1‖2 .
Proof. According to (RA), the νj are uniformly distributed. Using (GSA), (2.3), and
the definition of (Sk,r), Lemma 10 implies
E
[
ν2j
‖bˆj‖2
‖b1‖2 (Sk,r)
]
=

1
12r
k−jqj−1B if 1 ≤ j < k,
1
12q
j−1
B if k ≤ j < n− u,
1
3q
j−1
B if n− u ≤ j < n,
qn−1B if j = n.
(2.6)
In particular, E
[
ν2j
‖bˆj‖2
‖b1‖2 (Sk,qB)
]
= qk−1B for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , k−1 }. Again by (RA),
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the νj are statistically independent. Therefore,
E
[ ‖v‖2
‖b1‖2 (Sk,qB)
]
=
n∑
j=1
E
[
ν2j
‖bˆj‖2
‖b1‖2 (Sk,qB)
]
=
1
12
k−1∑
j=1
qk−1B +
1
12
n−u−1∑
j=k
qj−1B +
1
3
n−1∑
j=n−u
qj−1B + q
n−1
B
=
(k − 1)qk−1B
12
+
qk−1B − qn−u−1B
12(1− qB) +
qn−u−1B − qn−1B
3(1− qB) + q
n−1
B
=
kqk−1B − (k − 1)qkB + 3qn−u−1B + 8qn−1B − 12qnB
12(1− qB) .
Lemma 13. Let f : R+ → R : x 7→ (6/x)1/x. Under the preconditions of Theorem 9,
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,qB) ] ≤ E [ ‖v‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ] ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2.
Proof. Derivation shows that f has its only global minimum in x = 6e where f(6e) ≈
0.94 and f has no local maximum. Since limx→∞ f(x) = 1, this implies 0.94 < f(x) <
1 for all x ∈ (6,∞).
First, consider the special case qB = f(k). We know 8f(k)n−1 − 12f(k)n < 0
because of 2/3 < f(k). Furthermore, the inequation n − u − 1 ≥ n − 14k log2 k + 13
holds for all k ≥ 24. This implies n− u− 1 ≥ 3k under the theorem’s preconditions
on k. Hence we are left with
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ]
‖b1‖2 ≤
kf(k)k−1 − (k − 1)f(k)k + 3f(k)n−u−1
12(1− f(k))
≤ kf(k)
k−1 − (k − 1)f(k)k + 3f(k)3k
12(1− f(k))
=
1
2f(k)
+
1
2k(1− f(k)) +
54
k3(1− f(k)) .
(2.7)
We already know that f(k) is strictly increasing for k ≥ 24. Again by derivation, we
see that the same holds for k(1− f(k)) and k3(1− f(k)). Therefore, the most right
hand side in (2.7) is strictly decreasing for k ≥ 24. Evaluating in k = 24 yields
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ] ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 .
(Evaluating in k = 23 already yields a value > 0.99‖b1‖2.)
Now consider all admissible qB. Because of (RA), we have the conditional mean
value E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,r) ] = ∑nj=1E [ ν2j ‖bˆj‖2 (Sk,r) ]. According to (2.6), each sum-
mand E
[
ν2j ‖bˆj‖2 (Sk,r)
]
is strictly increasing in both r and qB. Therefore,
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Sk,qB) ] ≤ E [ ‖v‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ] ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2
for all qB ≤ f(k) = (6/k)1/k, k ≥ 24.
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Lemma 14 (Probability Enhancement). Let M be a set, P : M → { 0, 1 } a
predicate on M , and X a random variable on M such that Pr [P(X) = 1 ] > 0. Let
X1, . . . , Xm be independent samples of X.
If m ≥ 1/Pr [P(X) = 1 ], then
Pr [∃j ∈ { 1, . . . ,m } : P(Xj) = 1 ] > 0.63 > 1/2 .
Proof. The function g : (1,∞) → R : x 7→ (1− 1/x)x is strictly increasing and goes
to limx→∞ g(x) = e−1 (e. g., [FK90, §2.2]). Therefore, (1 − 1/x)m < e−1 for all
0 < x ≤ m. In particular,
Pr [∃j ∈ { 1, . . . ,m } : P(Xj) = 1 ] = 1− (1− Pr [P(X) = 1 ])m > 1− e−1 > 0.63
provided m ≥ 1/Pr [P(X) = 1 ].
Now the proof of Schnorr’s theorem regarding the success probability of the sam-
pling loop is merely an application of Lemmata 11, 13, and 14.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let f(k) = (6/k)1/k. If a sampled vector v satisfies (Sk,f(k)),
then we expect (i. e., with probability > 1/2) that ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 by Lemma 13.
The total probability theorem implies
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 ] ≥ Pr [ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.971‖b1‖2 (Sk,f(k)) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 1/2
·Pr [ (Sk,f(k)) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(k)
k(k−1)
4
(2.8)
where the event probability f(k)k(k−1)/4 = (6/k)(k−1)/4 is given by Lemma 11. There-
fore, we need at most
⌈
2(k/6)(k−1)/4
⌉ ≤ 2u iterations of the inner RSR loop in order
to enhance the success probability to more than 0.63 (Lemma 14).
The outer RSR loop. Theorem 9 bounds the expected running time of the inner
RSR loop. The analysis of RSR is completed by a bound on the number of iterations
of the outer loop and a check that the algorithm meets indeed its stated postcondition
when the outer loop is left.
Lemma 15. Let k, δ, B as in the preconditions of Alg. 1. The number of itera-
tions of the outer loop of RSR is O(n). When the outer loop is left, then ‖b1‖ ≤
(k/6)(n−1)/2kλ1(L).
Proof. When the outer loop is entered for the first time, then B is already LLL
reduced and λ1(L)2 ≤ ‖b1‖2 ≤ (δ − 1/4)−(n−1)λ1(L)2. Each iteration prepends a
vector v to the basis such that ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2. The subsequent LLL reduction
never replaces the first vector of the generating system by a longer one. Therefore,
after the jth iteration, λ1(L)2 ≤ ‖b1‖2 ≤ 0.99j(δ − 1/4)−(n−1)λ1(L)2. By the very
definition of λ1(L), the algorithm cannot produce a lattice vector shorter than λ1(L),
so necessarily 0.99j ≥ (δ − 1/4)n−1, i. e., j ∈ O(n).
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For any basis B = BˆR of the lattice L, the lengths of the orthogonalized base
vectors provide a lower bound λ1(L) ≥ minj ‖bˆj‖. (GSA) implies minj=1,...,n ‖bˆj‖ =
‖bˆn‖ = q(n−1)/2B ‖b1‖. Therefore, ‖b1‖ ≤ q−(n−1)/2B λ1(L).
The outer loop is left if and only if ‖bˆn‖2 ≥ (6/k)(n−1)/k‖b1‖2, i. e., if qB ≥
(6/k)1/k. Then ‖b1‖ ≤ q−(n−1)/2B λ1(L) ≤ (k/6)(n−1)/2kλ1(L).
2.6. Problems with RSR in Practice
Schnorr’s RSR makes two assumptions that both do not hold in general. We discuss
below how this affects the practicability of RSR. We prove Lemma 16 that yields a
sufficient condition on the basis B and the parameter q such that 12qk(k−1)/4 is indeed
a lower bound on the success probability of the inner sampling loop. Lemma 16
makes it possible to implement RSR since we now are able to choose a suitable value
for q if the basis B does not strictly satisfy (GSA). We exemplify that – even with
Lemma 16 – RSR requires soon impractically large parameters and needs to terminate
early even though the sampling loop is in fact still likely to find vectors shorter than
b1.
The Randomness Assumption. The RSR algorithm does not explicitly refer to
(RA). The assumption is nevertheless crucial for the total correctness of RSR: By
Theorem 9, the probability is at least 1/2 that the inner loop will terminate within⌈
2q−k(k−1)/4
⌉ ≤ 2u iterations. Under (RA), if the loop does not terminate after that
many iterations, we simply keep sampling lattice points and will eventually find a
sufficiently short vector, due to the law of large numbers.
However, our search space is actually finite. We do not even know for sure that
it contains such a vector we are after. If it does not, then the inner RSR loop is
infinite – RSR as described in [Sch03] can only be partially correct in practice. There
are two approaches to overcome this problem:
a) Abort the algorithm if the search space Su,B is exhausted. This is the most
simple solution that makes the algorithm terminate for any admissible input
but it has a serious drawback: The probability that RSR will terminate regularly
and therefore meet its postcondition is only 2−O(n) if the inner loop aborts after
O(2u) iterations.
b) Extend the search space, e. g., search Su+j,B, j = 1, 2, . . . , once Su,B is ex-
hausted. The proof of Theorem 9 works for larger values of u as well. In fact,
it is only the proof of Lemma 13 that imposes the upper bound u ≤ n− 3k− 1.
Each time we extend the search space there will again be a more than 63%
chance that the loop will find a sufficiently short vector within 2q−k(k−1)/4B
iterations.
If we implement the latter approach, then, in theory, the algorithm will eventu-
ally proceed. In practice, a user can or wants to afford only so many iterations
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whence there has to be a limit after which the algorithms gives up. A reasonable
implementation will therefore combine both approaches.
The Geometric Series Assumption. It is obvious that the lattice bases encoun-
tered in practice do not satisfy (GSA) in the strict sense. The best we can hope
for is that the lengths of their orthogonalized vectors bˆj approximate a geometric
sequence. This raises two questions: How much may the bases deviate from (GSA)
without rendering the analysis in Sect. 2.5 invalid? And how do we compute the
value qB required in the RSR algorithm?
The Lemma 16 below provides a sufficient condition that ensures the inner RSR
loop will succeed under (RA) with probability greater than 1/2 even if B does not
satisfy (GSA). We can also infer from this condition how to compute a suitable value
for qB. However, without (GSA) we need to modify the loop condition of the outer
RSR loop and we can no longer guarantee that ‖b1‖2 ≤ (k/6)(n−1)/2kλ1(L) once the
algorithm terminates.
Under (GSA), Schnorr’s event (Sk,r) restrict those components of the sampled
vector v that contribute most to its length. Without (GSA), we have no a priori
knowledge about the relative lengths of the bˆj . On the other hand, the expected
length of a sampled vector is invariant under any permutation of the first n− u− 1
Gram-Schmidt vectors. We therefore consider a modified event that takes the lengths
of the Gram-Schmidt vectors into account.
Definition 11. Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis, 1 ≤ u < n, 1 < k < n−u, and
r ∈ [0, 1]. Let v = ∑nj=1 νjbˆj = Sample(B,R, x) for random x ∈R { 0, . . . , 2u − 1 }.
The permutation σu,B ∈ Sym(n) sorts the first n − u − 1 Gram-Schmidt vectors by
non-increasing length, i. e.,
‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2 ≥ ‖bˆσu,B(j+1)‖2 for j ∈ { 1, . . . , n− u− 2 },
σu,B(j) = j for j ∈ {n− u, . . . , n }.
(2.9)
The event (Ek,u,r) is defined by
ν2σu,B(j) ≤ 14rk−j for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , k }. (Ek,u,r)
Remark 1. If B is subject to (GSA), then, for any u, σu,B is the trivial permutation
id : j 7→ j and (Ek,u,r) coincides with (Sk,r).
Remark 2. All νj , j ∈ { 1, . . . , n−u−1 } are independent uniform random variables
on (−12 , 12 ] by (RA) and equation (2.3). Therefore, the proof of Lemma 11 still applies
and the event probability
Pr [ (Ek,u,r) ] = r
k(k−1)
4 (2.10)
does not depend on σu,B.
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Definition 12. Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis not necessarily subject to
(GSA), u ∈ { 1, . . . , n }, q ∈ (0, 1), and σu,B as in Def. 11. Using the shorthand
δj = δj(B, q) = ‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2/‖b1‖2 − qj−1, j = 1, . . . , n, and k ∈ { 1, . . . , n − u − 1 }
define the deviation ∆B(k, u, q) of B as
∆B(k, u, q) :=
1
12
k−1∑
j=1
qk−jδj +
1
12
n−u−1∑
j=k
δj +
1
3
n−1∑
j=n−u
δj + δn . (2.11)
The deviation ∆B is not a proper measure how well B approximates a particular
geometric sequence. Since positive and negative δj compensate, ∆B(k, u, q) can be
0 even if (‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2/‖b1‖2)j does not resemble a geometric sequence at all. In
particular, the deviation does not relate to, e. g., the much more intuitive Lq distance,
q ∈ [1,∞], between the sequences (‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2/‖b1‖2)j and (qj−1B )j .
Lemma 16. Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis not necessarily subject to (GSA).
Let k ∈ Z such that 24 ≤ k and 3k + 14k log2 k − 13 ≤ n. For q ∈ (0, 1) set
u = u(k, q) =
⌈
k(k−1)
4 log2 (1/q)
⌉
+ 1.
If there is qB ∈ [0, (6/k)1/k] such that the deviation ∆B(k, u, qB) ≤ 0.019, then,
under (RA),
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 ] ≥ 12q k(k−1)4B
for uniformly sampled v ∈R Su,B.
Proof. We have by (2.3), (Ek,u,qB), and Lemma 10
E
[
ν2σu,B(j)
‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2
‖b1‖2 (Ek,u,qB)
]
=

1
12q
k−j
B (q
j−1
B + δσu,B(j)) if 1 ≤ j < k,
1
12(q
j−1
B + δσu,B(j)) if k ≤ j < n− u,
1
3(q
j−1
B + δσu,B(j)) if n− u ≤ j < n,
qn−1B + δσu,B(n) if j = n.
Set
s(k, qB, n) :=
kqk−1B − (k − 1)qkB + 3qn−u−1B + 8qn−1B − 12qnB
12(1− qB) .
Following the proofs of Lemmata 12 and 13, we find
E
[ ‖v‖2 (Ek,u,qB) ] = (s(k, qB, n) + ∆B(k, u, qB)) ‖b1‖2
≤ (0.971 + ∆B(k, qB))‖b1‖2
≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 .
We can therefore estimate
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 ] ≥ Pr [ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 (Ek,u,qB) ] · Pr [ (Ek,u,qB) ] ≥ 12q k(k−1)4B
by the total probability theorem.
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Figure 2.2.: Typical RSR parameters.
Remark 3. Schnorr asserts in a short remark that his theorems “hold for ap-
proximations where
∑n
i=1 µ
2
i (‖bˆi‖2/‖b1‖2 − qi−1) is sufficiently small for random
µi ∈R [−1/2, 1/2], e. g. smaller than 0.01” [Sch03, p. 5]. Even though his statement
covers the gist of Lemma 16, it is somewhat imprecise. Schnorr ignores that the ef-
fect of any overlength of bˆj on the analysis is different depending on j. Furthermore,
basing the condition on “random” Gram-Schmidt coefficients is somewhat fuzzy. In
contrast, Lemma 16 gives a formula that is based on the – under (RA)– well defined
expected values E
[
ν2j ‖bˆj‖2/‖b1‖2 (Ek,u,qB)
]
, that can easily be evaluated, and that
additionally gives better results since (Ek,u,qB) restricts always those components that
contribute most to length of sampled vectors.
Given the RSR parameter k and the lattice basis B, let qopt ∈ (0, (6/k)1/k] be the
maximum value such that
∆(RSR)B (k, qopt) = min{∆(RSR)B (k, q) q ∈ (0, (6/k)1/k] }
where ∆(RSR)B (k, q) := ∆B(k, u(k, q), q). If we were to implement RSR, then we needed
to iterate the outer RSR loop until ∆(RSR)B (k, qopt) > 0.019.
Note that q 7→ ∆(RSR)B (k, q) is piecewise defined by high degree polynomial func-
tions. Therefore, we do not a priori know that we can find a qopt by numerical
methods. The Simple Sampling Reduction algorithm (SSR) that we will propose in
Sect. 3.1 will avoid that problem.
Ignoring the fact that in general there might arise numerical problems, we stud-
ied which choice of k yields qopt and ∆(RSR)B (k, qopt) subject to the preconditions of
Lemma 16. We considered the bases that were generated in the course of Simple
Sampling Reduction. SSR is similar enough to RSR that this sequence of bases could
also have been generated by RSR. We computed qopt(k,B) by means of the function
scipy.optimize.brute from the Python SciPy library [Sci04].)
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Fig. 2.2 shows the results we obtained for an example in dimension n = 180 that
we will further discuss in Sect. 3.1.2. In our experience, this data is representative.
In diagram (a), kmin – marked by “+” – is the minimum admissible RSR parameter
such that the deviation is sufficiently small, i. e.
kmin = min{ k ∈ { 24, . . . , n } 3k + 14k log2 k − 13 ≤ n and ∆
(RSR)
B (k, qopt) ≤ 0.019 } .
The corresponding values for the estimated search space size u = u(kmin, qopt) and
the deviation ∆(RSR)B (kmin, qopt) are marked by “×” and “4”, respectively. In the
first three iterations, kmin is not larger than 26. Here qopt(kmin,B) ≈ 0.945 yields
deviations not larger than 0.011 and small search space sizes u ≤ 28. But kmin grows
to 35 in the fourth iteration and and to values ≥ 43 after that, qopt(kmin,B) ≈ 0.956 ≈
(6/k)1/k. This implies estimated search space sizes u ≥ 63 which are too large to be
enumerated in practice.
In the seventh iteration and afterwards the minimum deviation was too large for
all admissible k. Its minimum value, marked by “♦” in diagram (a), rises from 0.055
to 0.163 in the tenth iteration. At this point, RSR could not proceed whereas SSR
continued to improve b1.
We have seen in Lemma 16 that we can loosen the (GSA) for the analysis of the
inner loop. However, (GSA) was also instrumental when we computed the approx-
imation factor achieved by RSR. Without (GSA), all we know when the outer loop
terminates is – as always – minj ‖bˆj‖2 ≤ λ1(L)2. We no longer have a relation
between ‖b1‖2 and minj ‖bˆj‖2 that is stricter than what the initial LLL reduction
implies whence we cannot be sure anymore that ‖b1‖2 ≤ (k/6)(n−1)/2kλ1(L).
Finally, diagram (b) in Fig. 2.2 exhibits that – in practice – we cannot base our
reasoning about the sampling reduction’s postcondition w. r. t. the SVP approxima-
tion factor on (GSA). The diagram shows the squared lengths of the Gram-Schmidt
vectors in iterations 1 and 6, sorted according to σu,B. Superimposed are the hypo-
thetical squared lengths ‖b1‖2 · qopt(kmin,B)j−1 that the bases are supposed to ap-
proximate according to (GSA). It is apparent that, in the sixth iteration, minj ‖bˆj‖2
is more than one order of magnitude smaller than estimated by the (GSA) approxi-
mation. According to the (GSA) approximation, we achieved an SVP approximation
factor about 1×108/3×104 ≈ 3×103 whereas the actual data supports only an SVP
approximation factor 1×108/2.5×103 ≈ 4×104.
Thus, we cannot assume that RSR in practice meets the bounds given by the
theoretical analysis under (GSA) and (RA).
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Practical Sampling Reduction
We propose a practical Sampling Reduction algorithm and several generalizations
and describe their empiric behaviors.
3.1. Simple Sampling Reduction
We present the Simple Sampling Reduction algorithm in Sect. 3.1.1. This modifica-
tion of RSR does not refer to the (GSA) coefficient qB and is therefore better suited
to handle bases that do not closely approximate (GSA).
Finally, we give data on an example that exhibits the typical behavior of SSR. It
also demonstrates that we soon encounter bases for which we cannot find a suitable
RSR parameter k and a (GSA) coefficient qB such that we could proceed with RSR.
SSR does proceed, though.
3.1.1. The Simple Sampling Reduction Algorithm
As pointed out in Sect. 2.6, RSR needs to be modified in practice in order to deal
with the finite search space and the (GSA) failure of the lattice bases encountered
in practice. This section describes the Simple Sampling Reduction algorithm (SSR)
that incorporates such changes. SSR uses an subalgorithm Check Search Space Size
(CSSS) that determines whether the success probability of the inner loop is sufficient
to justify a further iteration of the outer loop. Here we use CSSS as a black box; we
discuss strategies for its implementation in the following sections.
The overall structure of the Simple Sample Reduction (Alg. 3 on the next page) is
the same as the structure of RSR: After an initial LLL reduction of the input basis
B the algorithm enters an outer loop. Therein it samples vectors v ∈ Su,B for some
u until v is significantly shorter than b1. Then the generating system formed by
prepending the short vector v to B is LLL reduced again, replacing the basis B.
Looking at the details, however, we see some notable changes which we discuss
below.
Input parameter umax. RSR determines the search space size 2u based on k and
the GSA coefficient qB. As we explained in Sect. 2.6, the probability that Su,B does
not contain any sufficiently short vector is non-negligible. Therefore, in practice we
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Algorithm 3 SSR
Input: • basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n of lattice L
• search space bound umax ∈ N
• LLL parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1)
Output: LLL reduced basis B′ = Bˆ′R′ of L such that
• 0.99‖b′1‖2 < min{ ‖v‖2 v ∈ Sumax,B′ } or
• CSSS((‖bˆ′1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆ′n‖2), umax) = false.
procedure SSR(B, umax, δ)
(B, b,R)← LLL(B, δ) /∗ B = BˆR, b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∗/
while CSSS(b, umax) = true do
for x from 0 to 2umax − 1 do
v← Sample(B,R, x)
if ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 then
break
else if x = 2umax − 1 then
terminate(“no short vector”)
end if
end for
(B, b,R)← LLL([v,b1, . . . ,bn], δ)
end while
terminate(“further progress too unlikely”)
end procedure
may need to expand the search space and sample more vectors than expected. How-
ever, the number of samples a user can or wants to afford is limited. The user specifies
this limit by means of the input parameter umax: SSR gives up and terminates after
an exhaustive search of Sumax,B, i. e., we cap the number of samples at 2umax .
Search space enumeration. The vectors from Su,B are randomly and indepen-
dently sampled in RSR. This is reasonable because the analysis of the inner RSR loop
requires random samples. But it also means that after 2u samples on average less
then 2/3 of the vectors in Su,B were actually considered whereas many vectors were
sampled twice.
Therefore, SSR deterministically enumerates Su,B. Note that Sample(B,R, x) ∈
Su,B for all u > log2 x by Proposition 8. That means SSR searches first Su,B for
small u, then for u + 1, u + 2, and so on until u = umax. If u′ = min{u ∈ N ∃v ∈
Su′,B : ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 } ≤ umax, then SSR will break out of the inner loop after
at most 2u′ samples. In particular, if random sampling finds a short vector then so
will enumeration, and the number of samples required by enumeration is, on average,
even smaller by a factor ≈ 2/3.
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Figure 3.1.: Typical base vector length reduction by SSR.
No explicit RSR parameter k. In RSR, k is used (a) for computing the required
search space size u and (b) in the loop condition of the outer RSR loop, thereby
controlling the approximation factor achieved by RSR. There is no need to compute
u in SSR since the maximum search space size is passed in by the user via umax.
As we will see later, none of the proposed implementations of CSSS make use of the
user defined parameter k. Since we cannot a priori estimate the final approximation
factor without (GSA), k has no impact on the postcondition of SSR. Thus, SSR has
no use for the parameter k any more.
3.1.2. Practical Behavior of SSR
We will study the empirical behavior of SSR and its variant in more detail later on.
Here we only point out on an example what is typical for SSR.
Fig. 3.1 shows the results of SSR applied to a lattice basis in dimension n = 180 that
were obtained as in Micciancio’s variant of the GGH cryptosystem [GGH97, Mic01b].
The original lattice basis O was uniformly chosen from {−180, . . . , 180 }180×180. This
basis was transformed into a basis H = HNF(O) in Hermite normal form. H was
first LLL reduced (initially using software floating point arithmetic) and finally BKZ
reduced with (δ, β) = (0.99, 5) using hardware floating point arithmetic. The squared
lengths of the columns of the resulting basis B are shown in the upper graph of
Fig. 3.1(a). The points in the diagram depict the square lengths in the unpermuted
order of the base vectors, i. e., a point with abscissa j represents ‖bˆj‖2 and τ = id.
The line shows the same data but in non-decreasing order, i. e., here τ is a permutation
such that ‖bˆτ(j)‖2 ≤ ‖bˆτ(j+1)‖2 for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n− 1 }.
The lower graph in Fig. 3.1(a) shows the squared lengths of the vectors of the SSR
output basis B′ after 10 outer loop iterations. The squared length of the shortest
vector in B′ is reduced by a factor ≈ 1/2 compared to the shortest vector in B. The
remaining base vectors also became shorter but less so: the median shrank from
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Figure 3.2.: Typical (GSA) behavior of SSR bases.
3.12×108 to 2.36×108, i. e., by a factor ≈ 3/4. Only the first ten base vectors are
particularly small. It stands out that the variance of the squared lengths became
smaller, in particular if we ignore the first ten base vectors.
We see in Fig. 3.1(b) that most of the reduction happened in the first six iterations
within 48 seconds. The following iterations improved the minimum norm square by
less than 10% each and required several minutes of sampling (at a rate of ≈ 5200
samples per second on a 2.4GHz Intel Pentium 4 machine with 1GByte RAM).
In Fig. 3.2 we see the (GSA) behavior of the lattice basis in the course of SSR.
Diagram (a) shows that the input basis B approximates (GSA) well. However, in-
serting the short vectors found by sampling and re-reducing the generating system
with BKZ, (δ, β) = (0.99, 5) makes only the very first Gram-Schmidt vectors shorter.
In the end, the graph of ‖bˆj‖2 forms a distinct hump around j = 10. But SSR does
not affect the lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆj with, say, j > 20 at all.
The latter phenomenon is even more apparent in diagram (b) that uses a logarith-
mic scale. Here all lengths are normalized with respect to the length of the respective
first base vector b1. Furthermore, the values are permuted by σu,B as defined in (2.9),
i. e., the Gram-Schmidt vectors are essentially sorted in non-increasing length order.
Thus, this diagram shows the quantities that actually determine the success probabil-
ity in the sampling loop. For j > 20, the graphs are more or less parallel. Therefore,
one needs to introduce a correction factor C into (GSA), ‖bˆj‖2 ≈ Cqj−1‖b1‖2, if it
is to describe the reality well.
3.2. Trivial CSSS
The most trivial Check Search Space Size implementation CSSStriv ignores its argu-
ments and always returns true. Choosing this implementation means “no matter how
small the success probability, exhaustively search Sumax,B”.
SSR will then always terminate in the inner loop after sampling in vain 2umax vec-
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tors. This might be a viable strategy for small or moderate umax. But if umax is
chosen such that the runtime of SSR is dominated by the sampling of lattice points
rather than the recurrent LLL reduction and the computing time for sampling 2umax
vectors is already near the limit the user can spend, then waisting 2umax samples
really hurts. In that case a user most likely prefers to keep sampling only if there
is a significant chance to improve the approximation factor. The CSSS implementa-
tions proposed in the following sections base their return value on estimations of the
sampling’s success probability.
3.3. CSSS Following Schnorr’s Approach
As discussed above, Schnorr’s analysis of RSR does no longer apply in general if
we cannot presume (GSA). Nevertheless, we can numerically evaluate all relevant
quantities and therefore estimate at runtime the success probability of a single sample
following the idea of Schnorr. From this we infer an estimate for the minimum search
space size that guarantees an at least 50% chance that a further SSR iteration will
find a shorter vector.
In the following, we first state a formula for the mean of ‖v‖2 taken over all v ∈ Su,B
that satisfy (Ek,u,B). We then describe CSSSevent that is based on the evaluation of
that conditional mean value.
3.3.1. The expected length of v.
Lemma 12 stated a formula for Pr [ (Sk,qB) ] that facilitated the further analysis of
RSR’s inner loop under (GSA). We do not have a similar closed formula if B is not
subject to (GSA). But (RA), equation (2.3), and the definition of (Ek,u,r) yield a for-
mula for the mean squared length of sampled vectors v ∈ Su,B under the precondition
(Ek,u,r). This formula can easily be evaluated numerically:
E(B; k, u, r) :=E
[ ‖v‖2 (Ek,u,r) ]
=
n∑
j=1
E
[
ν2j ‖bˆj‖2 (Ek,u,r)
]
=
n∑
j=1
sj(k, u, r)‖bˆσu,B(j)‖2
(3.1)
where
sj(k, u, r) =

1
12r
k−j if 1 ≤ j < k,
1
12 if k ≤ j < n− u,
1
3 if n− u ≤ j < n,
1 if j = n.
(3.2)
Note that we did not fix the parameters k, u, and r yet. Given B, we can choose
them subject to the preconditions of Def. 11 and u ≤ umax.
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Figure 3.3.: Success Probability Bounds in CSSSevent
3.3.2. The CSSSevent implementation.
In analogy to (2.8), we have
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 ] ≥ 12 Pr [ (Ek,u,r) ] (3.3)
provided E(B; k, u, r) ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2. The CSSSevent algorithm – specified in Alg. 4 –
is built around the function LogSuccessProbBound. Based on (2.10), (3.1) and (3.3),
this function computes a lower bound for log2 Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 ] that depends
– besides the Gram-Schmidt vectors – on the free parameters k and u. To be more
precise, LogSuccessProbBound(`, k, u, ‖b1‖2) determines⌊
max{ log2 12r
k(k−1)
4 r ∈ [0, 1] and E(B; k, u, r) ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 } ∪ {−∞}
⌋
.
Observe that Pr [ (Ek,u,r) ] is strictly increasing in r whence we need to find the max-
imum rmax such that the conditional mean value of ‖v‖2 does not exceed 0.99‖b1‖2.
On the other hand, E(B; k, u, r) is continuous and also strictly increasing in r. There-
fore, rmax is the unique root rmax ∈ [0, 1] of the equation E(B; k, u, r) = 0.99‖b1‖ and,
if it exists, then we can determine this root by, e. g., the textbook Regula Falsi method
[PTVF92]. All that is left for LogSuccessProbBound is to check first for the special
cases max{E(B; k, u, r) r ∈ [0, 1] } ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 as well as min{E(B; k, u, r) r ∈
[0, 1] } ≥ 0.99‖b1‖2 and to compute by (2.10) the actual probability estimate once
rmax is known.
The evaluation of E(B; k, u, r) in ExpLength is straightforward. One has to take
precautions, however, to avoid loss of floating point precision errors because the
largest and the smallest ‖bˆj‖ often differ by several orders of magnitude. Therefore,
one has to accumulate the summands in non-decreasing order.
For reasonable values of umax, say umax ≤ 50, the squared length of the orthogonal-
ized vectors bˆj , n−u ≤ j ≤ n, is typically very small compared to ‖bˆj‖2 for small j.
This is obvious under (GSA), but holds also in practice most of the time. Therefore,
the value of u has not much impact on E(B; k, u, r) and in turn on the result of Log-
SuccessProbBound. Fig. 3.3 exhibits this effect. The two diagrams show the success
30
3.3. CSSS Following Schnorr’s Approach
Algorithm 4 CSSSevent
Input: • b: vector of squared Gram-Schmidt vector lengths
b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) where B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n, n > 3
• umax: log2 of maximum search space size
Output: true if and only if
∃k ∈ { 1, . . . , n− umax − 1 }, u ∈ { 1, . . . , umax }, r ∈ [0, 1] :
E(B; k, u, r) ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 and 2umax ≥ 1/
(
1
2 Pr [ (Ek,u,r) ]
)
procedure ExpLength(`, k, u, r) /∗ ` = (l1, . . . , ln) ∗/
return 112
∑k−1
i=1 r
k−ili + 112
∑n−u−1
i=k li +
1
3
∑n−1
i=n−u li + ln
end procedure
procedure LogSuccessProbBound(`, k, u, ‖b1‖2)
if ExpLength(`, k, u, 1) ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 then
return −1
else if ExpLength(`, k, u, 0) ≥ 0.99‖b1‖2 then
return −∞
end if
rmax ← RegulaFalsi(ExpLength(`, k, u, q) = 0.99‖b1‖2, r ∈ [0, 1])
return bk(k−1)4 log2(rmax)− 1c
end procedure
procedure CSSSevent(b, umax)
for u from umax downto 1 do
`← (‖bˆσu,B(1)‖2, . . . , ‖bˆσu,B(n)‖2) /∗ σu,B defined by (2.9), page 21 ∗/
if umax ≥ −max1≤k<n−umax LogSuccessProbBound(`, k, u, ‖b1‖2) then
return true
end if
end for
return false
end procedure
probability bounds 12 Pr [ (Ek,u,r) ] before the first and after the tenth iterations of
SSR. (This particular example was computed from a public Micciancio key in dimen-
sion 180. All LLL-type reductions were performed with BKZ, (δ, β) = (0.99, 5).) The
probability bounds are clearly dominated by k.
In consequence, if CSSSevent returns true then we expect it to terminate in the first
loop iteration with u = umax, except for corner cases. In order to avoid computations
that are unlikely to yield a positive result anyway one might therefore decide to
skip all loop iterations in CSSSevent with u < umax and return false if the success
probability estimate with u = umax is too small for all admissible k. However, the
runtime of CSSSevent is negligible compared to the sampling loop and the repeated
LLL reduction, so the advantage of this optimization is debatable.
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3.4. CSSS by Convolution
The success probability computed by Schnorr’s approach under (GSA) and by the
algorithm CSSSevent without (GSA) is based on quite rough estimates. E. g., it
neglects all the sufficiently short vectors that match no event (Ek,u,r) such that
E(B; k, u, r) ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2. In fact, the average number of samples required in our
experiments until a sufficiently short vector is found is orders of magnitude smaller
than predicted by CSSSevent.
We present an algorithm CSSSFourier that overcomes this problem and numerically
determines the minimum number of samples required to guarantee under (RA) a
success probability of SSR’s sampling loop not less than 1/2. The approach taken by
CSSSFourier is to determine Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ x ] = λ(Bn−1(r(x)) ∩Q)/λ(Q) by means of
the convolution theorem where Bn−1(r(x)) ⊂ Rn−1 is the ball with radius r(x) :=
(x−‖bˆn‖2)1/2, Q ⊂ Rn−1 is a suitable cuboid, and λ is the volume, i. e., the Lebesgue
measure.
After fixing our notion of Fourier transform and introducing the Fresnel integral
function, we will first give an exact formula for the distribution of ‖v‖2 in terms
of the inverse Fourier transform of a product of Fresnel integrals. However, a naïve
evaluation of this formula by discrete Fourier transform will suffer from so called
aliasing effects. Our algorithm CSSSFourier in Sect. 3.4.3 will therefore counteract
those aliasing effects.
3.4.1. Preliminaries
Even though Fourier transformation of complex valued functions is a well established
concept in mathematics, the scaling factors involved are not generally agreed upon.
For example, [BS89], [PTVF92], [FJ03], and [For84] all use definitions of the Fourier
transform that differ in details. We therefore need to settle on one definition.
Definition 13. Let g, h : R→ C be Lebesgue integrable functions. Then
F g :R→ C : x 7→
∫
R
g(y)e2piıxy dy (3.4)
F−1 h :R→ C : x 7→
∫
R
h(y)e−2piıxy dy (3.5)
defines the Fourier transform of g and the inverse Fourier transform of h, respectively.
The convolution product of g and h is
g ∗ h : R→ C : x 7→
∫
R
g(y)h(x− y) dy . (3.6)
In the following, we need only basic facts of the rich theory of Fourier transforms.
We state them here for reference purposes.
Proposition 17. Let g, h : R→ C be Lebesgue integrable.
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a) Both F g and F−1 g are continuous and
lim
|y|→∞
(F g)(y) = 0 = lim
|y|→∞
(F−1 g)(y) .
b) g is a purely real function (up to some zero set) if and only if
(F g)(−y) = (F g)(y)
for all y ∈ R.
c) If F g is Lebesgue integrable as well then
F−1(F g) = g = F(F−1 g)
almost everywhere.
d) (“Convolution Theorem”) The convolution product g ∗ h is Lebesgue integrable
and
F(g ∗ h) = (F g) · (F h) .
e) If f, g are piecewise continously differentiable, then so is their convolution prod-
uct and
∂x(f ∗ g) = (∂xf) ∗ g = f ∗ (∂xg) .
Proof. E. g., [For84].
Let X ∈R (−t, t] be a uniform random variable. As we will see below, the Fourier
transform of the distribution of X2 involves the so called Fresnel integral function.
Definition 14. The function
Fr : R→ C : t 7→
∫ t
0
e2piı
x2
4 dx (3.7)
is named Fresnel integral function.
The literature (e. g., [Wei05, PTVF92]) often refers to a pair C : R → R and
S : R → R of Fresnel integrals where Fr = C + ıS. The Fresnel integral, which is
closely related to the Gauss error function erfc, has applications in signal processing,
optics, statistics, and even railway engineering, and its efficient computation is well
studied. Its graph, depicted in Fig. 3.4, is known as Cornu spiral. The Fresnel
integral is an odd function and
Fr(t) ∼ 1+ı2 + 1pite2piı
t2−1
4 (3.8)
for tÀ 1. In particular, Fr is bounded.
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3.4.2. The Probability Function of ‖v‖2
We give an exact formula under (RA) for Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ t ], v ∈R Su,B, in terms of the
Fourier transform of its distribution function. For this, we consider the intersection
of the n-dimensional ball Bn(x) = {v ∈ Rn ‖v‖ ≤ x } with an n-dimensional cuboid
Qt1,...,tn = (−t1, t1]×· · ·×(−tn, tn], tj > 0, both centered at the origin. We determine
the ratio Rt1,...,tn(x) of vectors in Qt1,...,tn that are shorter than
√
x,
Rt1,...,tn : R→ R : x 7→

λ(Bn(√x)∩Qt1,...,tn)
λ(Qt1,...,tn)
for x ≥ 0,
0 for x < 0.
(3.9)
λ denominates the Lebesgue measure. We write ∂x as a shorthand for the differential
operator ddx .
Theorem 18. With the notation above and n > 2, define ϕt1,...,tn : R → C as the
unique continuous function such that, for y > 0,
ϕt1,...,tn(y) =
n∏
j=1
Fr(2tj
√
y)
2tj
√
y
and ϕt1,...,tn(−y) = ϕt1,...,tn(y) . (3.10)
In particular, ϕt1,...,tn(0) = 1. Then Rt1,...,tn ∈ C1(R) and
Rt1,...,tn(x) =
∫ x
0
(F−1 ϕt1,...,tn)(s) ds . (3.11)
Before we set out to proof Theorem 18, let us apply it to our problem at hand:
Corollary 19. Let B ∈ Zd×n, n > 2, be a lattice basis with Gram-Schmidt decom-
position B = BˆR and 1 ≤ u < n. Let v =∑nj=1 νjbˆj ∈R Su,B be uniformly sampled.
For 1 ≤ j < n set tj = ‖bˆj‖ if n− u ≤ j < n and tj = 12‖bˆj‖ else.
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Then, under (RA), D‖v‖2 : R → R : x 7→ (F−1 ϕt1,...,tn−1)(x − ‖bˆn‖2) is the
distribution function of ‖v‖2 where ϕt1,...,tn−1 is defined as in Theorem 18 and
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ x ] = ∫ x−‖bˆn‖2
0
(F−1 ϕt1,...,tn−1)(s) ds . (3.12)
Proof. According to (RA) and the definition of Su,B, the random function u :=
v − bˆn ∈ Qt1,...,tn−1 is uniformly distributed. This implies
Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ x ] = Pr [ ‖u‖2 ≤ x− ‖bˆn‖2 ] = Rt1,...,tn−1(x− ‖bˆn‖2)
because ‖u‖2 ≤ x− ‖bˆn‖2 if and only if u ∈ Bn−1
(
(x− ‖bˆn‖2)1/2
)
.
We prepare the proof of Theorem 18 by computing the Fourier transform F ∂xRt
of the 1-dimensional ratio’s derivative. Afterward, we observe that the n-dimensional
ratio’s derivative is the convolution of the derivatives of the respective 1-dimensional
ratios. Then everything falls in place due to the convolution theorem.
First, we make the formulas for the case n = 1 explicit:
Lemma 20. Let Rt : R→ R, t > 0, as above. Then, for all x ∈ R \ { 0, t2 },
Rt(x) =

0 if x < 0,√
x
t if 0 < x < t2,
1 if t2 < x,
and ∂xRt(x) =
{
1
2t
√
x
if 0 < x < t2,
0 else.
(3.13)
Furthermore, ∂xRt is Lebesgue integrable, (F ∂xRt)(0) = 1, and, for all y > 0,
(F ∂xRt)(y) =
Fr(2t
√
y)
2t
√
y
and (F ∂xRt)(−y) =
Fr(2t
√
y)
2t
√
y
. (3.14)
Proof. The 1-dimensional ball B1(
√
x) = [−√x,√x] and the cuboid Qt = (−t, t] are
both in fact intervals in R and therefore Rt(x) = λ ([−
√
x,
√
x]) /λ ((−t, t]) = √x/t
if 0 ≤ x ≤ t2. For larger x the ratio is saturated because of (−t, t] ⊆ [−√x,√x]. The
formula for ∂xRt(x) follows immediately by elementary derivation.
∂xRt is Riemann integrable on R \ { 0, t2 } by the second fundamental theorem of
calculus and therefore Lebesgue integrable on R. Thus, we can apply the Fourier op-
erator. By Prop. 17, F ∂xRt has the Hermitian property (F ∂xRt)(−y) = (F ∂xRt)(y)
and is continuous. Now assume y > 0. Then
(F ∂xRt)(y) =
∫
R
∂xRt(z)e2piıyz dz =
∫ t2
0
1
2t
√
z
e2piıyz dz
=
∫ 2√yt
0
2
√
y
2tx
e2piı
x2
4
x
2y
dx =
1
2t
√
y
∫ 2t√y
0
e2piı
x2
4 dx =
Fr(2t
√
y)
2t
√
y
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by means of the substitution x(z) = 2
√
y
√
z. In particular,
(F ∂xRt)(0) = lim
y→0
Fr(2t
√
y)
2t
√
y
= lim
x→0
Fr(x)− Fr(0)
x
= (∂x Fr)(0) = 1
since Fr(0) = 0.
Lemma 21. Let n ≥ 1 and Rt1,...,tn, tj > 0, as above. Then
Rt1,...,tn(x) =
∫ x
0
(∂xRt1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂xRtn) (s) ds (3.15)
for all x ∈ R. Rt1,...,tn is at least piecewise continuously differentiable.
Proof. We show ∂xRt1,...,tn = ∂xRt1 ∗ · · · ∗∂xRtn by induction. The lemma is trivially
true if n = 1.
Now assume the lemma holds for n ≥ 1. Set M(x) := Bn(x) ∩ Qt1,...,tn and
N(x) := Bn+1(x) ∩Qt1,...,tn+1 . We can, by definition, express the Lebesgue measure
of a set as integral over the corresponding characteristic function, i. e., λ(N(
√
x)) =∫
Rn+1
χN(
√
x)(s) ds. With s = (s′, sn+1) ∈ Rn ×R, we have s ∈ N(
√
x) if and only if
s′ ∈M(
√
x− s2n+1). Applying Fubini’s lemma, we find
Rt1,...,tn+1(x) = 2
∫ tn+1
0
λ
(
M(
√
x− s2)
)
λ (Qt1,...,tn)
1
λ
(
Qtn+1
) ds
= 2
∫ t2n+1
0
λ (M(
√
x− y))
λ (Qt1,...,tn)
1
2tn+1
dy
2
√
y
=
∫
R
Rt1,...,tn(x− y) · ∂xRtn+1(y) dy
=
(
Rt1,...,tn ∗ ∂xRtn+1
)
(x)
by substituting y(s) = s2 and Lemma 20. Since both ∂xRtn+1 and, by assumption,
Rt1,...,tn are piecewise continously differentiable, we have
∂xRt1,...,tn+1 = ∂xRt1,...,tn ∗ ∂xRtn+1 = ∂xRt1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂xRtn ∗ ∂xRtn+1 .
by Prop. 17, i. e., the lemma also holds for n+ 1.
Lemma 22. Let ϕt1,...,tn as above. Then |ϕt1,...,tn(y)| ∈ O(|y|−n/2). If n > 2 then
ϕt1,...,tn is Lebesgue integrable.
Proof. We know Fr(y) ∼ sgn(y)(1+ı2 + 1pi|y|e2piı
y2−1
4 ) for large |y|, so |Fr(2t√|y|)| ∈
O(1) for any t > 0. Therefore,
|ϕt1,...,tn(y)| ∈ O
(∏n
j=1
1
2tj
√
|y|
)
= O
(|y|−n/2) .
The function fc : R → R : y 7→ c|y|−n/2 is Lebesgue integrable for all n > 2 and
all c ∈ R. Since |ϕt1,...,tn | is continuous and there is c ∈ R such that |ϕt1,...,tn | ≤ fc,
ϕt1,...,tn must be Lebesgue integrable as well.
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Proof of Theorem 18. According to Lemma 20, ∂xRtj is Lebesgue integrable for all
j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }. We know from Prop. 17 and Lemma 21 that their convolution
product ∂xRt1,...,tn = ∂xRt1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∂xRtn is Lebesgue integrable as well. By the
convolution theorem, Lemma 20, and the definition of ϕt1,...,tn ,
F ∂xRt1,...,tn = F ∂xRt1 · . . . · F ∂xRtn = ϕt1,...,tn .
Since both ∂xRt1,...,tn and ϕt1,...,tn are Lebesgue integrable (Lemma 22), Prop. 17
guarantees
∂xRt1,...,tn = F
−1 F ∂xRt1,...,tn = F
−1 ϕt1,...,tn
almost everywhere. The left hand side is piecewise continuous by Lemma 21, the
right hand side is continuous by Prop.17. Therefore, the functions must be equal
everywhere and Rt1,...,tn ∈ C1(R).
Remark 4. For completeness’ sake, we also give a formula for ∂xRt1,...,tn if n = 2.
W. l. o. g., assume 0 < t1 ≤ t2. Using entry no. 146 from the integral tables in [BS89],
we find
∂xRt1,t2(x) =
[
sgn(s)
2t1t2
arctan
(√
s
x− s
)]min{x,t1 }
max{ 0,x−t2 }
=

pi
4t1t2
if 0 < x ≤ t21,
pi−2 arctan
“√
t21/(x−t21)
”
4t1t2
if t21 < x ≤ t22,
arctan
“√
(x−t22)/t22
”
−arctan
“√
t21/(x−t21)
”
2t1t2
if t22 < x ≤ t21 + t22,
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
∂xRt1,t2 is continuous except in x = 0.
3.4.3. The CSSSFourier Algorithm
In the following, we propose a Check Search Space Size implementation CSSSFourier,
Alg. 5, that is based on Cor. 19. Our algorithm computes the inverse Fourier trans-
form by means of the inverse discrete Fourier transform. It avoids the significant
errors caused by the so called aliasing effect that a naïve application of the inverse
discrete Fourier transform would incur.
As suggested by Cor. 19, most of the work is delegated to a function Ratio that
computes Rt1,...,tm(x), m > 2. CSSSFourier first determines the parameters tj for
j ∈ { 1, . . . , n−1 } and then computes p := Pr [ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖ ] = Rt1,...,tn−1(0.99).
It finally tests whether the probability that Su,B does not contain a sufficiently short
vector is 1/2 or less, i. e., (1− p)2u ≤ 1/2 or equivalently log2(1− p) ≤ −2−u. Even if p
is very small, log2(1− p) can be efficiently computed with sufficiently high precision
by a power series expansion.
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Algorithm 5 CSSSFourier
Input: • b: vector of squared Gram-Schmidt vector lengths
b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) where B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n, n > 3
• u: log2 of maximum search space size
• D: global parameter, 2D DFT sample points
Output: true if and only if Pr
[ ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 ] > 21−umax
procedure RDeriv ((t1, . . . , tm), T,N) /∗ T > 2
√
t21 + · · ·+ t2m, N > 1 ∗/
for j from 0 to N/2 do
(Φj , k)← (ϕt1,...,tm(j/T ), 0)
repeat
δΦ ← ϕt1,...,tm((j + kN)/T ) + ϕt1,...,tm((j − kN)/T )
(Φj , k)← (Φj + δΦ, k + 1)
until δΦ < ε /∗ equality up to floating point precision ∗/
end for
return N4T DFT
−1((Φ0, . . . ,ΦN/2,ΦN/2−1, . . . ,Φ1)t)
end procedure
procedure Ratio (x, (t1, . . . , tm))
N ← 2D
T ← min{ 2τ τ ∈ Z and 2τ > 2
√
t21 + · · ·+ t2m }
(d0, . . . , dN−1)t ← RDeriv((t1, . . . , tm), T,N)
return Quadrature(x, (d0, . . . , dN−1), T,N)
end procedure
procedure CSSSFourier (b, u)
(t1, . . . , tn−1)← (12‖bˆ1‖, . . . , 12‖bˆn−u−1‖, ‖bˆn−u‖, . . . , ‖bˆn−1‖)/‖bˆ1‖
p← Ratio(0.99− ‖bˆn‖2/‖b1‖2, (t1, . . . , tn−1))
return log2(1− p) ≤ −2−u
end procedure
Ratio asks yet another function RDeriv for the values of (∂xRt1,...,tm)(jT/N), j ∈
{ 0, . . . , N − 1 }. The number N of sample points is set to a power of two in order
to make it possible to choose the most efficient inverse discrete Fourier transform
implementation in RDeriv. The exponent D is a global constant, typically 10 ≤
D ≤ 15. We choose T as a power of 2 as well so the floating point representations
of the sampling points jT/N are exact. The lower bound T > 2
√
t21 + · · ·+ t2m
is a requirement of RDeriv. The value of Rt1,...,tm(x) can then be recovered from
the samples (∂xRt1,...,tm)(jT/N) by a standard quadrature formula, e. g., Simpson’s
rule [PTVF92]. Note that quadrature formulas approximate the integral function by
piecewise polynomial functions. If jT/N ≤ x < (j + 1)T/N then we approximate
the integral up to jT/N using the quadrature formula and the integral from jT/N
up to x by evaluating the interpolation polynomial used by the quadrature formula.
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We omit here the details that can be looked up in any introductory textbook on
numerical analysis.
Finally, the function RDeriv computes the vector (Φ0, . . . ,ΦN/2,ΦN/2−1, . . . ,Φ1)
where Φj is the value of the absolutely convergent series
∑
k∈Z ϕt1,...,tm((j + kN)/T ).
The subsequent inverse discrete Fourier transformation of this vector reveals the
samples ∂xRt1,...,tm(jT/N), j ∈ { 0, . . . , N − 1 }. The correctness of RDeriv under the
preconditions stated in the comment is due to Lemma 23 which we will show below.
Remark 5. In order to keep the algorithm simple, RDeriv uses a naïve method
to compute Φj . In general, numerical analysists frown upon the evaluation of a
series the terms of which converge only polynomially to zero. However, sampling
reduction is intended for use with high dimensional lattices, say n > 100. Then
|ϕt1,...,tn−1 | ∈ O(|y|−(n−1)/2) ⊆ O(|y|−50) becomes quickly smaller than the floating
point precision, anyway. Still, we can do better: [PTVF92] describes a method due
to Van Wĳngaarden that can speed up the computation of Φj .
Discrete Fourier Transform and Aliasing. The discrete Fourier transform
makes it possible to approach the Fourier transform numerically.
Definition 15. Let N ∈ N. The function
DFT : CN → CN : (g1, . . . , gN )t 7→ (G1, . . . , GN )t, Gj =
N−1∑
k=0
gke
2piı kj
N , (3.17)
is named discrete Fourier transform.
The discrete Fourier transform is an automorphism of CN with inverse
DFT−1 : CN → CN : (G1, . . . , GN )t 7→ (g1, . . . , gN )t, gj = 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Gke
−2piı kj
N .
(3.18)
The DFT can be considered a discretization of integral (3.4) in N equidistant sample
points: Let g : R → C, N ∈ N, and ∆ > 0 such that supp g ⊆ [0, N∆]. Then, for
j ∈ { 0, . . . , N − 1 },
(F g)( jN∆) =
∫
R
g(x)e2piı
j
N∆
x dx
≈
N−1∑
k=0
g(k∆)e2piı
j
N∆
k∆∆ = ∆
N−1∑
k=0
g(k∆)e2piı
kj
N .
(3.19)
The DFT has many important applications in, e. g., signal processing. Implemen-
tations of highly optimized and numerically very stable DFT algorithms are freely
available [FJ03]. These algorithms typically run in O(N logN) time and achieve an
L2 error O(
√
logN) [FJ05].
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If g is bandwidth limited to frequencies smaller in absolute value than the Nyquist
critical frequency f∆ = 12∆ , i. e., (F g)(y) = 0 for |y| ≥ f∆, then one can usually
expect that the approximation (3.19) is quite good. However, if g is not bandwidth
limited then aliasing can add significant errors. Aliasing refers to the inevitable
phenomenon that the DFT value Gj , which is supposed to approximate (F g)( jN∆),
in fact contains “power” from all (F g)( j+kNN∆ ), k ∈ Z. This is a consequence of the
fact that – according to Parseval’s theorem – the total powers of both, a function
g : R→ C and a finite sequence (g1, . . . , gN−1) ∈ CN ,
‖g‖22 = ‖F g‖22, ‖(g0, . . . , gN−1)t‖22 = ‖DFT(g0, . . . , gN−1)t‖22 (3.20)
are invariant under continuous and discrete Fourier transform, respectively.
Since |ϕt1,...,tn(y)| > 0 for all y 6= 0, ∂xRt1,...,tn is not bandwidth limited at all.
Direct application of the inverse discrete Fourier transform to samples of ϕt1,...,tn
is unlikely to result in good approximations of samples of ∂xRt1,...,tn . We show in
the following how we can compute the discrete Fourier transform of ∂xRt1,...,tn up
to arbitrary precision, including aliasing, from ϕt1,...,tn . Then the inverse discrete
Fourier transform will recover the samples of ∂xRt1,...,tn . That is, we forestall the
effect of aliasing.
Fourier Series Expansion. The discrete Fourier transform is more or less the
evaluation of a Fourier series with N coefficients. The following lemma – that shows
the correctness of RDeriv in Alg. 5 – uses this to our advantage.
Lemma 23. For n > 2, let Rt1,...,tn and ϕt1,...,tn as above and T ∈ R such that T >
2
√
t21 + · · ·+ t2n. For any positive N ∈ N set ∆ = T/N and rj = (∂xRt1,...,tn)(j∆),
j ∈ { 0, . . . , N − 1 }. Then
(r0, . . . , rN−1)t = DFT−1((Φ0, . . . ,ΦN/2,ΦN/2−1, . . . ,Φ1)t) (3.21)
where
Φj = 14∆
∑
k∈Z
ϕt1,...,tn
(
j+kN
T
)
. (3.22)
Proof. The series Φj = 14∆
∑
k∈Z ϕt1,...,tn
(
j+kN
T
)
converges absolutely due to Lem-
ma 22; in particular, the ordering of its terms does not matter.
Let f ∈ C (R) be square integrable on the interval [−1/2, 1/2] and f(−1/2) = f(1/2).
Then f has the Fourier series expansion [BS89]
f(x) =
∑
k∈Z
ck(f)e−2piıkx for −1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, ck(f) = 14
∫ 1/2
−1/2
f(y)e2piıky dy .
In particular, if supp f ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2], then ck(f) = 14(F f)(k).
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Define g := (∂xRt1,...,tn) ◦ (T id). g is continuous with supp g ⊆ [−1/2, 1/2] and
g (j/N) = g ((j −N)/N) if N/2 ≤ j < N . Since g is Riemann integrable, it is also
square integrable. Then
ck(g) = 14(F g)(k) =
1
4T (F ∂xRt1,...,tn)
(
k
T
)
= 14T ϕt1,...,tn
(
k
T
)
and, observing Φl = 14∆
∑
k∈Z ϕt1,...,tn
(
l+kN
T
)
= N
∑
k∈Z cl+kN (g),
(∂xRt1,...,tn)(j∆) = g
(
j
N
)
=
∑
k∈Z
ck(g)e
−2piı kjN = 1N
N−1∑
l=0
Φle
−2piı ljN .
We find by comparison of the last equation with (3.18) – and with the shorthand
rj = (∂xRt1,...,tn)(j∆) – that (r0, . . . , rN−1)t = DFT−1((Φ0, . . . ,ΦN−1)t). Since all
rj ∈ R, the Φj have the Hermitian property Φj = ΦN−j .
Evaluation of the Fresnel integral. Above we always assumed that we can easily
evaluate the Fresnel integral and therefore ϕt1,...,tm . This is in fact the case due to
the following: By element-wise integration of the exponential function’s power series
we find the power series
Fr(x) =
∞∑
j=0
(piı
2
)j x2j+1
(2j + 1) · j! (3.23)
that converges rapidly for small x. For large x, we write the Fresnel integral in terms
of the Gauss error function
Fr(x) =
1 + ı
2
erfc(z), z =
√
pi
2
(1− ı)x (3.24)
that can be evaluated by the continued fraction expansion
erfc(z) =
1√
pi
e−z
2 1
2z2 + 1− 1 · 2
2z2 + 5− 3 · 4
2z2 + 9− · · ·
. (3.25)
Based on these equations, [PTVF92] gives an algorithm Fresnel that efficiently com-
putes the Fresnel integral function up to arbitrary precision.
3.5. Pool Sampling Reduction
We propose in Sect. 3.5.1 a generalization of SSR that exploits fairly short sample
vectors to improve the overall quality of the result lattice basis. In Sect. 3.5.2 we de-
scribe how different pool sizes and acceptor parameters affect the algorithm’s runtime
and reduction result.
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3.5.1. The PoolSR Algorithm and Randomized Acceptors
RSR and SSR concentrate on reducing the length of the first base vector. In fact,
they typically do significantly reduce the length of the very first base vectors only.
We propose a Sampling Reduction variant that generates more short vectors in the
result basis.
Before the sampling loop in SSR finds a vector that is actually shorter than√
0.99‖b1‖ it is likely to generate lattice points v such that ‖v‖ ≈ ‖b1‖. SSR discards
those vectors even though they are shorter than most of the base vectors. The Pool
Sampling Reduction algorithm (PoolSR) stores some of the shortest sampled vectors
and includes them in the generating system the LLL reduction of which becomes the
lattice basis in the next iteration of the outer loop. The underlying idea is that we
hope to improve the overall reduction result if we insert lattice points v into the
generating system such that ‖v‖2 ¿ 1n
∑n
j=1 ‖bj‖2.
Besides the input basis, the maximum search space size, and the LLL reduction
parameter, PoolSR (Alg. 6) expects a pool size s ≥ 1 as well as some (possibly
randomized) acceptor algorithm A that, on input a lattice vector v, returns true or
false. We suggest some reasonable acceptors below.
PoolSR maintains a “pool” [p1, . . . ,pt] of at most s vectors. The pool vectors are
stored in non-decreasing length order. Every time a vector v is sampled that is not
short enough to terminate the sampling loop, v is passed to the acceptor algorithm
A. If A returns true or v is sufficiently short then v is inserted in the pool according
to its length. If the pool already held s vectors then the longest pool vector is
dropped whence the pool has never more than s elements. Besides v, A may access
all variables that define the current state of PoolSR, i. e., B, R, b, umax, and x. We
do not write them as explicit parameters to keep the notation simple.
As in SSR, if a vector v is found such that ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 then the algorithm
leaves the sampling loop and LLL reduces a new generating system of the lattice L.
The only difference is that PoolSR inserts the remaining pool vectors in the generating
system between v = p1 and the base vectors bj , j = 1, . . . , n.
The separate acceptor provides the flexibility to choose between different pool
selection policies. For example, if A = ASSR with
ASSR(v) = false for all v ∈ L(B), (3.26)
or if s = 1, then PoolSR becomes SSR. Thus, PoolSR is in fact a generalization of
SSR. The other trivial acceptor Aall such that
Aall(v) = true for all v ∈ L(B) (3.27)
adds the s shortest vectors that were encountered in the sampling loop to the sampling
loop. Using Aall can result in pool vectors that are significantly longer than b1
and therefore hinder rather than improve the reduction of B. This can be avoided
by accepting vectors only if their length does not exceed a certain limit. Such a
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Algorithm 6 PoolSR
Input: • basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n of lattice L
• search space bound umax ∈ N
• LLL parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1)
• pool size s ≥ 1
• (randomized) acceptor algorithm A : L(B)→ { true, false }
Output: LLL reduced basis B′ = Bˆ′R′ of L such that
• 0.99‖b′1‖2 < min{ ‖v‖2 v ∈ Sumax,B′ } or
• CSSS(B′,R′, umax) = false.
procedure PoolSR(B, umax, δ, s,A)
(B, b,R)← LLL(B, δ) /∗ B = BˆR, b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∗/
while CSSS(b, umax) = true do
t← 0 /∗ Invariant: ‖p1‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖pt‖, t ≤ s ∗/
for x from 0 to 2umax − 1 do
v← Sample(B,R, x)
if ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 or A(v) = true then
jv ← min{ j ∈ { 1, . . . , t+ 1 } j = t+ 1 or ‖v‖ ≤ ‖pj‖ }
[p1, . . . ,pt+1]← [p1, . . . ,pjv−1,v,pjv , . . . ,pt]
t← min{ s, t+ 1 }
end if
if t > 0 and ‖p1‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 then
break
else if x = 2umax − 1 then
terminate(“no short vector”)
end if
end for
(B, b,R)← LLL([p1, . . . ,pt,b1, . . . ,bn], δ)
end while
return B
terminate(“further progress too unlikely”)
end procedure
restriction is modeled by the acceptor Cτ with threshold τ ≥ 0.99,
Cτ (v) = (‖v‖2 ≤ τ‖b1‖2) . (3.28)
E. g., C1 ensures that the pool holds only vectors that are shorter than b1.
In general, we want to accept also vectors that are longer than b1 provided they are
still significantly shorter than the longest base vector. However, the optimal choice
of τ for a given basis is not obvious. This is addressed by the randomized acceptor
Rτ,α that makes the selection of the pool vectors more fuzzy. It accepts vectors v
such that ‖v‖2 > τ‖b1‖2 as pool vector candidates with a chance depending on their
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Algorithm 7 Randomized acceptor Rτ,α
Input: • vector v ∈ Zn
• squared norm ‖b1‖2 of reference vector
• threshold τ ≥ 0.99
• fuzziness coefficient α > 0
• uniform (pseudo) random number generator Rand on [0, 1)
Output: Rτ,α ∈ { true, false } such that
• Rτ,α = true if ‖v‖2 ≤ τ‖b1‖2,
• Pr [Rτ,α = true ] = eα(τ−‖v‖2/‖b1‖2) else.
procedure Rτ,α(v, ‖b1‖2, τ, α,Rand)
r ← Rand()
p← eα(τ−‖v‖2/‖b1‖2)
return r ≤ p
end procedure
length. More precisely, for any vector v ∈ L(B),
Pr [Rτ,α(v) = true ] = min
{
1, eα(τ−‖v‖
2/‖b1‖2)
}
. (3.29)
For instance, R1,ln(2) accepts any vector shorter than b1. If v is twice as long as
b1 then R1,ln(2) outputs a uniformly distributed random bit. If v is three time as
long as b1 then R1,ln(2) accepts v only in one out of four cases, and so on. Alg. 7
demonstrates that the implementation of Rτ,α is straightforward.
3.5.2. Empirical Behavior of PoolSR
If used with the acceptor Rτ,α, then PoolSR is not deterministic anymore. If we run
PoolSR several times with the same input then we observe in fact differences in the
runtime and the lengths of the base vectors. We discuss below the effects of the
parameters using examples that exhibit typical behavior.
Fig. 3.5 on the facing page shows the squared lengths of the base vectors before
and after PoolSR with ASSR, R1,1, and R1,25, respectively. In the latter experiments
the maximum pool size was s = 60. The input basis was generated in the same
way as described in Sect. 3.1.2. In contrast to the SSR result depicted in Diag. (a)
– where the length of the first base vectors grows rapidly – we observe in Diag. (b)
and (c) a block of vectors not much longer than b1 at the front of the bases. The
length of this block varies in most cases between 15 and 30. After this block the base
vectors suddenly become longer; the squared length gap between the leading block
and the shortest of the remaining base vectors is typically between 30% and 50% of
the squared lengths of the first base vectors.
Compared with SSR, PoolSR does not significantly reduce the SVP approximation
factor. With above input, the squared length of b1 in the PoolSR output basis ranged
in several experiments from 8.2×107 to 9.9×107 whereas SSR achieves 9.4×107. We
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(a) Poolsize s = 1, Acceptor ASSR.
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(b) Poolsize s = 60, Acceptor R1,1.
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(c) Poolsize s = 60, Acceptor R1,25.
Figure 3.5.: Typical base vector length reduction by PoolSR.
did not notice any influence of the acceptor parameter α either. The same holds
for the reduction of the orthogonalization defect. The block of short vectors at the
beginning of the basis is not large enough to significantly improve odef(B); the final
value is in all three experiments ≈ 21500.
The acceptor parameter α does affect the runtime behavior of PoolSR, though.
With α = 1, the pool grows almost always to its maximum size s = 60, even if a
vector short enough to leave the inner loop is found after less than 210 samples. The
mean squared pool vector length varies from 1.2 · ‖b1‖2 to 1.6 · ‖b1‖2, the average
factor is about 1.4. The maximum squared pool vector length is on average about
1.6 · ‖b1‖2. I. e., the bulk of the pool vectors is not much shorter than the shortest
of the remaining base vectors. The BKZ reduction of the generating system formed
by the pool and the former basis with so many vectors not reduced at all costs much
time: In the experiment shown in Fig. 3.5(b), only 43 seconds were spent in the
sampling loop, but 481 seconds in the BKZ reduction.
The situation is different with a large acceptor parameter α = 25. The pool
contains most of the time less than 5 vectors. On average, the squared norm of the
longest pool vector does not exceed 1.1 · ‖b1‖2. In consequence, PoolSR spends much
less time in the BKZ reduction of the generating system: In the experiment shown
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(a) Poolsize s = 1, Acceptor ASSR.
 5e+07
 1e+08
 1.5e+08
 2e+08
 2.5e+08
 3e+08
 3.5e+08
 4e+08
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
 1300
 1350
 1400
 1450
 1500
 1550
 1600
reduction time in seconds
||b|
|2
lo
g 2
 
o
de
f(B
)
minimum norm square
10th smallest norm square
15th smallest norm square
30th smallest norm square
mean norm square
log2 odef(B)
(b) Poolsize s = 60, Acceptor R1,1.
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(c) Poolsize s = 60, Acceptor R1,25.
Figure 3.6.: Typical runtime behavior of PoolSR.
in Fig. 3.5(c), 285 seconds were spent on sampling, but only 149 seconds on BKZ
reduction.
Fig. 3.6 exhibits these differences in the runtime behavior. In Diag. (b), each
iteration of PoolSR with α = 1 took approximately 40 to 60 seconds, no matter how
many samples were required. The squared norm of the shortest base vector decreased
at a moderate pace only. (It increased in the second iteration because b1 was not
the shortest base vector.)
In contrast, we see in Diag. (c) that PoolSR with α = 25 allows a much more
rapid improvement of the shortest base vector; e. g., after less than 200 seconds, the
minimum norm square was already down to 1.1×108. In fact, this behavior is quite
similar to the behavior of SSR if applied to the same input basis: SSR terminated
after 394 seconds of which the last three iterations accounted for 286 seconds. But
the 15th smallest norm square in the output of SSR is about 1.7×108 whereas it is
only about 1.2×108 in the PoolSR output.
Like SSR, PoolSR significantly affects the first Gram-Schmidt vectors of the basis
only. The lengths of bˆj , j > 30, do not differ much in the input and the output basis.
This observation explains why PoolSR does not generate a better SVP approximation
factor than SSR: Since the effects of BKZ do not reach further into the basis if we
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Figure 3.7.: Typical Gram-Schmidt vector length after PoolSR.
prepare a generating system from the original basis and a larger pool compared to
a generating system from the basis preceded by a single short vector, the success
probability of the sampling loop in PoolSR is similar to that in SSR.
3.6. Short Projection Sampling Reduction
We describe in Sect. 3.6.1 the Short Projection Sampling Reduction algorithm (Short-
ProjectionSR) that aims at shaping the sequence (‖bˆj‖)j=1,...,n such that subsequent
sampling iterations stand a greater chance to find a vector shorter than b1. We
report typical empirical results with ShortProjectionSR in Sect. 3.6.2.
3.6.1. The ShortProjectionSR Algorithm
When we study the sampling reduction of NTRU lattices in Section 6.2, then we
will encounter bases where b1 is orders of magnitude shorter than the longest Gram-
Schmidt vector. It is therefore very unlikely for any feasible search space size umax
that Sample generates a vector shorter than b1. Even if we reduce a basis that ap-
proximates (GSA) reasonably well, the effects of the intermittent LLL-type reduction
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Algorithm 8 ShortProjectionSR
Input: • basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n of lattice L
• search space bound umax ∈ N
• reduction factor γ ∈ (0, 1)
• set T of target indices, ∅ 6= T ⊆ { 1, . . . , n− umax }
• LLL parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1)
Output: LLL reduced basis B′ = Bˆ′R′ of L such that ∀j ∈ T :
• γ‖b′j‖2 < min{pij(‖v‖2) v ∈ Sumax,B′ } or
• CSSS((‖bˆ′j‖2, . . . , ‖bˆ′n‖2), umax) = false.
procedure ShortProjectionSR(B, umax, γ, T, δ)
(B, b,R)← LLL(B, δ) /∗ B = BˆR, b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∗/
while CSSS′(b, γ, T, umax) = true do
for x from 0 to 2umax − 1 do
v← Sample(B,R, x)
t← min{ j ∈ T ‖pij(v)‖2 ≤ γ‖bˆj‖2 } ∪ {∞}
if t ∈ T then
break
else if x = 2umax − 1 then
terminate(“no short vector”)
end if
end for
(B, b,R)← LLL([b1, . . . ,bt−1,v,bt, . . . ,bn], δ)
end while
terminate(“further progress too unlikely”)
end procedure
on the length of the Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆj peters quickly out if j ≥ 30, as seen in
Fig. 3.2 and 3.7. This brings the Sampling Reduction soon to a halt. ShortProjection-
SR addresses both problems by inserting sampled vectors in between the base vectors
rather than to prepend them.
Schnorr remarks in [Sch03] that the very first base vectors often show a bad (GSA)
approximation. He therefore suggests EShort, a modification of the sampling loop that
searches a vector v ∈ Su,B such that ‖pij(v)‖2 ≤ 0.99‖bˆj‖2 for some j ≤ 10. The new
generating system of L(B) is then formed by inserting v in front of bj . Therefore,
Sampling Reduction with EShort may proceed longer than RSR because more sample
vectors can trigger another iteration of the outer loop and the LLL-type reduction
may affect the length of some more Gram-Schmidt vectors. However, EShort sticks
to modifying the generating system near the front of the basis.
ShortProjectionSR advances on EShort by shifting the focus from making the outer
Sampling Reduction loop proceed some more iterations to changing the lengths of
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the Gram-Schmidt vectors in the middle of the basis. We want to exploit two effects:
If we insert vectors with short projections then we make the hump smaller that we
observed in Fig. 3.2. Therefore, the likelihood to sample a vector shorter than b1
in further Sampling Reduction iterations grows. Second, recall that all LLL-type
reductions ensure that ‖pij−1(bj)‖2/‖pij−1(bj−1)‖2, j ∈ { 2, . . . , n }, does not fall
below some threshold. Vectors with short projections inserted in the middle of the
generating system therefore cause the LLL-type reduction to modify the generating
system where we did not observe much effect with SSR. In particular, we hope to see
a decrease in the lower bound
α =
min{ ‖bj‖ j = 1, . . . , n }
min{ ‖bˆj‖ j = 1, . . . , n }
on the approximation factor we obtained. We introduce an explicit parameter γ that
specifies the factor by which the inserted vector’s projection must be shorter than
the respective bˆj . The smaller γ the more likely it is that the inserted vector forces
the LLL-type reduction to modify the basis around the insertion index.
The ShortProjectionSR algorithm is presented in Alg. 8. It takes – compared with
SSR– two additional parameters: The reduction factor γ and the set T of target
indices. T specifies at which positions a sample vector may be inserted into the
lattice basis to form the new generating system. The reduction factor determines
when a sample vector projection is considered short enough; ShortProjectionSR leaves
the sampling loop if there is an index j ∈ T such that the sample vector v satisfies
‖pij(v)‖2 ≤ γ‖bˆj‖. The minimum index for which this condition holds is stored in
the variable t. Then v is inserted in B at column t and this generating system is
reduced again with an LLL-type reduction as in SSR.
The various Check Search Space Size algorithms discussed above assumed that we
search a vector v subject to ‖v‖2 ≤ 0.99‖b1‖2 whence we need to modify them as
well. Note that b1 = bˆ1 and pi1(v) = v. So CSSS((‖bˆj‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2), umax) actually
returns true if and only if it estimates the probability to find a vector v ∈ Sumax,B
such that ‖pij(v)‖2 ≤ 0.99‖bˆj‖2 as sufficient. In all considered CSSS implementations
it is straight forward to replace the factor 0.99 by γ. T may contain more than one
potential insertion point. We can easily account for that by computing the logical or
of CSSS((‖bˆj‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2), umax) for all j ∈ T . We name the CSSS implementations
that were adapted in such a manner CSSS′.
If we specialize γ = 0.99 and T = { 1 }, then ShortProjectionSR reduces to SSR;
so ShortProjectionSR is in fact a generalization. Furthermore, if we apply Short-
ProjectionSR with γ = 0.99 and T = { 1, . . . , 10 }, then we obtain SSR combined with
Schnorr’s EShort.
3.6.2. Empirical Behavior of ShortProjectionSR
We first describe how the combination of SSR with Schnorr’s EShort – in the following
named EShort-ShortProjectionSR – performs. We then consider the effects of Short-
ProjectionSR if used to overcome the lack of change in ‖bˆj‖2 for j > 30. In both cases
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(b) Runtime behavior.
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Figure 3.8.: Typical effect of ShortProjectionSR with γ = 0.99 and T = { 1, . . . , 10 }.
the example lattice used is the same as in Sect. 3.5.2 and the LLL-type reduction is
always BKZ with (δ, β) = (0.99, 5).
Comparing Fig. 3.8 with Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, two observations are most strik-
ing: First, neither the minimum nor the mean base vector norm square nor the
orthogonalization defect differ significantly between the output of SSR and EShort-
ShortProjectionSR. However, the base vector length does not increase as rapidly in
the latter as in the former. Similar to PoolSR with R1,25, there are base vectors not
much longer than b1. These vectors do not form such a distinct plateau, though.
The lengths of the first base vectors are more scattered.
Second, ShortProjectionSR quickly reduced the minimum and average base vector
length, like SSR; this decrease came to a stop after about 150 iterations (about
500 seconds). I. e., each iteration took only few seconds, most of which were spent in
the BKZ reduction. (A more optimized implementation that imposes less overhead
for each iteration is likely to speed up this phase of the reduction.) Fig. 3.8(b)
shows that at this point the distribution of the base vector lengths is similar to the
distribution after PoolSR with R1,25 (Fig. 3.6(c)).
After that, ShortProjectionSR kept finding suitable vectors – sampling up to 222 ele-
ments – for further 60 iterations. On average, 216 to 217 samples were required before
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a vector was found that could be inserted in the generating system, accumulating to
somewhat more than 7000 seconds runtime. (The runtime of the intermittent BKZ
reductions was negligible in comparison.) But these more expensive iterations did
not improve ‖b1‖2 anymore. There was only a minimal improvement in the length of
the 20th and 30th shortest base vectors. The mean squared length vacillated around
10% above its minimum value.
This leaves the impression that, with respect to the base vector length, EShort-
ShortProjectionSR performs similar to PoolSR if terminated as soon as there is no
more progress. However, we made a curious observation that causes us to prefer
PoolSR over EShort-ShortProjectionSR: We repeated some of our experiments on a
notebook with an Intel Pentium 4 Mobile CPU at 1.7GHz and 1GByte RAM. In
general, the notebook took about 1.25 as long as the PC to obtain the same results.
But the intermittent BKZ reduction in the ShortProjectionSR iterations took about 3
times as long as on the PC! (The performance of the sampling loop was not notably
slower than expected, though.) Thus, on the notebook, EShort-ShortProjectionSR
required about 1500 seconds to compute a result comparable to PoolSR with R1,25,
given the same input as above. PoolSR did not suffer the same slow-down in its
BKZ reduction, it took typically between 600 and 700 seconds to complete. We can
only speculate about the cause of this phenomenon: The implementations of the
reduction algorithms used were always the same. But EShort-ShortProjectionSR has
a more global effect on the Gram-Schmidt decomposition of the bases than PoolSR,
cf. Fig. 3.8(a) versus Fig. 3.7. This seems to trigger a code flow and memory access
pattern that the notebook hardware cannot handle well due to, e. g., a different RAM
interface or less first level cache. The ShortProjectionSR is more likely to be affected
by such hardware differences since it stresses the BKZ reduction more than PoolSR.
So, even though our experiments on our primary test hardware indicated a similar
performance of EShort-ShortProjectionSR and PoolSR, we prefer the latter to compute
short basis vectors.
The more global effect of EShort-ShortProjectionSR on the Gram-Schmidt decom-
position can also be an advantage, though: If we are interested in minimizing the
guaranteed approximation factor α, then this algorithm is more effective. We can
deduce from the PoolSR result shown in Fig. 3.7 that the approximation factor is at
most 184, whereas the EShort-ShortProjectionSR yields α ≤ 109. If we apply Short-
ProjectionSR with γ = 0.99 and T = { 1, . . . , 30 }, then we obtain in 4000 seconds
the even better approximation factor bound α ≤ 80 but the worse minimum squared
base vector length ‖b1‖2 ≈ 1.2×108.
There is no reason to restrict the target indices set T to consecutive numbers
{ 1, . . . , t } for some t. For example, when we study the effects of sampling reduction
on the reduction of NTRU lattice bases, ShortProjectionSR with T = { t } for some
t > 1 will assume the role of SSR because the Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆj with j < t
are orders of magnitude shorter than bˆt; in that situation, any attempt to find a
vector shorter than b1 in a reasonably sized search space is doomed to failure.
When reducing bases that originally met (GSA) the freedom in choosing target
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stage algorithm parameters umax CSSS′ tstage Nstage
1 PoolSR γ = 0.99, s = 60,A = R1,25 25 CSSS′event 500 75
2 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.75, T = { 1, 21, . . . , 25 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
3 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.75, T = { 1, 41, . . . , 45 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
4 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.75, T = { 1, 61, . . . , 65 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
5 PoolSR γ = 0.99, s = 60,A = R1,25 25 CSSS′event 500 75
6 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.85, T = { 1, 21, . . . , 25 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
7 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.85, T = { 1, 41, . . . , 45 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
8 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.85, T = { 1, 61, . . . , 65 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
9 ShortProjectionSR γ = 0.99, T = { 1, . . . , 5 } 24 CSSS′event 150 60
Table 3.1.: Algorithms and parameters used in Fig. 3.9
indices can be helpful as well. If we apply PoolSR to such a basis and subsequently
run ShortProjectionSR with T chosen such that specific Gram-Schmidt vectors become
shorter, then, in consequence, further iterations of PoolSR are more likely to succeed.
Fig. 3.9 exhibits this effect. In this experiment we reduced the input basis in nine
stages; the algorithms and parameters used in each stage are given in Table 3.1. We
moved on to the next stage whenever CSSS′ returned false, more than tstage seconds
had already passed since the beginning of the current stage, or the reduction algo-
rithm’s outer loop had been already iterated Nstage times, whatever happened first.
The intermittent LLL-type reduction was always BKZ with (δ, β) = (0.99, 5).
The second, third, and fourth graph in Fig. 3.9(a) and in its magnified cutting
Fig. 3.9(b) show the squared length of the Gram-Schmidt vectors at the end of
stage 1, 2, and 4, respectively. We see that the initial PoolSR did not significantly
change the length of the Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆj with j ≥ 20. The following Short-
ProjectionSR decreased ‖bˆj‖2 by up to 20% for j ∈ { 10, . . . , 30 }. As before, the
squared length of the Gram-Schmidt vectors did not significantly change for j > 30.
At the end of stage 4, ‖bˆj‖2 was reduced by 10% to 20% for 10 ≤ j ≤ 60.
The first stage had ended after 11 iterations in 149 seconds since CSSS′event esti-
mated that the search space size had to be at least u = 30 for further progress to
be likely. At the beginning of stage 5, the reduction of ‖bˆj‖2 for j ≤ 60 had caused
this estimate to drop to u = 19. In fact, a sufficiently short vector was found in the
search space after enumeration of only 212.64 vectors. This demonstrates that we can
use ShortProjectionSR to boost PoolSR’s success probability.
In the end, ‖b1‖2 was reduced to 6.6×107, i. e., to a third of its original length. Even
more notably, the combination of PoolSR and ShortProjectionSR improved the basis
globally such that the average squared base vector length was finally only 1.5×108,
a reduction by 25% to 40% compared with the results of the previous algorithms.
We can thus achieve approximately the same length reduction for all base vectors,
not only for the very first ones as with SSR. The orthogonalization defect was also
improved to 21387, the minimum value for all Sampling Reductions of this particular
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Figure 3.9.: Typical effect of combined PoolSR and ShortProjectionSR.
basis. We pay for this improvement with a roughly doubled runtime, compared with
PoolSR.
The parameters given in Table 3.1 are often a good starting point to obtain ac-
ceptable results with ShortProjectionSR. In general, though, the user has to make an
intelligent choice of T , based on the length of the intermediate Gram-Schmidt vec-
tors. If T is too large or is not changed often enough, then ShortProjectionSR typically
starts to increase the length of bˆj for large j as shown, e. g., in Fig. 3.8(a). That
causes the success probability of further PoolSR iterations to drop rapidly. Therefore,
ShortProjectionSR is best suited for an interactive setting.
3.7. Further Generalizations
The target indices set T in ShortProjectionSR enables us to apply Sampling Reduction
to bases that grossly violate (GSA) due to a peek of the Gram-Schmidt vector lengths
in the front half of the basis, effectively ignoring all vectors before that peek. We
describe a generalization of the search space that facilitates something similar if
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there is a jump in the length of the trailing Gram-Schmidt vectors. We conclude this
chapter with two remarks on distributed implementations of Sampling Reduction and
on the reduction of bases that are only implicitly given by Gram matrices.
3.7.1. Search Space Generalization
The definition of the search space Su,B in 2.3 was motivated by the empiric observation
that the larger j the smaller is ‖bˆj‖2. That is not necessarily so, even for LLL-reduced
bases. (Recall, LLL defines a lower bound only for the ratio ‖bˆj−1‖2/‖bˆj‖2.) But if
bˆn is already large, than it is unlikely that Su,B contains any short vector v because
‖v‖2 ≥ ‖bˆn‖2. In such a case we would like to ignore bˆn and look for a short vector
in the sublattice generated by [b1, . . . ,bn−1].
Similarly, let J ⊂ { 1, . . . , n } such that G = { bˆj j ∈ J } is the set of the u +
1 shortest Gram-Schmidt vectors of the basis B. The Sample algorithm generates
vectors v =
∑
j νjbˆj such that ν2j > 1/4 only if n−u ≤ j. Assume {n−u, . . . , n− 1 }
is not contained in J . Then Sample is suboptimal because the expected length of
the vectors it computes is larger than the length we could expect if ν2j > 1/4 implied
j ∈ J .
Third, recall that E[ ‖v‖2 v ∈ Su,B ] =
∑
j
1
3r
2
j‖bˆj‖2 by (RA) where νj ∈ (−rj , rj ].
Therefore, if ‖bˆk‖2 < ‖bˆl‖2 and we can arrange a search space S′u,B such that
r′j =

2rk if j = k,
rl/2 if j = l, and
rj else,
then E[ ‖v′‖2 v′ ∈ S′u,B ] < E[ ‖v‖2 v ∈ Su,B ].
The generalized search space Vc,B defined below enables us to exploit all these
observations. The Sample and CSSS implementations can be easily adapted to work
with Vc,B.
Definition 16. Let B ∈ Zd×n be a lattice basis with Gram-Schmidt decomposition
B = BˆR. Let c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Nn and assume there is j0 ∈ { 1, . . . , n } such that
cj = 0 if and only if j > j0. Then the generalized search space Vc,B is the set of all
lattice vectors v =
∑n
j=1 νjbˆj ∈ L(B) subject to
νj ∈

(−cj/2, cj/2] if 1 ≤ j < j0,
{ 1, . . . , cj } if j = j0,
{ 0 } if j0 < j ≤ n,
(3.30)
for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }.
The algorithm GenSample presented in Alg. 9 on the next page is the obvious
adaption of Sample that generates vectors from Vc,B.
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Algorithm 9 GenSample
Input: • unit upper triangular matrix R = [r1, . . . , rn] ∈ Qn×n,
• lattice basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition
B = BˆR,
• c ∈ Nn as in Def. 16,
• x ∈ N
Output: v ∈ Vc,B
procedure Sample (B,R, c, x)
for j from n downto 1 do
if cj > 0 then
(x, z)← (bx/cjc, x mod cj)
if j = n or cj+1 = 0 then
(v,ν)← (x+ 1)(bj , rj) /∗ ν = (ν1, . . . , νn)t, νj+1 = · · · = νn = 0
∗/
else
z ← (−1)zbz/2c /∗ z ∈ Z ∩ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
y ← dνj − 1/2e /∗ νj − y ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] ∗/
if νj − y ≤ 0 then
y ← y − z /∗ νj − y ∈ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
else
y ← y + z /∗ νj − y ∈ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
end if
(v,ν)← (v,ν)− y(bj , rj) /∗ νj ← νj − y ∗/
end if
end if
end for
return v
end procedure
Proposition 24. Let B = BˆR ∈ Zd×n, c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Nn, and j0 ∈ { 1, . . . , n }
as in Def. 16. Set N =
∏j0
j=1 cj ≥ 1. Then
f : { 0, . . . , N − 1 } → Vc,B : x 7→ GenSample(B,R, c, x)
is a bĳection. In particular, |Vc,B| = N .
Proof. Note that v and ν will always be eventually initialized in the first branch
of the innermost if block because c1 > 0 by the precondition on c. In the second
branch, z is assigned an integer such that
z ∈
{
{−(cj − 2)/2, . . . , cj/2 } if cj is even,
{−(cj − 1)/2, . . . , (c− 1)/2 } if cj is odd.
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More precisely, z is 0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . . if x mod cj is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , respectively. Then
z is used to choose one of the cj possible values for νj in the interval (−cj/2, cj/2].
Otherwise, the proof is analogous to the proofs of Prop. 7 and 8.
GenSample constitutes the innermost loop of all Sampling Reduction variants. In
practice, we therefore restrict all nonzero cj to powers of 2 so computing x mod cj
reduces to extracting the least significant bits of x and computing bx/cjc is simply a
bit shift.
We immediately see that Vc,B = Su,B if j0 = n and
cj =
{
2 if n− u ≤ j < n,
1 else.
If the last n− j0 Gram-Schmidt vectors are particularly long, then Vc′,B with
c′j =

0 if n− j0 < j,
2 if n− u− j0 ≤ j < n− j0,
1 else.
is likely to contain shorter vectors than Su,B. We can address the second issue men-
tioned above by assigning c′j a value greater than 1 if and only if j ∈ J . Finally, we
can try to exploit third opportunity to optimize the expected squared length of the
sample vectors pointed out above by choosing cj > 2 for those cj corresponding to
the shortest Gram-Schmidt vectors.
CSSStriv can obviously be used in combination with GenSample without modifica-
tion. For CSSSevent we have to adapt ExpLength so it takes the following, generalized
version of equation (3.2) into account:
sj =

1
12cjr
k−j if 1 ≤ j < k,
1
12c
2
j if k ≤ j < j0,
1
2(cj + 1) if j = j0,
0 else.
(3.31)
Furthermore, we have to replace the permutation σu,B by τc,B such that
τc,B(j) = j if j ≥ j0,
τc,B(i) < τc,B(j) if i, j ∈ { 1, . . . , j0 − 1 } and ci < cj ,
(3.32)
and
‖bˆτc,B(i)‖ ≥ ‖bˆτc,B(j)‖ if i < j < j0 and ci = cj . (3.33)
The adaption of CSSSFourier is even simpler: We compute
(t1, . . . , tj0−1)← (c1‖bˆ1‖, . . . , cj0−1‖bˆj0−1‖)/(2‖b1‖) .
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The expected contribution of bˆj0 to the squared length of the sample vectors is
E := E[ ν2j0‖bˆj0‖2
∑n
j=0 νjbˆj ∈ Vc,B ] =
∑cj0
l=1 l
2‖bˆj0‖2/cj0
= (cj0 + 1)(2cj0 + 1)‖bˆj0‖2/6 .
Then the success probability is Ratio(γ − E/‖b1‖2, (t1, . . . , tj0−1)).
3.7.2. Distributed Sampling
The LLL algorithms manipulates the basis in each iteration. This implies that pre-
vious attempts to parallelize lattice basis reduction [Hec95, Wet98] had to rely on
a very tight communication network – preferably memory shared by all computing
nodes – and that the algorithm had to be broken down in very fine granular tasks
that were assigned to the available nodes, resulting in a lot of overhead for the man-
agement of these tasks. Approaches that speculatively computed the Gram-Schmidt
coefficients in columns l ∈ { j, . . . , n } while the main LLL algorithm was still at stage
j had to discard all results every time LLL swapped two base vectors and therefore
gained a moderate advantage only.
Sampling Reduction is different since it does not modify the basis during the
sampling phase at all. It runs the same algorithm GenSample again and again for
only slightly different input data. This is an algorithm pattern for which SIMD-
parallelization (single instruction, multiple data) excels. Blochinger, Küchlin, Lud-
wig, and Weber describe in [BKLW99] a software package DOTS that supports the
distribution of search problems as the one encountered in Sampling Reduction within
loose networks of heterogenous machines, say the workstations in a department LAN.
To implement such a distributed Sampling Reduction we partition the search space
in disjunct parts Vc,B =
⋃N
j=1 Vj where N is typically a small multiple of the number
of available nodes. Then we schedule the search space parts on the computing nodes;
for this we need to transfer only once the basis and the specification of the Vj assigned.
As soon as a node has exhausted its section of the search space, the next available
Vj is scheduled on this node. This continues until either a node returns a sufficiently
short vector – in which case all other nodes are notified and abort their task – or all
Vj were searched without success.
If N is large enough to keep all nodes busy but the search space parts are not
too small to avoid unnecessary communication overhead between the nodes and the
scheduler, then distributed systems like DOTS have an efficiency close to 100%,
i. e., the attainable speedup scales linearly in the number of nodes. For instance,
our primary test hardware computes 216 samples in dimension 180 in about 10 to
15 seconds. So if each search packet covers at least 216 vectors, then we expect that
a distributed implementation results in a very high efficiency.
3.7.3. Gram Matrices
In some applications the lattices are only implicitly given by Gram matrices.
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Definition 17. A matrix G ∈ Rn×n is a Gram matrix if and only if G is symmetric
positive semi-definite, i. e.,
G = Gt and xtGx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn.
For any lattice basis B ∈ Zd×n, the corresponding Gram matrix is G = BtB ∈ Zn×n.
Conversely, a non-singular Gram matrix G ∈ Zn×n determines the corresponding
lattice basis (and thereby the lattice) up to an isometry, i. e., there is a lattice basis
B ∈ Rn×n such that G = BtB, and if B′ ∈ Rn×n with G = B′tB′, then there is a
matrix O ∈ Rn×n such that OtO = In is the identity matrix and B′ = OB.
Note that the Gram-Schmidt decompositions of two lattice bases corresponding to
the same Gram matrix differ only in the direction of the Gram-Schmidt vectors, i. e.,
if B = BˆR and B′ = Bˆ′R′, then R′ = R and Bˆ′ = OBˆ with OtO = In. In particular,
‖bˆ′j‖2 = ‖bˆj‖2 for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }. Since LLL-type reductions require only the
squared lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors and the Gram-Schmidt coefficient ma-
trix R, there are corresponding algorithms for the reduction of Gram matrices (cf.,
e. g., [Wet98]). The same holds for the reduction of singular Gram matrices which
corresponds to the LLL reduction of arbitrary finite generating systems of a lattice.
It is trivial to modify GenSample such that the algorithm does not return the vector
v ∈ Vc,B anymore but rather x ∈ Zn such that Bx = v ∈ Vc,B. Then GenSample
operates – besides the search space parameter c and the index x – only on the Gram-
Schmidt coefficient matrix R, i. e., data that the LLL reduction of a Gram matrix
computes as well. The squared length of a sampled vector is given by ‖v‖2 = xtGx
whence we can implement the sampling loop for Gram matrices.
After the sampling loop we need to construct the new (singular) Gram matrix G′
corresponding to the hypothetical generating system [v,B]. Using v =
∑n
j=1 xjbj ,
we find
G′ =
(‖v‖2 xtG
Gx G
)
where G ∈ Zn×n is the input Gram matrix.
This shows that the Sampling Reduction algorithms we described in this chap-
ter can be easily transferred to the reduction of Gram matrices, even if we do not
explicitly state the modified algorithms.
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Quantum Lattice Reduction
Algorithms for the quantum computing model attracted a lot of interest in recent
years, even though there are no implementations yet that can solve problems of prac-
tical significance. (See, e. g., [Gle05] for an impressive list of currently funded quan-
tum computing projects.) Quantum computers can solve problems that are believed
to be hard in the classical computing model. In particular, Shor [Sho97] proposed
a remarkable quantum algorithm that solves the RSA problem in polynomial time.
Hence, the eventual advent of quantum computers beyond the proof-of-concept stage
will make it necessary to turn away from the worldwide most deployed cryptosystem.
Recently, several research projects were launched that explore alternatives to the es-
tablished cryptosystems that withstand attacks with quantum computers (see, e. g.,
[BCD+04]).
The literature has only very recent results on the hardness of lattice problems in
the quantum computing model, most notably by Regev [Reg05, AR04, AR03, Reg02].
Those results that improve on classical results apply to special classes of lattices only
[Reg03]. We describe in this chapter a variant of the Simple Sample Reduction
algorithm – first presented in [Lud03] – that exploits the capabilities of quantum
computers to boost the search of the sample space. It is to our knowledge the first
result that indicates that quantum algorithms for general lattice problems asymp-
totically outperform classical algorithms. Our algorithm does not run in polynomial
time, though.
4.1. Grover’s Quantum Search
This section provides the background on Grover’s quantum search required for an
understanding of the Quantum Search Reduction algorithm proposed in the following
section. We specify the pre- and postconditions of the quantum search algorithm
and of the quantum counting algorithm which estimates the number of solutions to
a search problem. We refer the reader to textbooks on the subject, e. g. [NC00], for
more details.
The quantum computing model is based on the following four postulates of quan-
tum mechanics:
State: Every isolated quantum system is associated with some Hilbert space V . The
state of the quantum system is completely described by a unit length vector,
59
Chapter 4. Quantum Lattice Reduction
commonly written as so called ket vector |ψ〉 ∈ V . Therefore, the state space of
a quantum system is the unit sphere in its corresponding Hilbert space. In the
context of quantum computing the associated Hilbert space is always V = CN
for some 2-power N = 2n. In particular, the most simple quantum systems –
the so called qubits – are associated with Vq = C2.
Composite Systems: Let two quantum systems be associated with the Hilbert
spaces V1 and V2, respectively. Then the composite system is associated with
the tensor space V1 ⊗ V2. A quantum system built from k qubits is therefore
associated with V =
⊗k
j=1 Vq = V
⊗k
q = C
2k .
Evolution: Let |ψ(t)〉 ∈ V describe the state of a closed quantum system at time
t, i. e., the state of a system that does not interact with its environment at all.
For any t1, t2 ∈ R, there is a unitary operator U on the associated Hilbert space
V such that |ψ(t2)〉 = U |ψ(t2)〉. Conversely, if t1 6= t2 ∈ R, V = V ⊗nq , and
U ∈ End(V ) is unitary, then there is a closed quantum system associated with
V such that |ψ(t2)〉 = U |ψ(t2)〉.
Measurements: If the state of a quantum system is measured, then there is for any
potential outcome e ∈ E an operator Me ∈ End(V ) such that
∑
e∈EM
†
eMe = I.
(M†e is the Hermite conjugate or adjoint of Me. I is the identity operator.) If
the system is in state |ψ〉 before the measurement, then the probability of the
outcome e is Pr[ e |ψ〉] = 〈ψ|M†eMe|ψ〉 where the bra 〈ψ| ∈ V ∗ is the dual of
|ψ〉 ∈ V . After a measurement with outcome e, the system is in the state
|ψ′〉 = Pr[ e |ψ〉]−1/2Me|ψ〉.
For our purposes, it suffices to consider measurements with respect to the canon-
ical base vectors of V = C2n , i. e., E = { 0, . . . , 2n − 1 } and Me = |e〉〈e| where
{ |0〉, . . . , |2n − 1〉 } is the (orthonormal) canonical basis of CN .
A quantum algorithm consists essentially of three steps: (a) We prepare an n qubit
quantum register in a defined base state |e〉. (b) We apply some unitary operations on
the register. (Note that afterwards the system is no longer necessarily in a base state
but in some superposition |ψ〉 = ∑2n−1j=0 ψj |j〉 subject to ∑2n−1j=0 ψjψj = 1.) (c) We
measure the system and find it with probability ψeψe and up to some unobservable
phase factor eıϕ in the base state |e〉, e ∈ { 0, . . . , 2n − 1 }. We can implement
more complex algorithms if we measure subregisters only and base the choice of the
subsequent unitary operations upon the outcomes.
As long as we do not measure any registers, the control flow in a quantum algorithm
(i. e., the sequence of quantum operations applied to the register) can depend on
the register size only, not on its current state. That is because the algorithm may
be applied to a superposition of all possible (classical) inputs whence the quantum
operations need to control virtually all possible threads of execution in parallel. That
makes the computing model of uniform circuit families the most adequate to describe
quantum algorithms.
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Let Sk = { 0, 1 }k, Sl = { 0, 1 }l, and f : Sk → Sl a total function. Then
F : Sk × Sl → Sk × Sl : (x, y) 7→ (x, f(x)⊕ y)
is a bĳection and F−1 = F . Hence, there is a unitary operator UF on k + l qubit
registers such that UF (|x〉 ⊗ |y〉) = |x〉 ⊗ |f(x) ⊕ y〉. In particular, measurement of
UF (|x〉 ⊗ |0〉) = |x〉 ⊗ |f(x)〉 yields with certainty the result (x, f(x)) whence UF is
said to compute f .
If f can be computed by a classical algorithm in worst case time O(t) and on
worst case space O(m), then we can construct a sequence of O(t) elementary unitary
operations U˜j (so called gates) operating on at most O(m) additionally auxiliary
qubits such that U˜1 ◦ U˜2 . . . restricted to the first k + l qubits is UF . Thus, for
any classical algorithm with worst case complexity in O(f(n)) we have an equivalent
uniform quantum circuit family with circuit depth in O(f(n)) as well.
Theorem 25 (Grover; Boyer, Brassard, Hoyer, Tapp). Let S = { 0, . . . , N −
1 }, N = 2n. Let Pred be a classical algorithm that computes the predicate P : S →
{ 0, 1 }.
There is a quantum algorithm Grover that, on input M = |P−1({ 1 })| > 0 and an n
qubit quantum circuit OP such that OP|e〉 = (−1)P(e)|e〉 for any canonical base vector
|e〉, returns some s ∈ P−1({ 1 }). Grover makes expected Θ((N/M)1/2) queries of OP
and performs expected Θ((N/M)1/2) additional elementary quantum operations.
This result is remarkable because in the classical computing model the search of
an unordered set takes expected linear time in N/M whereas Grover is sublinear.
Furthermore, this algorithm is known to be optimal; there cannot be a quantum
algorithm for searching unordered sets that requires asymptotically less quantum
gates. The black box oracle OP is essentially a quantum circuit that computes P and
can therefore be algorithmically derived from the classical algorithm Pred.
Inspection of the Grover algorithm shows that M does not need to be exact, a
good approximation is sufficient. The better the approximation, the less iterations
of the probabilistic algorithm will be required on average. There is no impact on the
asymptotic runtime as long as the error is less than, say, M1/2.
The full proof of Theorem 25 can be found in [Gro96, BBHT96]. We briefly sketch
the algorithm Grover for the case 0 < M ≤ N/2 that exhibits the most important
parts. Set
|α〉 = 1√
N −M
∑N
j=1
P(j)=0
|j〉 , |β〉 = 1√
M
∑N
j=1
P(j)=1
|j〉 ,
and
|ψ〉 = 1√
N
∑N
j=1
|j〉 .
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|α〉
|β〉
|ψ〉
OP|ψ〉
G|ψ〉
ϑ/2
ϑ/2
ϑ
Figure 4.1.: The Grover rotation G (from [NC00])
|ψ〉 is the superposition of all search space elements, |α〉 is the superposition of all
non-solutions, and |β〉 is the superposition of all solutions. Observe that |ψ〉 =
(M/N)1/2|β〉 + ((N −M)/N)1/2|α〉 belongs to the subspace V ′ spanned by |α〉 and
|β〉.
The single qubit Hadamard gate H is defined by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and rotates the base vector |0〉 into the superposition 2−1/2(|0〉 + |1〉). The n qubit
Hadamard operator is the n-fold tensor product H⊗n = H⊗ . . .⊗ H of H with itself.
H⊗n maps |0〉 to |ψ〉. Define the Grover operator
G = H⊗n(2|0〉〈0| − I)H⊗nOP
= (2|ψ〉〈ψ| − I)OP .
We note (a) G can be realized without knowledge of |β〉 orM , (b) OP restricted to V ′
is a reflection about |α〉, and (c) 2|ψ〉〈ψ| − I restricted to V ′ is a reflection about |ψ〉.
G has to be a rotation in V ′ since it is the composition of two reflections . Fig. 4.1
illustrates that the rotation is from |ψ〉 towards |β〉 by ϑ = 2arcsin((M/N)1/2) ∈
[0, pi/2].
Thus, the Grover algorithm is as follows: We prepare first the register in state |0〉
and apply H⊗n, so the register is in state |ψ〉. Then we apply k times the Grover
operator G where k = b(pi − ϑ)/(2ϑ)e ≤ ⌈(pi/4)(N/M)1/2⌉, thereby transforming the
register in a state near |β〉. Therefore, a final measurement of the register will find
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it, with high probability, in a base state |s〉 that contributed to β, i. e., in a base
state corresponding to a solution s. If the classical verification with Pred shows the
unlikely event P(s) = 1, then we simply restart Grover.
For the Grover algorithm to be useful we still need a way to estimate M or –
equivalently – ϑ in advance. This is achieved by the quantum counting algorithm
QC.
Theorem 26 (Boyer, Brassard, Hoyer, Tapp). Let S, P : S → { 0, 1 }, OP, N ,
and M as in Theorem 25. Let ε > 0 and m ∈ N+.
There is a quantum algorithm QC that, on input the black box oracle OP, returns,
with probability at least 1 − ε, the Grover rotation angle ϑ up to m binary digits
precision. QC queries O2jP for all j ∈ { 0, . . . , t − 1 } and requires O(t2) additional
elementary quantum operations where t = m+ dlog2(2 + 1/(2ε)e.
Since sin2(ϑ/2) =M/N , we can derive an estimate M˜ for the number of solutions
in S from the value ϑ˜ returned by QC. For example, if t = dn/2e + 3 than we have
|M − M˜ | ∈ O(M1/2).
ϑ is the angular velocity of the map t 7→ Gt|ψ〉 whence it is no surprise that ϑ can
be recovered from some samples G|ψ〉,G2|ψ〉, . . . by means of the Fourier transform.
The details of Shor’s renowned quantum Fourier transform [Sho94] are beyond the
scope of this outline of quantum searching. Suffice it to say that the quantum Fourier
transform in the shape of the so called phase estimation algorithm computes ϑ up
to t binary digits from G20 |ψ〉, . . . ,G2t−1 |ψ〉. The QC algorithm was first described in
[BBHT96] and later refined in [BHT98].
4.2. The Quantum Search Reduction Algorithm
We describe in this section a quantum algorithm for the reduction of lattice bases.
This algorithm is a variation of SSR using Grover’s search algorithm and the quantum
counting algorithm.
SSR has two parts that involve a search problem in the set Su,B or – using the
generalizations from Sect. 3.7 – in the set Vc,B: CSSS returns true if and only if the
implementation deems it likely that there is at least one solution v ∈ Vc,B subject
to ‖v‖2 ≤ γ‖b1‖2. The sampling loop in SSR systematically searches Vc,B for such a
solution. The Quantum Search Reduction QSR on the following page replaces CSSS
and the sampling loop by QC and Grover, respectively.
There is the minor technical inconvenience that both quantum algorithms expect
a quantum circuit OP as black box oracle and the predicate evaluated by this oracle
changes every outer SSR loop iteration. The workaround is to store the parameters
the predicate depends on in some extra quantum registers that remain in some fixed
base state throughout each QSR iteration. In particular, the extra registers won’t be
entangled with the working registers of QC and Grover and will therefore not interfere
with these algorithms. More descriptive, the black box oracle uses the extra registers
like global read-only variables in a classical algorithm.
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Algorithm 10 QSR
Input: • basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zd×n of lattice L
• reduction factor γ ∈ (0, 1),
• c ∈ Nn as in Def. 16,
• LLL parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1)
Output: LLL reduced basis B′ of L such that γ‖b′1‖2 < min{ ‖v‖2 v ∈
Vc,B′ }.
/∗ m: floating point size, m′: small constant in N+ ∗/
prepare |rb〉|rR〉|rγ〉|rc〉|rx〉 ∈ V ⊗mnq ⊗V ⊗mn(n−1)/2q ⊗V ⊗mq ⊗V ⊗m
′n
q ⊗V ⊗ log2 |Vc,B|q
|rγ〉|rc〉 ← |γ〉|c〉
OP ← QuantumCircuit(x 7→ SamplePredicate(b,R, γ, c, x))
(B, b,R)← LLL(B, δ) /∗ B = BˆR, b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∗/
|rb〉|rR〉 ← |b〉|R〉
M ← QC(OP)
while M > 0 do
x← Grover(OP)
v← GenSample(B,R, c, x)
(B, b,R)← LLL([v,b1, . . . ,bn], δ)
|rb〉|rR〉 ← |b〉|R〉
M ← QC(OP)
end while
However, this implies that we know the space occupied by the global black box
parameters in advance, for all QSR iterations. The algorithm Sample used in the
search condition above refers to the lattice basis B and computes a lattice vector
v. While it is possible to come up with space bounds for all B and v that may be
computed in the course of QSR, these are in fact worst case bounds. Since quantum
space is a scarce resource, we’d like to avoid any waste of qubits. On inspection of the
criterion ‖v‖2 = ‖GenSample(B,R, c, x)‖2 ≤ γ‖b1‖2, we realize that we do not need
to make v explicit as long as we can compute its norm. We can easily reconstruct
the short vector v we want to prepend to the basis from its index in Vc,B returned
by Grover. This idea is implemented by the algorithm SamplePredicate on page 66.
Therefore, QSR can be outlined as follows: The algorithm first prepares all quan-
tum registers required by the black box and initializes the registers that will not
change. Then it determines the quantum circuit OP such that it fits the search space
size |Vc,B|. (As mentioned in Sec. 4.1, there is a uniform quantum circuit family
of suited black box oracles with circuit depth in O(n2) because SamplePredicate is
classically computable in O(n2) time. Furthermore, uniform circuit families are in-
herently constructive, so QSR can actually fix the required circuit.) Then, as long as
QC asserts there is indeed a sufficiently short vector in Vc,B, QSR employs Grover to
find the index of such a vector v, reconstructs v by means of GenSample, and finally
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LLL reduces the generating system formed by prepending v to B.
How many qubits need to be reserved for the extra registers OP operates on?
SamplePredicate expects the squared norms b of the Gram-Schmidt vectors of B,
the Gram-Schmidt coefficient matrix R, the reduction factor γ, the search space
descriptor c, and the search space element number x. All but the last parameter
need to be stored in extra registers prior to the calls of QC and Grover. The Schnorr-
Euchner variant of LLL, which is mostly used in practice, as well as BKZ store b and
R in floating point format, so we can assume a floating point format here as well.
Let m be the number of Bits occupied by each such floating point number. Then the
extra register that holds b has to be mn qubits wide. The upper triangular matrix R
requires a mn(n− 1)/2 qubit register. The product of all nonzero entries in c is the
search space size |Vc,B|. Since the search in a set with more than 2160 elements seems
infeasible, even with Grover, m′n qubits (with some small constant m′ = 4, say) are
certainly enough to store c.
The algorithm SamplePredicate follows the path set forth by GenSample. It exploits
that GenSample never references the value of v. So the algorithm still computes ν
such that Sample(B,R, x) = Bˆν if we remove all occurrences of v. Then the input
parameter B is not used anymore whence we can remove it as well.
Recall that c contains trailing zeros only. SamplePredicate thus executes the first
branch of the innermost if block exactly once. All following iterations execute the
else branch and modify only coefficients νi of ν with i ≤ j because R is unit upper
triangular. This implies that the update after the innermost if block suffices to
restitute the loop invariant ` = ‖∑ni=j+1 νibˆi‖2. Hence, ` = ‖Sample(B,R, x)‖2 at
the end of the algorithm. (Note that the right hand side is invariant if we replace
B by any real matrix B′ with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B′ = [bˆ′1, . . . , bˆ′n]R such
that ‖bˆ′i‖2 = ‖bˆj‖2 for all j ∈ { 1, . . . , n }.) SamplePredicate can therefore test the
inequation ‖Sample(B,R, x)‖2 ≤ γ‖b1‖2 by comparing ` with the scaled value of
‖bˆ1‖2 = ‖b1‖2.
4.3. QSR vs. Classical Algorithms
We cannot construct a quantum variant of PoolSR because Grover returns exactly one
index into the search space and the predicate needs to be deterministic. We cannot
express “almost short enough” within the Grover framework. We can formulate such
a predicate for the vectors sought in ShortProjectionSR, though, whence it is possible
to construct a quantum variant of ShortProjectionSR in analogy to QSR.
Due to the nature of quantum measurements, Grover returns a random solution to
the search problem specified by OP. QSR is thus a randomized algorithm, different
from the deterministic SSR.
LetM be the number of sufficiently short vectors in Vc,B and |Vc,B| = 2u. SSR needs
expected O(n22u/M) classical operations to find a vector it can insert in front of b1.
Grover, on the other hand, comes up with such a vector after only O(n2(2u/M)1/2)
quantum operations.
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Algorithm 11 SamplePredicate
Input: • b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2) ∈ Qn
• unit upper triangular matrix R = [r1, . . . , rn] ∈ Qn×n such that there is
B ∈ Zd×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition B = [bˆ1, . . . , bˆn]R,
• reduction factor γ ∈ (0, 1),
• c ∈ Nn as in Def. 16,
• x ∈ { 0, . . . , |Vc,B| − 1 }
Output: 1 if ‖GenSample(B,R, c, x)‖2 ≤ γ‖b1‖2 and 0 else.
procedure SamplePredicate (b,R, x)
(`,ν)← (0,0)
for j from n downto 1 do
if cj > 0 then
(x, z)← (bx/cjc, x mod cj)
if j = n or cj+1 = 0 then
ν ← (x+ 1)rj /∗ ν = (ν1, . . . , νn)t, νj+1 = · · · = νn = 0 ∗/
else
z ← (−1)zbz/2c /∗ z ∈ Z ∩ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
y ← dνj − 1/2e /∗ νj − y ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] ∗/
if νj − y ≤ 0 then
y ← y − z /∗ νj − y ∈ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
else
y ← y + z /∗ νj − y ∈ (−cj/2, cj/2] ∗/
end if
ν ← ν − yrj /∗ νj ← νj − y ∗/
end if
`← `+ ν2j ‖bˆj‖2
end if
end for
if ` ≤ γ‖bˆ1‖2 then
return 1
else
return 0
end if
end procedure
Furthermore, the output precision of QC needs to be sufficiently high for us to
decide M > 0 or not. A more detailed analysis shows that QC answers this question
if ϑ is determined up to m = du/2e + 1 bit precision [NC00]. In that case, QC
performs Θ(2u/2) Grover iterations. The runtime of QSR is hence dominated by QC
and the total cost of a single iteration is O(n22u/2 + n3) operations. In contrast, a
single SSR iteration requires O(n22u/M+n3) operations. QSR is thus asymptotically
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faster than SSR provided M ∈ o(2u/2) which, empirically, we can assume after a few
iterations, at the latest. The number of samples we have to compute before a short
vector is found usually grows rapidly whence QSR offers an almost quadratic speedup
– asymptotically, that is.
It is not possible yet to predict the actual runtime that will be attached to a
single operation on a quantum computer. It is not even clear yet which technology
will be used to realize “large” quantum computers. It is therefore pointless to try
to compare the O-constants in the runtimes of QSR and SSR. If, hypothetically,
Grover will in fact realize a quadratic speedup with respect to the wall clock time
required, then QSR will enable us to search a candidate set in about two weeks that
is infeasible to search with today’s classical hardware: Our primary test hardware
enumerates approximately 233 sample vectors in a n = 180 dimensional lattice per
fortnight. Under our hypothesis, a quantum computer will therefore search up to 266
sample vectors within the same time span. Adding n2 operations per sample for the
evaluation of SamplePredicate, the classical search of that many vectors would cost
more than 280 operations.
Another play of thought considers the SVP approximation factor achieved by QSR
if we return to (GSA). Then Schnorr’s analysis of RSR applies and RSR computes in
O(n3e(k/4) ln(k/6)+n4) time a vector at most e(n/2k) ln(k/6) times as long as a shortest
lattice vector. If we replace the random sampling in RSR by Grover in analogy to QSR
then the runtime drops to O(n3e(k/8) ln(k/6)+n4). Or, equivalently, a quantum variant
of RSR achieves in O(n3e(k/4) ln(k/3)+n4) time an SVP approximation factor as small
as e(n/4k) ln(k/3); i. e., the approximation factor is improved almost quadratically.
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Chapter 5.
The LaRed Framework
We describe LaRed, a C++ library and framework for lattice basis reduction by sam-
pling. The design of LaRed eases the implementation of different sampling reduction
strategies and allows for the use of almost arbitrary long integer and floating point
arithmetic packages. We also describe the Python extension module laredpy that sup-
ports the interactive use of LaRed and provides tools for the evaluation of algorithms
implemented with LaRed.
5.1. LaRed
In Chapter 3, we reported on the empirical behaviour of the proposed algorithms.
For this we needed an implementation of various sampling reduction algorithms until
the algorithms reached the form presented in this thesis. It soon became clear that
ad-hoc prototypes did not offer the flexibilty we needed. We therefore developed
a framework and accompanying library named LaRed for lattice basis reduction by
sampling.
We motivate the requirements that governed the development of LaRed in the
following Sect. 5.1.1. Then Sect. 5.1.2 explains our design choices for LaRed in order
to meet these requirements, before Sect. 5.1.3 provides the information about LaRed’s
implementation that is needed for its effective use.
5.1.1. Design Goals and Requirements
If LaRed is to be used beyond this thesis it has to offer an intuitive interface and has
to make efficient use of the available computing resources. It has to be portable so
it can be built and behaves correctly not only today on different platforms but on
future platforms as well. Given the rapid change of affordable computer hardware
this portability serves also LaRed’s maintainability.
We have seen that Sampling Reduction is in fact a family of algorithms that follows
the pattern described in Alg. 12. There are many reasonable ways to implememt this
pattern: The LLL-type reduction can be, e. g., the Schnorr-Euchner variant of LLL,
BKZ, or Koy’s primal-dual reduction. We discussed several possible implementations
of the loop condition in Sect. 3.2 through 3.4. We can sample vectors from the search
space at random or by enumeration. The selection of sample vectors used to form
the new generating system may depend on b1 only or on the Gram-Schmidt vectors
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Algorithm 12 Sampling Reduction Pattern
Input: generating system G of a some latticce L
Output: reduced basis B of L
B← LLL-type reduction of B
while chance of progress considered sufficient do
Sample vectors from some search space and recombine some of them with B
into a new generating system G of L = L(B).
B← LLL-type reduction of G
end while
return B
bˆj as well, and so on. All these variations have in common that they do not interfere
with each other; e. g., we can choose the method to sample vectors regardless of
the LLL-type reduction. In other words, Sampling Reduction is the composition of
several orthogonal policies.
From the outset, our goal was that LaRed is easily extendible due to a thorough
separation of concerns [HL95]. LaRed should impose a minimal interface only on the
policies, so a user can easily define her own policy implementations which substitute
the policies LaRed ships with. Ideally, policy modifications should still be possible
at runtime so as not to discourage experimentation. This implies that code changes
due to a modified policy should be as locally confined as possible. It should not be
necessary to alter any code that is not part of the respective policy’s implementation.
We therefore concretize the term policy as a piece of code that, as Alexandrescu
[Ale01] puts it, “takes care of only one behavioral or structural aspect. As the name
suggests, a policy establishes an interface pertaining to a specific issue. You can
implement policies in various ways as long as you respect the policy interface.” In
contrast to Alexandrescu, though, we do not require a policy to be applied at compile
time.
As mentioned in Sect. 3.7.2, the search of Vc,B for a short vector is an application
where SIMD-parallelization (single instruction, multiple data) excels. The use of
software packages like DOTS [BKLW99] can be encapsulated into policies. However,
in the presence of concurrency, any non-const global or static data poses a risk of race
conditions, though. Since we don’t want to preclude the use of such a distributed
search policy, LaRed must not use non-const global or static data.
Policies typically modify the behaviour of an algorithm. There is another aspect
of LaRed that has to be configurable but that ideally does not change the behaviour
of the implemented algorithms: The long integer and floating point arithmetic used.
In particular, the inherent limitations of floating point arithmetic (FPA) imply that
every choice of FPA is a compromise between the lattice bases an algorithm can
actually reduce and its efficiency. For instance, the Gram-Schmidt decomposition of
an input basis can fail if the ratio between the maximum and minimum length of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors becomes too large and in consequence there are too few precise
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digits left in the Gram-Schmidt coefficients. In such a case, a more precise (software)
FPA type is required; on the other hand, hardware FPA – e. g., the elementary C++
type double – is typically more efficient by at least an order of magnitude. LaRed
therefore has to support various arithmetic types.
However, code duplication hurts maintainability and should be avoided where pos-
sible. It follows that LaRed’s arithmetic should be configurable by means of type
traits. By type trait we refer to a mechanism that “establishes a uniform symbolic
interface over a coherent set of design choices that vary from one type to another”
[Ale00]. As an additional benefit, the freedom in the choice of arithmetic enables us
to interface LaRed to existing computational algebra libraries like LiDIA [LG04] and
NTL [Sho05].
The boundaries between policies and type traits are often somewhat fuzzy; as a
rule of thumb, policies let the user customize how some objective is achieved – they
fill in the respective algorithms. Type traits, in contrast, provide the information
required to instantiate a generic implementation of some algorithm for different data
types that model a common concept.
Early on we encountered a further requirement: Experiments with high dimen-
sional lattice bases often ran several days whence they were impractical to perform
on a notebook that gets turned off once or twice a day. Even on a stationary PC,
we had to abort long running experiments due to security critical operating system
updates, power outages and so on. The system thus had to support dumping the
algorithm’s current state in regular intervals to disk and resuming the reduction later
on starting in this state.
Finally, some reductions are best run under interactive control – as seen, e. g., in
Sect. 3.6.2. It was therefore necessary to develop a convenient interface that supports
the available policies and does not make the definition of new interfaces prohibitively
hard.
5.1.2. Design Choices
While testing several prototypes of LaRed, the above mentioned requirements became
apparent. We discuss in this section some of the corresponding design alternatives
and describe the choices we finally settled on.
Policies
A traditional approach to place some decisions within an algorithm in the user’s
responsibility is through callback functions. For instance, the LLL implementations
in NTL expect a function pointer check as parameter. If check= 0! then it refers
to a function that is called in each iteration with the base vector last computed as
argument. The LLL-reduction is terminated immediately if *check returns a nonzero
value because, say, the vector is short enough for a given application.
Plain function pointers are rarely used in modern C++ libraries. The main reason
is that functions are not stateful – non-const function scope static data aside which is
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considered harmful in general because it is prone to break the system in the presence
of concurrency. Following the lead of the C++ standard library, function pointers are
often replaced by so called functors, i. e., objects of a class type for which operator()
has been overloaded. Functors are called with the funtion call syntax we know from
function pointers as well, but they can be parameterized when they are constructed
and they can keep state between calls. Actually, there is nothing special about
operator(); any member function can assume its role if there is a convention within
the framework how this member function is named. The objects that replace plain
function pointers must implement a given interface; the semantics they implement
may vary within certain bounds. In other words, these objects must be substitutable
and the operations they define have to be polymorphic as defined by Liskov [Lis88].
There are two realizations of polymorphism in C++, static and dynamic. The
former is also known as compile time polymorphism because it is implemented by
means of class and function templates. As long as they support the same syntax,
objects of different types can be treated the same way; the compiler can figure out
which functions need to be actually called. The advantage of static polymorphism
is that, at this stage, we still can replace function signatures and the types the
algorithms operate on. These manipulations can be arbitrary complex; in fact, the
C++ template mechanism offers us a Turing complete language [AG04] – the programs
implemented in this language operate on types and integral numbers and their results,
when executed by the compiler, are C++ code as well.
Static polymorphism is surprisingly powerful. But it has three disadvantages that
go against the design goals mentioned in Sect. 5.1.1: Template metaprogramming
is not a feature C++ was designed for; it was merely “discovered” [Unr02] and uses
a rather awkward syntax. Therefore, programs using static polymorphism tend to
be not easily accessible and, in consequence, hard to maintain. Abundant use of
templates stresses the compiler, often to its limits, and even recent compilers are
known to fail to implement templates conforming to the C++ standard. Porting
code that relies on non-trivial static polymorphism often requires to work around
those compiler deficiencies. Static polymorphism can thus hurt portability. These
two drawbacks have to be weighed whenever static polymorphism is a reasonable
design alternative; still, static polymorphism is often succesfully used. But our goal
that policies can be easily replaced, ideally at runtime, tipped the scale since static
polymorphism is inherently compile time bound.
So we are left with dynamic polymorphism, realized in C++ by means of virtual
member functions. The design of policies based on runtime polymorphism is in fact
an instance of the Strategy design pattern [GHJV95]. That is, for each policy we
need a strategy class that defines the interface. Any member function of the strategy
class that is intended to be customized by user defined policies is declared (pure)
virtual. At runtime, we supply pointers or references to objects of derived types
which implement the complete interface. The concrete policy types may be defined
outside LaRed and the applied policy can be changed between calls into LaRed by
simply exchanging the referenced policy objects. As we will see below, we can even
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define new policy types at runtime through laredpy.
Dynamic polymorphism is not without drawbacks either: A virtual member func-
tion call is more time expensive and constitutes in most cases a barrier for any
compiler optimization. This hurts most if the member function implementation is
simple enough to be inlined if called statically. But we decided to accept a potential
performance penalty – few percents in the worst case – in exchange for the flexibility
we gain if we can easily switch policies.
Type Traits
We explained above that LaRed should support different arithmetic data types. The
arithmetic lies at the core of LaRed’s algorithms whence we could not as easily accept
a performance hit encurred by dynamic polymorphism as with the policies above. On
the other hand, it seemes likely that a user will use a small set of arithmetic types
only. It is feasible and practicable to instantiate the algorithms and policies for all
arithmetic types the user plans to use. Therefore, the arithmetic in LaRed is realized
by means of static polymorphism.
More precisely, the main algorithm classes are parameterized on the long integer
type used to represent the elements of the input basis and on the floating point
type used for the Gram-Schmidt decomposition of the basis. These classes make
both types accessible through public member typedefs Integer and FP, respectively.
Then all policy classes are parameterized on the calling algorithm class. That way
there is only one template parameter; the code does not become too complicated and
unmaintainable due to the cumbersome template syntax.
Of course, we must actually operate on objects of the respective arithmetic types.
We could reasonably expect that these overload the arithmetic operators. But we also
need to compute logarithms, square roots, truncate floating point numbers and so on.
There is no generally agreed upon arithmetic type concept that covers these function
names. Furthermore, assume we required that, for every floating point object x of
type T, the expression sqrt(x) returns the square root of x as another object of type
T. Then all calls of sqrt from within LaRed had to be unqualified and we had to trust
the compiler to find the correct function by argument dependent lookup (ADL, also
known as Koenig lookup). That is because the functions for different arithmetic types
are defined in different namespaces, and we have no other way to tell the compiler
to look up sqrt in a namespace the name of which we do not know in advance and
that does not enclose LaRed’s namespace. Unfortunately, such use of ADL is rather
fragile; for instance, the outcome depends on whether the compiler implements the
two phase name lookup required by the C++ standard – which some compilers, that
are the default compilers on many systems, still do not (GCC 3.3, MSVC++ 7.1,
among others).
We overcome this by an indirection that the compiler can easily optimize away: We
declare all required functions as function templates in a separate, nested namespace
LaRed::arithmetic. These function templates simply forward the calls to type
specific implementations. We provide inlined definitions of the primary templates
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that rely on ADL as above. As long as the corresponding function for a particular
arithmetic type is not named different from our default and as long as the compiler
is able to resolve the function name by ADL, the primary templates are sufficient;
the user does not need to write any support code. Otherwise, the user only hass to
provide explicit specializations of the respective function templates that forward the
calls through qualified function calls.
We also need some type traits that map from the arithmetic types to some con-
stants. This is easily achieved by static member variables of class templates. For
example, LaRed::arithmetic::Zero<T>::value is supposed to be a constant of
type T with value 0. Again, the primary templates’ definitions should fit all types
that have conversion constructors accepting ints. If objects of this type cannot be
initialized this way or the compiler used is not up to it, then an explicit specialization
is an easy workaround.
State Serialization
We mentioned in Sect. 5.1.1 the need to store the current reduction’s state in non-
volatile memory combined with the ability to resume the reduction from the stored
state later on. We first had to decide how to trigger a dump of the current state.
On Unix and similar systems it is common to make deamons reload their configu-
ration or log statistics by sending some signal. We discarded the option to let users
of LaRed request a state dump at more or less arbitrary points in the reduction by a
similar mechanism. The handling of such asynchronous events would have involved
low level system programming and thus hurt both portability and maintainability of
LaRed for a doubtful gain.
We rather opted for a synchronous solution, i. e., the current state can be written
on few well defined points only. For simplicity’s sake, we decided that a state dump
should be triggered whenever a user defined time interval has passed.
Note that the various reduction algorithms are not independent: For instance,
BKZ calls LLL as a subalgorithm. In a design that relies on the language inherent
stack mechanism to call subalgorithms, we still could serialize the state of all active
algorithms – by always passing a pointer to the “parent” algorithm object, say, so
we could walk up the stack and serialize all reduction objects. However, there is no
portable way to restore an arbitrary deep process stack when a reduction dumped to
disk is to be resumed.
We therefore had to include our own stack of reduction algorithms in LaRed. When
resuming a reduction, this stack is reconstructed and the algorithm pushed last on
the stack is executed. This also means that the algorithm implementations need to
maintain some explicit information what part of the algorithm needs to be executed
next so they can proceed when called after stack reconstruction. In other words, the
algorithms have to be implemented as some kind of finite state machines.
In retrospect, the requirement to be able to dump and resume reductions had a
major impact on LaRed’s design – perhaps much more than one would be willing
to grant, on the first glance, to a feature not directly related to LaRed’s objective,
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lattice basis reduction. However, it turned out that the algorithms’ decomposition
when implementing the state machines helped with identifying separating potential
policies. Thus, the implementation became actually less intertwined and more clear.
Interface
It is easy to define free function templates that shield the user from the handling of
LaRed’s own stack and the setup of the algorithm classes, which are mostly imple-
mentation details. These function templates can provide default policies if the user
chooses not to supply her own.
Since the abstract policy classes are parameterized on the algorithm class special-
izations, the algorithm classes necessarily leak into the user code. The impact on the
maintainability of the user code can be minimized, though, by providing typedefs
for the strategy class specializations. If only a fixed set of arithmetic types needs
to be supported, then we can also provide an extra layer that hides the template
specializations. For instance, LaRed ships with an NTL interface that supports all
algorithms with the long integer type NTL::ZZ combined with the floating point types
double, NTL::quad_float, NTL::xdouble, and NTL::RR, respectively. The user of
this interface does not need to be aware that all policy classes are in fact template
classes.
The user is free to change policies after each sampling reduction iteration because
we chose not to implement the outer loop within LaRed. There is rather an algorithm
class that runs CSSS and computes the new generating system G using the user
defined policies. It is up to the user to reduce G again by an LLL-type reduction of
her choice. So the user can apply in each iteration any defined policy.
Implementing an interactive user interface from scratch that puts the user in com-
plete control of the reductions run is a major undertaking. We avoided that by
defining a binding to the interpreted programming language Python. Within the
Python interpreter, we can run the reductions with arbitrary complex policy combi-
nations. Incidentally, the binding even supports that we derive Python classes from
the C++ strategy classes, whence we can define new policies at runtime. The Python
binding is described in more detail in Sect. 5.2.
5.1.3. Implementation
The previous section discussed LaRed on a more abstract level. Here we describe the
actual implementation of LaRed. After some remarks about the code LaRed is based
on, we will first see how AlgorithmStack controls the execution of the algorithms
and how this interacts with the serialization and resumption of reductions. Then we
give an overview over the sampling reduction policies already implemented in LaRed
and how they interact.
The implementation of LLL and BKZ in LaRed evolved from code in NTL. NTL is
distributed under the GNU General Public License (GPL). We could therefore adapt
the code, but, in concequence, LaRed is covered by the GPL as well.
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Algorithm
run(): bool [virtual, abstract]
dump(): void
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
AlgorithmStack
run(): void
pop(): void
top<AlgT>(): AlgT&
push<AlgT, T1, T2, ...>(T1 t1, T2 t2, ...): void
dump(): void
restore(Path archive): void
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
10..n
LLLAlgorithm
run(): bool [virtual]
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
IntType
FPType
LLLImpl
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
LLLAlgT
1
1
BKZAlgorithm
run(): bool [virtual]
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
IntType
FPType
BKZImpl
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
BKZAlgT
1
1
1
1
SRAlgorithm
run(): bool [virtual]
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
IntType
FPType
SRImpl
serialize<ArchT>(ArchT& ar, unsigned ver): void      
SRAlgT
1
1
Figure 5.1.: Algorithm Classes (♦ aggregation, 4 inheritance)
LaRed makes heavy usage of some Boost libraries [Boo04]. Boost is a collection
of free peer reviewed C++ source libraries. It was started to provide reference im-
plementations for potential additions to the C++ standard library and to establish
existing practice prior to standardization. Boost therefore promotes quality program-
ming practices and strives for maximum portability. The implementation of LaRed
relies on six Boost libraries in particular: Boost.Smart Pointer automates memory
management by means of reference counting. Boost.Serialization handles the writ-
ing and reading of complex data structures to and from disk. This involves some
interaction with the filesystem; because of Boost.Filesystem we can avoid any oper-
ating system specific file system API. Boost.Preprocessor supplies the tools needed to
implement variadic forwarding function templates. Boost.Random implements (non-
cryptographic) pseudo random number generators of which we use the Mersenne
Twister generator [MN98]. Boost.Test, finally, provides the framework for the unit
tests that we implemented to avoid regressions.
Unless mentioned otherwise, all code that is part of LaRed’s public interface is
placed in the namespace ::LaRed.
The relationship between the algorithm classes and the execution stack is shown
in Fig. 5.1. The diagram uses an UML-like notation and shows an selection of the
respective class members only.
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An AlgorithmStack contains Algorithm objects. These objects can be accessed
through a typical stack interface: pop() removes the topmost object from the stack
and destroys it. Given a non-empty stack, a reference to the topmost element can
be obtained by top(). If it is known that the top most object can be cast to the
type AlgT, then it is possible to make top() return a reference to this type by use
of the explicit template syntax top<AlgT>(). This function template enforces type
safety; any illegal cast causes an exception to be thrown at runtime. The only way
to push a new element onto the stack is through the member function template of
the same name. Note, however, that it does not push an already existing object
onto the stack; you rather have to provide the object’s type AlgT and a parameter
list. push<AlgT>(...) constructs a new AlgT object on the free store, forwarding
the supplied parameter list to the appropriate constructor. Due to this restriction,
an AlgorithmStack can enforce its ownership of all Algorithm objects it contains.
This encapsulation of responsibilities avoids potential interactions with code that
was not written for the LaRed framework and thus improves its maintainability.
The constructor forwarding is implemented with the help of the Boost Preprocessor
library by horizontal preprocessor iteration, a technique well known in the field of
C++ generative programming, see, e. g., [AG04]. By default, LaRed supports up to
twenty arguments which we suppose to serve almost any conceivable algorithm class.
If not, then the limit can still be pushed further by a redefinition of the preprocessor
constant LARED_ALGORITHM_MAX_ARITY.
A reduction’s current state is defined by the state of all elements in the object
graph that is accessible from the corresponding AlgorithmStack. When we write
this state to disk we need to visit the objects in this graph, store their data members,
and proceed with all objects they reference. We also need to recognize if we already
stored an object before, so as not to enter an infinite recursion. If an object’s data
was already serialized, then we have to note where in the previous data stream the
relevant information can be looked up. Conversely, when we read the serialized graph,
we must ensure that no object is deserialized twice and that references to the same
object are restored correctly – even if the object is referenced through pointers to
base classes.
This is anything but a trivial task, but the complexity involved is encased in the
Boost Serialization library. We only had to write some boilerplate code for any class
that may be serialized. With this in place, we can dump the complete object graph
reachable through the stack object s by an invocation of s.dump(). This member
function makes sure that at least the time span s.dump_interval passed since the
last dump. If so, then it creates a backup of the the previous archive file, opens a new
archive, and writes s with a single line of code into the archive – together with all
Algorithm objects s contains as well as all directly or indirectly referenced objects.
The reconstruction of a reduction is even simpler: Given the name of an archive file,
s.restore(name) deserializes all objects stored in the archive and resets all references
such that the new object graph is equivalent to the graph that was dumped into the
file name.
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void
AlgorithmStack ::
run() {
while(!this ->empty ()) {
this ->dump ();
if(this ->top <Algorithm >(). run()) {
this ->pop ();
}
}
}
Listing 5.1: AlgorithmStack::run()
We indicated in Sect. 5.1.2 that the algorithms need to be implemented as state
machines of some kind. Their input is the generating system, the Gram-Schmidt
decomposition computed so far, etc. Let a be an Algorithm object. Each possible
state of a corresponds to a particular section of the algorithm a implements. Then
a.run() executes this algorithm section on the stored data and, depending on the
outcome, a switches into a new state that specifies how to proceed. a.run() returns
true if and only if a reached a final state, i. e., if a should be popped from the stack.
With this specification of Algorithm::run(), the code that triggers both the algo-
rithm execution and the periodical serialization becomes very simple, see Listing 5.1.
The generation of the serialization code that enables the concrete algorithm classes
to be serialized through pointers to Algorithm strains compilers with suboptimal in-
ternal template support (like, e. g., GCC 3.4). The instantiation and compilation
of the implementations of the reduction algorithms requires considerable compiler
resources as well. We therefore separated the implementations from the algorithm
classes as shown in Fig. 5.1. We can thus instantiate algorithm classes and implemen-
tations each in their own translation unit and keep the compiler’s memory consump-
tion and the total compile time within acceptable limits (up to 350MByte RAM and
approximately 12 minutes, respectively, on our primary test PC with GCC 3.4.3).
The state machine implementation in the run() member of the algorithm classes
does not need to be sophisticated at all. Any solution more involved than the simple
dispatch by a switch statement would be overkill and thus hurt the code’s accessibil-
ity. We see in the excerpt in Listing 5.2 on page 80 that most calls of the individual
algorithm parts do not require any arguments; the algorithm implementation objects
maintain all necessary context. The only exception are those algorithm parts that
may need to call another algorithm. They take the stack onto which they push the
new algorithm as parameter.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 5.2 on the next page specifies how LaRed’s Sam-
pling Reduction implementation SRImpl interacts with the SRControl, SRSampler,
SRReporter, and CSSS policy objects. For clarity’s sake, the diagram omits all func-
tion parameters and return values. (The defined policies are depicted in Fig. 5.3 on
page 81).
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SRAlgorithm SRImpl SRControl SRReporter CSSS SRSampler
prepare()
prepare()
compute_GS()
initialize()
initialize()
check_success_probability()
recompute()
is_indicated()
report()
12
8
ite
ra
tio
ns
loop()
next_sample_idx()
sample()
process_sample()
is_indicated()
report()
check_need_more_samples()
more_samples_available()
quit()
update_gen_system()
is_indicated()
report()
Figure 5.2.: Sampling Reduction Sequence Diagram
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template <typename IntType , typename FPType >
bool
BKZAlgorithm <IntType , FPType >::
run() {
switch(this ->state) {
case prepare:
this ->state = this ->impl ->bkz_prepare ();
break;
case initial_LLL:
this ->state =
this ->impl ->bkz_initial_LLL(this ->get_stack ());
break;
case initial_LLL_postprocess:
this ->state = this ->impl ->bkz_initial_LLL_postprocess ();
break;
case enum_prepare:
this ->state = this ->impl ->bkz_enum_prepare ();
break;
// more cases skipped ...
}
return this ->state == finished;
}
Listing 5.2: Excerpt from BKZAlgorithm::run()
The SRControl policy assumes a central role. It provides all sampling reduction pa-
rameters, including the other policy objects. That way the control policy can enforce
that all other policies and parameters are compatible. For instance, SSRControl –
the control policy that implements SSR – will always return a target set object rep-
resenting { 1 }, the user has no chance to define a different target set which would
not make sense for SSR. Similarly, the ShortProjectionSRControl object does not
accept target set and search space arguments representing T and Vc,B, respectively,
if there is 1 ≤ j ≤ maxT such that cj > 1 since otherwise the preconditions of CSSS
would not hold anymore.
The SRReporter object logs status reports to the console or in a log file. Its base
class StatusReporterBase defines flags that specify whether no log, a periodic log
once in a user defined time span, or a log every iteration should be written. Addi-
tionally, there’s a flag that controls if a log is written when the reduction terminates.
During the reduction, SRImpl checks with a call to the non-virtual member func-
tion StatusReporterBase::is_indicated() whether it is supposed to output a log
statement via report().
However, the periodic logs require that a reporter object resets the timer in its
StatusReporterBase subobject whenever report() is called, no matter how a user
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StatusReporterBase
is_indicated(): bool 
SRReporter
report(): void
do_report(): void [virtual, abstract]   
SRAlgT
MuteSRReporter
do_report(): void [virtual]  
SRAlgT
DefaultSRReporter
do_report(): void [virtual]  
SRAlgT
SRControl
compute_GS(): void
prepare(): void
process_sample(): void
need_more_samples(): void
update_gen_system(): void
quit(): void
do_prepare(): void [virtual, abstract]
do_process_sample(): void [virtual, abstract]
do_need_more_samples(): void [virtual, abstract]
do_update_gen_system(): void [virtual, abstract]    
do_quit(): void [virtual, abstract]
get_CSSS(): CSSS&
get_reporter(): SRReporter&
get_search_space(): SearchSpace const&
get_sampler(): SRSampler&
get_reduction_factor(): FPType
get_target_set(): SRTargetSet const&
SRAlgT 1
1
TargetSet
1 1
SRCommonControl
do_prepare(): void [virtual]
do_process_sample(): void [virtual]
do_need_more_samples(): void [virtual]   
do_quit(): void [virtual]
SRAlgT
SSRControl
do_prepare(): void [virtual]
do_process_sample(): void [virtual]
do_need_more_samples(): void [virtual]
do_update_gen_system(): void [virtual]   
do_quit(): void [virtual]
SRAlgT
ShortProjectionSRControl
do_prepare(): void [virtual]
do_process_sample(): void [virtual]
do_need_more_samples(): void [virtual]
do_update_gen_system(): void [virtual]   
do_quit(): void [virtual]
SRAlgT
PoolSRControl
do_prepare(): void [virtual]
do_process_sample(): void [virtual]
do_need_more_samples(): void [virtual]
do_update_gen_system(): void [virtual]   
do_quit(): void [virtual]
SRAlgT
Acceptor
init(): void
accept(): bool
do_init(): void [virtual, abstract]
do_accept(): bool [virtual, abstract]   
SRAlgT
1 1
RandExpAcceptor
do_init(): void [virtual]
do_accept(): bool [virtual]   
SRAlgT
SREnumSampler
do_init(): void [virtual]
do_next_sample_idx: IntType [virtual]
do_more_samples_available(): bool [virtual]   
SRAlgT
SRSampler
do_init(): void [virtual, abstract]
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Figure 5.3.: Policies Class Diagram ( composition, ♦ aggregation, 4 inheritance)
defined SRReporter policy overrides the logging function. We therefore applied the
Template Method design pattern [GHJV95]. Despite its name, the pattern does not
refer to the class and function templates defined in C++. Template Method rather
delegates parts of an algorithm to methods that can be overridden by subclasses, but
enforces some pre- and postprocessing steps. Here, the report() implementation in
SRReporter resets the timer before it delegates the actual logging to the virtual mem-
ber function do_report(). The report() member function is non-virtual whence its
invocations from SRImpl are statically bound. Even if a user defined logging policy
overrides report(), LaRed still calls the function defined in SRReporter. The only
member a user can effectively customize is do_report().
We applied Template Method to LaRed’s policy design throughout. We use it, e. g.,
to assert the policies’ pre- and postconditions.
Implementations of the SRControl interface may factor out some details into their
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own policies. So does, e. g., PoolSRControl. It defines an Acceptor policy that
handles the decision whether a sample vector is included in the pool of short vectors.
LaRed ships with an Acceptor implementation that realizes Rτ,α. Since the random
distribution defined by equation (3.29) is somewhat arbitrary, it would be reasonable
to implement, say, the acceptor A(lin)τ1,τ2 subject to
Pr
[
A(lin)τ1,τ2(v) = true
]
=

1 if ‖v‖2/‖b1‖2 ≤ τ1,
0 if ‖v‖2/‖b1‖2 ≥ τ2,
(‖v‖2/‖b1‖2 − τ1)/τ2 else,
for 0 < τ1 < τ2 as well. All that is necessary to make a ShortPoolSRControl
object use A(lin)τ1,τ2 is to replace the default Acceptor policy object by means of the
corresponding setter member function.
The UML-like class diagram in Fig. 5.3 on the page before gives an overview over
the policy classes implemented in LaRed. Again, the diagram shows only a selection
of the respective class members and omits the function parameters.
The class hierarchies and their interdependencies follow naturally from the design
choices described above. There are only few details left worth mentioning: First, the
implemented control policies have some overlap; e. g.., all three policies terminate
the short vector search if a vector v was found such that ‖pit(v)‖2 ≤ γ‖bˆt‖2 for any
t in the target set T . To avoid code duplication, we defined the intermediate class
SRCommonControl that implements the behaviour shared by all LaRed control policies.
SRCommonControl does not override all abstract member functions in SRControl,
though, whence it is not possible to allocate an object of type SRCommonControl.
Second, there is no reason for CSSS to store either the target set or the search
space. The policy objects potentially need this data only in do_recompute(), which
determines a new estimate for the search’s success probability. This member function
is called once per sampling reduction iteration, and both the search space and the
target set may be modified by the user between iterations. Therefore, both are passed
to CSSS::recompute() as parameters. Fig. 5.3 reflects this by showing an association
only between SearchSpace and TargetSet on the one hand and CSSS on the other
hand, the most loose coupling there is.
Finally, Fig. 5.3 exhibits a somewhat perplexing composition: The implementation
of TrivialCSSS contains an EventCSSS object. The reason is that we want to be
able to document the estimated success probability even if we enumerate the search
space independent from the success probability. So TrivialCSSS::do_recompute()
forwards to the recompute() member of the contained EventCSSS object, but always
returns true.
5.2. laredpy
When performing experiments with the sampling reduction algorithms implemented
in LaRed, we often had to change parameters and even policies between iterations,
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based on the result of the previous iteration. We therefore needed a user interface that
allows to inspect the reduction results, modify arbitrary policy parameters, and store
the results in a format on disk that is suited for further postprocessing. Implementing
such an interface – console based or using some GUI toolkit – is tedious, error prone,
and often requires platform specific code.
A common workaround is to write an application that takes the information which
policies to apply as well as all necessary parameters from the command line. Ex-
periments are then run either interactively from the command shell or automated
through shell scripts.
This approach suffers from disadvantages that made it impracticable for our pur-
pose: The frequent setup and tear down of processes is expensive; in particular
because the lattice basis must, for each iteration, pass twice through the I/O system
– the process has to read it in the beginning and then has to output the new gener-
ating system at the end. The parsing of command lines that need to be validated,
interpreted, and checked for the mutual compatibility of the given options is compli-
cated as well. So we’d experience a significant performance loss when the iterations
at the beginning of sampling reduction often take seconds only. Furthermore, the
long lists of command line arguments are cumbersome to type. But, most impor-
tantly, command shells were not designed to handle arbitrary data. They typically
support rudimentary string handling and, in some cases, elementary integer arith-
metic; they are certainly not suited for operations on large floating point arrays etc.
That is necessary, though, if we want to evaluate the previous iteration’s result and
automatically decide the parameters for the next iteration.
We therefore needed a higher level scripting environment as provided by commer-
cial applications like Maple or Matlab or by scripting languages like Perl, Python,
or Ruby. The former offer good support for the mathematical evaluation and vi-
sualization of data, but lack somewhat when it comes to, e. g., file handling and
interaction with user defined native code. We therefore decided to use a general pur-
pose scripting language and settled on Python [Pyt05] because of its clean syntax,
the huge repository of available libraries, and, last but not least, its support for native
extensions.
5.2.1. The LaRed Binding to Python
Python defines a C API that can be used to implement so called extension modules,
i. e., software packages implemented in another programming language, typically a
compiled language like C or C++. In fact, the better part of Python’s standard
library is implemented as extension modules. Except in rare corner cases, pure
Python modules behave the same as extension modules.
For this to work, one has to register all exported user defined data types with
the Python interpreter and wrap all functions in some interface code. Python is a
dynamically typed language; in principal, one can pass arbitrary argument lists to
functions. The wrapper code around the native functions therefore needs to check
and – where reasonable – convert all arguments, allocate new Python objects for the
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return values, etc. Manually writing such code is rather involved and tedious.
Fortunately, there are several software packages and code generators that facilitate
writing the interface code at a more abstract level. The Boost Python library [Boo04]
is specialized in exporting C++ libraries to Python. With Boost.Python, exporting
a C++ class reduces to writing few lines to register the type and few lines for each
exported function. The library provides the wrapper code needed to guarantee type
safety, dispatches calls to the correct function among the set of all possible overloads,
maps C++ exceptions to Python exceptions, and so on.
The definition of a Python binding for LaRed was therefore straightforward. We
only had to register all classes that are part of LaRed’s public NTL interface mentioned
in Sect. 5.1.2 as well as their public members with Boost.Python. Alltogether, the
C++ code that exports LaRed and the NTL arithmetic classes to Python is less than
10% the size (in lines of code) of LaRed itself.
Python supports object-oriented programming; in particular, Python has classes
and a dispatch mechanism that is similar to the late binding of C++ virtual member
functions. If C++ classes with virtual members are properly registered, then the
member functions can be overriden by Python instances of this class (or Python
classes derived from the C++ class). Boost.Python guarantees that the override takes
effect, even if the member function is called from C++ through a base reference. If
necessary, then Boost.Python redirects the call back to the Python interpreter. This
happens completely transparent for the C++ code. We thus have a mechanism to
modify and create sampling policies at runtime. This is a byproduct of the binding
via Boost.Python and does not require extra code.
The separation of Sampling Reduction in independent policies helped with keeping
LaRed’s source base manageable since we no longer need NM functions to cover all
combinations of the N +M available implementations of any two policies. It also
means, though, that the user has to construct all the policy objects and assemble
the actual reduction algorithm. This is not a considerable inconvenience when LaRed
is called from C++ since there the code is not rewritten often. But it is a hurdle
in an interactive setting where the user has to type the corresponding code every
time a session is started. laredpy therefore defines convenience functions for the
most frequently used policy combinations that set up the policy objects all at once.
These convenience functions provide reasonable defaults for most arguments. Due
to a Python feature called keyword arguments, the user needs to provide – in no
particular order – those arguments only that actually differ from the defaults. (This
is different from, e. g., C++, where only trailing default arguments may be omitted.)
5.2.2. Evaluating Reduction Algorithms with laredpy
For the evaluation of the proposed reduction algorithms, we had to run numerous
test series and log both the results as well as information about the reduction in a
way that facilitates further postprocessing. Due to the amount of data involved – the
logfiles alone occupied more than 400MByte of diskspace – a systematic approach
was necessary. The following requirements on the experiment harness transpired
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early on:
a) The logs must clearly identify individual experiments.
b) The data of a concluded experiment must not be modified anymore; in partic-
ular, the system has to prevent that log files are accidentally overwritten in a
subsequent experiment.
c) The data preserved has to be comprehensive. It must be possible to reconstruct
all calls of the reduction functions including all policies and parameters. Storing
all intermediate generating systems is impractical for the excessive disk space
consumption, but at least characteristics like the norm of both the base vectors
and the corresponding Gram-Schmidt vectors need to be logged.
d) The retrieval and filtering of log data must be straight forward enough to be
practical, even in an interactive setting. The data structures used to retrieve
log data must aid its evaluation. This is probably illustrated best by a counter-
example: It would be most simple to return the logfile’s content as a flat string.
However, that puts the burden of parsing the string on the user and therefore
hinders its processing, visualization, and interpretation.
Implementing such an experiment harness is a task where we could bring to bear the
advantages of Python. In particular, Python’s flexible data structures in combination
with its support for runtime class interface manipulations and its interpreted nature
were crucial in meeting above requirements with surprisingly little code.
We adopted the rule that for each experiment there should be a separate directory
in the file system where to write all relevant data. Each experiment is uniquely
identified by its log directory. At the same time, the user is free to choose the labels
of the experiments in any way that can be mapped to file system paths. Expressive
labels help to browse large sets of experiments. For instance, we kept the experiments
in a directory tree where each level specified the type of lattice (Micciancio, subset-
sum, NTRU, etc.), a serial number of the particular lattice, the LLL-type algorithm
used in the reduction and its parameter, the general Sampling Reduction strategy,
and so on. This type of hierarchy is not imperative, though. The user can settle on
any suitable directory structure.
A reduction can only be reconstructed if the input basis is available. The exper-
iment harness of laredpy therefore requires that any input basis is read from a file
on disk; it cannot be set up to log the reduction of bases generated on the fly. (The
reduction algorithms do accept such bases, it is only the experiment harness that
enforces this rule for replicability’s sake.)
An experiment is started by a call to startExperiment(source, logdir). The
argument source names the file where the input basis is stored, logdir specifies
the directory associated with the new experiment. startExperiment creates this
directory if necessary; if it already exists, then the function checks that it is empty.
That way we can guarantee that laredpy never overwrites a previous experiment. Any
attempt to do so results in an immediate exception.
startExperiment returns a nested Python dictionary – referred to as expdict
in the following – that stores all information about the experiment, including the
85
Chapter 5. The LaRed Framework
logged data. A dictionary is an associative array: Its elements are accessed with the
familiar square bracket subscription syntax, but the indices or keys do not need to
be consecutive integers. laredpy uses strings as keys throughout.
expdict holds the full path to the source file and the name of the host where
this path is valid and the experiment is run. This information is also written
to the file named source. The current basis system of the lattice is accessible
as expdict["basis"]. The basis is written to the file named result by calling
finishExperiment(expdict).
The most crucial data for the evaluation of an experiment is kept in the dictio-
nary entry expdict["log"]. This entry references a Python list that holds for each
reduction performed – LLL-type or Sampling Reduction – another dictionary. These
nested dictionaries contain the actual log records.
If expdict is passed to a laredpy reduction function, then the function adds a log
entry to expdict["log"]. This entry always contains the key "algorithm" with the
possible values "LLL", "BKZ", or "SR" and and the key "runtime" that stores the
user CPU time (in seconds) spent on this reduction. All other entries depend on the
algorithm and the selected policies.
laredpy takes advantage of a Python feature to keep the generation of the log en-
tries simple: One can query and manipulate the set of attributes and methods of
already constructed objects. In particular, one can insert code in an existing object;
so, whenever the user creates an instance of one of the policy classes defined in LaRed,
then laredpy inserts a readonly property logentry into the policy object. The value
of this property is a dictionary that holds all key-value-pairs that describe the log
info pertaining to this policy object – policy parameters set by the user as well as
data computed by the policy object like, e. g., the search space size estimated by a
CSSS object. This dictionary is constructed whenever logentry is accessed. There-
fore, laredpy’s reduction functions only need to merge the values of the logentry
properties of all all policy objects into the function’s log record and append the re-
sulting dictionary to expdict["log"]. In result, expdict holds all data necessary to
reproduce the reduction and the available information on the effect of the reductions.
Each time a log entry is added to expdict["log"], it is also appended in a “pretty-
printed” textual representation to the file logfile. The chosen format is in fact a
valid Python expression that evaluates to the log record. Therefore, expdict["log"]
can be efficiently reconstructed by passing the content of logfile, enclosed by the
strings "[" and "]", to Python’s eval function. This is implemented in laredpy by
the function readLog(expdir) that expects the path to the experiments log directory
and returns the corresponding expdict structure as above.
The nested dictionary structure of the log data in combination with Python’s sup-
port for anonymous functions and so called list comprehension – a concise mechanism
to build new lists by filtering and manipulating the elements of existing ones – is very
convenient to process the log data. For example,
[ rec["samples"] for rec in expdict["log"] if "samples" in rec ]
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returns a list with the number of samples generated in each Sampling Reduction
invocation in the course of the experiment. It is therefore easy, both in an interactive
setting and in a script, to apply some statistical function on the log data or pass it
on to a Python library for data visualization like, e. g., gnuplot’s Python interface.
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Cryptographic Applications
Lattice theory has many applications in, e. g., integer programming [Len83] and com-
munication theory [AEVZ02]. Arguably, the majority of applications of computa-
tional lattice theory stems from cryptography, though.
We study in this chapter the impact of Sampling Reduction on some cryptographic
applications. Each of these applications operates on its own class of lattices. In the
cryptanalysis of Micciancio’s variant of the GGH cryptosystem [GGH97, Mic01b], we
encounter “random” lattices like the ones we used to demonstrate the behavior of
Sampling Reduction in Chapters 2 and 3. The reduction of knapsack lattice bases was
used to break several subset-sum based cryptosystems [Odl90, BO91]. If applied di-
rectly, this approach can break cryptosystems based on low density subset-sum prob-
lems only. However, a more general analysis [OT03] of the results in [LO85, CJL+92]
indicates that an improved lattice basis reduction can break high density knapsacks
like the ones constructed in the cryptosystem proposed by Okamoto, Tanaka, and
Uchiyama [OTU00] as well. From a practical point of view, the NTRU cryptosystem
[HPS98, HHGP+03] is currently the most important lattice based cryptosystem. Its
security relies on the hardness of finding short vectors in certain modular convolution
lattices.
6.1. Micciancio’s GGH Variant
In 1997, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [GGH97] proposed a cryptosystem –
commonly referred to as GGH – that is based on the hardness of the Closest Vector
Problem (CVP). The CVP is NP-hard [EB81]; but if the point x ∈ Zd is not too
far away from the lattice L, then the closest lattice point can indeed be efficiently
computed by, e. g., Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [Bab86]. The admissible distance
dist(x, L) = min{ ‖v− x‖ v ∈ L } depends on the available basis of L. In the GGH
system, both the private key K and the public key H are bases of a lattice L, but K
allows to solve CVP instances (x, L) for points x much further away from L than H
does. The GGH system assumes it is hard to recover a basis B from H that admits
a distance comparable to K.
The way GGH generated the keys and encoded the messages in the point x ∈ Zn
turned out to be flawed; the system was broken in 1999 by Nguyen [Ngu99]. However,
the system can be seen as a blueprint for encryption and signature primitives based
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Algorithm 13 ReduceModBasis
Input: • v = (v1, . . . , vn)t ∈ Zn
• lattice basis H = [h1, . . . ,hn] = (hi,j) ∈ Zn×n in Hermite normal form
Output: v′ ∈ Zn such that v′ − v ∈ L(H) and v′ = Hx′ for some x′ ∈ [0, 1)n
for j from n downto 1 do
v← v − bvj/hj,jchj
end for
return v
on CVP. Micciancio [Mic01b] proposed in 2001 a variant of GGH that uses a different
encoding of the message in Zn and that guarantees that the public key does not leak
any information about the private key that an attacker could not efficiently compute
from any other basis as well. As a side effect, the space asymptotically occupied by
both public keys and ciphertexts dropped in Micciancio’s scheme by one power of n
compared to the original GGH proposal.
Micciancio’s proposal describes an encryption scheme, but Goldreich, Goldwasser,
and Halevi already outlined how such an CVP based encryption primitive can be
turned into a signature primitive [GGH97].
6.1.1. Micciancio’s Cryptosystem
Micciancio’s system utilizes normalizations of both lattice bases and ciphertexts.
Since an attacker can compute these normalizations anyway, they do not incur any
weaknesses.
A lattice basis H = (hi,j) ∈ Zn×n is said to be in Hermite normal form if and
only if H is upper triangular and 0 ≤ hi,j < hi,i for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. It is well
known from linear algebra that, for any lattice basis B ∈ Zn×n, there is a unique
basis transformation U ∈ GLn(Z) such that H = BU is in Hermite normal form. In
other words, every lattice has exactly one basis H in Hermite normal form. Given any
basis, there are polynomial time algorithms to compute H, cf. [Coh96], for instance.
The second normalization is basis dependent: Let B ∈ Zn×n a lattice basis and
v ∈ Zn. We replace v by the unique representative v′ ∈ Zn of v + L(B) that lies
within the parallelepiped spanned by the columns of B. In principle, we can efficiently
compute v′ for any v and basis B; but it is particularly simple if B is in Hermite
normal form, see Alg. 13.
The encryption primitive proposed by Micciancio is as follows. The security para-
meter n is the dimension of the lattice used to hide the message.
Key Generation. Choose a random lattice basis B ∈R {−n, . . . , n }n×n, detB 6=
0. The private key is its LLL reduction K = LLL(B), the corresponding public key is
(H, ρ) where H = HNF(B) is the Hermite normal form of B and ρ > 0 is the maximum
distance such that knowledge of K allows solving all CVP instances (x, L(H)) with
dist(x, L(H)) ≤ ρ. (For instance, Babai’s algorithm solves the CVP if all Gram-
Schmidt vectors of K are longer than 2ρ.)
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Algorithm 14 Babai
Input: • lattice basis B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zn×n with Gram-Schmidt decomposition
B = BˆR
• squared lengths of Gram-Schmidt vectors b = (‖bˆ1‖2, . . . , ‖bˆn‖2)
• vector c ∈ Zn such that dist(c, L(B)) ≤ min{ ‖bˆj‖/2 j = 1, . . . , n }
Output: v ∈ L(B) next to c
v← 0
for j from n downto 1 do
xj ← d〈c, bˆj〉/‖bˆj‖2c /∗ round to closest integer ∗/
c← c− xjbj
v← v + xjbj
end for
return v
Encryption. The sender encodes the message by some agreed upon enumeration
method as a vector m ∈ Zn subject to ‖m‖ ≤ ρ. The ciphertext is then computed
by c = ReduceModBasis(m,H).
Decryption. The receiver computes v ∈ L(K) such that ‖v − c‖ ≤ ρ using, e. g.,
Babai’s nearest plane algorithm. The message is then recovered as m = c− v.
This method results in a strikingly simple and elegant encryption scheme, but,
unfortunately, it is impractical. If the dimension n of a Micciancio key is less than
800, then the estimated effort to break this instance of the scheme is less than the
threshold stipulated for secure cryptosystems by Lenstra and Verheul [LV01] – even
if the only lattice basis reduction available to an attacker is BKZ [Lud02].
In dimension 800, the keys H and K occupy about 1 MByte and 690 KByte, re-
spectively. The key generation is prohibitively slow: In our experiments on a Sun
Blade 100 machine with a 500 MHz UltraSparc IIE processor, the computation of
a public key for n = 800, using the implementation of Kannan’s HNF algorithm in
LiDIA [LG04], took about 46 hours.
The encryption took about 0.29 seconds per message on said machine. This is still
orders of magnitude slower than, say, RSA, but it might be possible to significantly
speed it up by a less naïve implementation. However, the decryption poses a much
more serious problem: Babai’s algorithm as given in Alg. 14 requires exact arithmetic.
Since ‖c‖ is typically huge, we had to compute the Gram-Schmidt coefficient matrix
with a precision of several thousand bits to successfully decrypt messages with this
algorithm. The required space to hold the Gram-Schmidt coefficients – far more than
100 MByte – renders this impractical, though.
We therefore followed a heuristic approach: Let v′ be the lattice point by a floating
point implementation of Alg. 14. If ‖c − v′‖ ≤ ρ, then v′ is the closest point to c.
Otherwise, we expect ‖c− v′‖ < ‖c‖, whence we apply Alg. 14 again to c′ = c− v.
With this method, we could reliably decrypt messages, but decryption took more
than one hour per message in dimension 800.
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Figure 6.1.: Average height of private and reduced public Micciancio keys
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, umax = 22, CSSStriv)
In summary, Micciancio’s scheme is not appropriate for practical applications.
However, variants in special classes of lattices that allow a more compact representa-
tion of the bases may turn out to be practical. For example, in the NTRUSign system,
each public key of size O(n) is associated with a 2n-dimensional lattice. NTRUSign
uses the ability to solve an approximate CVP in this lattice as proof of possession of
the private key, similar to the signature variant of Micciancio’s scheme.
For our purposes, the perhaps most important feature of Micciancio’s scheme is
that it does not impose any particular structure on the lattices used. For the lack of a
natural distribution on all lattices, the lattices used in Micciancio’s scheme, compared
to the other classes of lattices considered in this chapter, come arguably closest to
the intuitive notion of random lattices. Micciancio’s scheme therefore serves as an
important benchmark for the performance of lattice basis reduction algorithms.
6.1.2. Lattice Basis Reduction Attacks
Recovering a message in the Micciancio scheme is equivalent to (exactly) solving
some CVP instance. Agrell et al. [AEVZ02] survey the known deterministic CVP
algorithms; their experiments show exponential behavior for all of them. On the
other hand, the nearest plane algorithm (Alg. 14 on the preceding page) by Babai –
which, in general, solves an approximate version of the CVP only – enables the holder
of a private Micciancio key K to find in polynomial time the lattice point v closest
to the ciphertext c provided ‖c− v‖ ≤ min{ ‖kˆj‖ j = 1, . . . , n }.
An attacker can therefore either try to reduce the public key such that the height of
the reduced basis becomes large enough to make decrypting feasible. Or the attacker
targets a single ciphertext and constructs a new lattice problem that is likely to be
easier to solve.
Fig. 6.1 shows that the former approach is not feasible with LLL-type reductions
for large n. The height of the reduced public keys becomes soon negligible, even with
BKZ.
As discussed in Chapter 3, SSR and PoolSR have not much effect on the height of
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the reduced bases. Hence, these algorithms are not a reasonable alternative for an
attacker. ShortProjectionSR, in contrast, does significantly affect the length of the
last Gram-Schmidt vectors. The 4th graph in Fig. 6.1 therefore shows the average
height after application of ShortProjectionSR to the already BKZ reduced (β = 5)
public keys with target index set { 1, . . . , 10 }, i. e., the target set that corresponds
to Schnorr’s EShort. It is apparent that the height of the result basis the attacker
obtains is much larger, but for increasing n the height again declines. The difference
between the height of a such reduced public key at dimension n and the corresponding
private key is roughly the same as the difference between a BKZ reduced public key
and its corresponding private key at dimension n − 50. In other words, Sampling
Reduction increases the dimension up to which this attack is viable by about 50.
The second approach that targets a single ciphertext only is realized by the so called
embedding attack [GGH97]. For this attack, we consider the lattice L′ generated by
the block matrix
A′ =
(
A c
0 1
)
∈ Z(n+1)×(n+1) (6.1)
where A is the basis the attacker obtained by reducing the public key H and c is
the attacked ciphertext. Let v be the lattice point in L′ closest to c. Clearly,
x′ = (c− v, 1)t ∈ L(A′) and ‖x′‖2 ≤ ρ2 + 1. Thus, heuristically, x′ is a short or even
shortest vector in L′. The closer c to v, the larger is the likely gap between λ1(L′)
and λ2(L′) and the better are the chances to recover x′ by lattice basis reduction.
The embedding attack is surprisingly powerful. Table 6.1 on the following page
shows the ratio and average runtime of successful attacks with LLL depending on
the lattice dimension and on the distance of the ciphertext to the lattice. In key
dimension 150 and lower, we did not observe any failures. n = 190 was the minimum
dimension where an embedding attack with LLL consistently failed for ciphertexts far
enough from the lattice. Successful attacks terminated within minutes, at most.
As expected, BKZ reduction pushes the dimension where the embedding attack
fails (Table 6.2 on page 95). With β = 5, it is only in n = 220 and higher that we
observed any failures. However, the runtime of successful attacks varied considerably
and is, on average, higher by a factor about 20.
Since we are only interested in a single short vector, SSR is the most appropriate
non-interactive Sampling Reduction algorithm. Table 6.3(a) on page 96 shows that,
if LLL alone fails, then SSR used in conjunction with LLL is in fact a viable alternative
to BKZ that runs much faster. Unfortunately, SSR does not succeed as reliably as
BKZ; it failed to break most ciphertexts in dimension 240. But we have to point out
that these experiments were run with the rather small search space size umax = 20
and this search space was rarely exhausted because CSSSevent soon indicated a small
success probability. In fact, in most experiments only up to ≈ 215 vectors were
sampled. We can therefore expect to break more instances if we accept larger search
spaces and consequently longer runtimes.
We have a similar result for our experiments with SSR combined with BKZ, β = 5,
cf. Table 6.3(a). SSR could break some ciphertexts that withstood BKZ alone. The
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Table 6.1.: Embedding attack on Micciancio messages with LLL (δ = 0.99)
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Table 6.2.: Embedding attack on Micciancio messages with BKZ (β = 5)
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Table 6.3.: Embedding attack on Micciancio messages with SSR
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runtime of these attacks was longer than the successful BKZ attacks in the same
dimension by a small factor only.
6.2. NTRU
The NTRU cryptosystem was originally proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silver-
man at the rump session of Crypto ’96. It was pointed out early on that breaking
NTRU instances is equivalent to finding very short vectors or solving CVPs in a
very particular class of lattices. In fact, Coppersmith and Shamir [CS97] published
a thorough analysis of the relation between NTRU and lattice problems even before
NTRU was formally published [HPS98].
NTRU appeals for two reasons: First, NTRU operates on elements of the factor
ring R := Z[X]/(XN − 1) for some integer N . The multiplication in R is in fact a
convolution and therefore allows very efficient implementations. Furthermore, NTRU
computations do not require support for large integers which considerably simplifies
the implementation of NTRU on small devices. This makes NTRU’s performance
at least competitive to established cryptosystems like RSA or ECC, if not faster.
Second, NTRU is independent from the RSA problem and the discrete logarithm
problem. It is therefore a viable alternative in case RSA or ECC should ever be
fundamentally broken. This is a particularly attractive argument in view of the
discussion about the impact of quantum computing on cryptography; sufficiently
large quantum computers can break both RSA and ECC in polynomial time, but
there is no known quantum algorithm that breaks NTRU.
On the other hand, the suggested parameters and padding schemes for NTRU had
to be revised several times [JJ00, NP02, HGNP+03]. The first NTRU based signature
scheme NSS [HPS01] as well as a hastily patched version were almost immediately
broken [GJSS01, GS02]. This cost NTRU a lot of confidence. The NTRUSign scheme,
proposed in 2002 [HHGP+02], seems to be stronger than NSS; we are not aware of
any attacks that fundamentally break it. But there were minor flaws in NTRUSign as
well [MYK04] and the key generation and parameter sets are still subject of research
[HHGP+05], so it is probably too early to assess the security of NTRUSign.
6.2.1. NTRU Lattices
We sketch in this section the correspondence between instances of the NTRUEncrypt
primitive and the NTRU lattices. More details can be found in [CS97] and [HSW03].
Every element of R can be represented by an integral polynomial of degree at most
N − 1. In the NTRU context, the length of such a polynomial f = ∑N−1j=0 fjXj is
measured by the centered norm
‖f‖2c =
N−1∑
j=0
(fj − f)2 with f = 1
N
N−1∑
j=0
fj .
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(To be precise, ‖ · ‖c is a pseudo-norm only since ‖f‖c = 0 does not imply f = 0.
This does not matter for our discussion, though.)
The map R → ZN : f = ∑N−1j=0 fjXj 7→ f = (f0, . . . , fN−1)t is an isomorphism of
Z-algebras. The multiplication in R corresponds to the convolution product in ZN ,
i. e., R×R→ R : (f, g) 7→ f ∗ g corresponds to ZN ×ZN → ZN : (f ,g) 7→ Cfg where
Cf =

f0 f1 · · · fN−1
fN−1 f0 · · · fN−2
...
... . . .
...
f1 f2 · · · f0
 ∈ ZN×N .
NTRUEncrypt has numerous system parameters. Besides the polynomial degree
N , one has to fix a small modulus p and a large modulus q such that pR+qR = R. The
proponents of NTRU discussed the choice p = X − 2 [HS00], but the recommended
parameter sets suggest p = 3. The polynomial sets Lf ,Lg ⊂ R describe the private
key space; the elements of Lf need to be invertible both modulo p and modulo q. If
Lf ,Lg are chosen according to the recommended parameter sets, then ‖f‖c, ‖g‖c are
public constants independent from f ∈ Lf , g ∈ Lg.
The private key (f, g) is a uniform random element of Lf ×Lg. The corresponding
public key is
h = f−1 ∗ g mod q . (6.2)
The lattice Lh,q,α is generated by the block matrix
Bh,q,α =
(
αIN 0
Ch qIN
)
∈ R2N×2N
where IN is the N dimensional identity matrix and α ∈ R is positive. Lh,q,α contains
the vector vα := (αf ,g)t since
vα = Bh,q,α
(
f
w
)
with w = 1
q
(Chf − g) ∈ ZN
by (6.2). In other words, the private key is essentially a lattice point. Its norm
‖vα‖c :=
√‖αf‖2c + ‖g‖2c is public knowledge due to the construction of the polyno-
mial spaces Lf and Lg. It turns out that vα is a very short vector in Lh,q,α; in fact,
for suitable α, the norm ‖vα‖c is smaller than the estimate σ =
√
Nqα/pie for the
first minimum λ1(Lh,q,α) that follows from the Gaussian heuristic. Coppersmith and
Shamir [CS97] show that it suffices to find vectors v′ not much longer than vα, say
4‖vα‖c, to break NTRU. Thus, the most direct attack on NTRU is to apply lattice
basis reduction algorithms to Bh,q,α in the hope the reduction may yield sufficiently
short basis vectors.
Empirically, LLL-type reduction algorithms are the more likely to find a short
vector x in a lattice the smaller the ratio between the length of x and the Gaussian
heuristic estimate. An attacker who tries to recover the private key by reduction
of Bh,q,α will therefore choose α = ‖g‖c/‖f‖c as this choice minimizes said ratio.
LNTh,q := Lh,q,‖g‖c/‖f‖c is the NTRU lattice corresponding to the public key h.
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6.2.2. Attacks by Sampling Reduction
We describe the effectiveness of lattice reduction attacks on NTRU by ShortProjection-
SR. Our results indicate that the estimated breaking cost for NTRU needs to be
reassessed. Such a reassessment needs to take more refined attacks (e. g., zero-forced
NTRU lattices [MS01] or meet-in-the-middle attacks [HGSW03]) into consideration
as well, whereas we were most interested in how Sampling Reduction performs in the
class of NTRU lattices.
For a given NTRU instance with private key (f, g) and public key h set
a := N/q,
c :=
√
4pie‖f‖c‖g‖c/q =
√
2N‖v‖c/σ
where v ∈ LNTh,q is the vector corresponding to the private key and σ is the Gaussian
heuristic estimate for λ1(LNTh,q ). Hoffstein, Silverman, and Whyte state in a technical
report [HSW03] that, based on their experience, the greater a or c the longer it takes
to break NTRU by lattice reduction. They report experimental results for a = 0.535
and c = 1.73.
We prepared our test cases as outlined by [HSW03]: We chose the elements of
Lf ,Lg as polynomials with exactly df , dg coefficients equal to 1 and all remaining
coefficients equal to 0. This implies ‖f‖2c = df − d2f/N and ‖g‖2c = dg − d2g/N for all
f ∈ Lf , g ∈ Lg. Depending on the security parameter N , we determined q, df , and
dg such that a and c were close to but not less than the values used in said technical
report and α ≈ 1. We then chose a random private key (f, g) and computed h
according to (6.2). We finally generated the lattice basis
B = s
(
α˜IN 0
Ch qIN
)
∈ Z2N×2N (6.3)
with the scale factor s = 103 where α˜ = dsαc/s is α rounded up to three decimal
digits.
We reduced such bases for 97 ≤ N ≤ 113 with BKZ for successively increasing val-
ues of β and additionally with ShortProjectionSR. We exhibit the observed reduction
behavior on an example with N = 113; it is representative for all experiments.
The parameters for the generation of this experiment were N = 113, q = 191,
df = 22, and dg = 21, which implies a = 0.592 and c = 1.78. The euclidean norm of
the target vector v was roughly ‖v‖ ≈ 6.3s.
The basis was initially BKZ reduced in 502 seconds with δ = 0.99 and up to β = 5.
This yielded 7 base vectors b with ‖b‖2 = s2q2 = 3.6×1010, all other base vectors
were much longer, cf. the top graph in Fig. 6.2(a) on the next page. The BKZ reduced
basis did therefore not admit to break this NTRU instance.
It is also obvious from Fig. 6.2 that the chance to improve the basis with either
SSR or PoolSR was negligible since ‖b1‖2 ≈ 0.2‖bˆ8‖2. However, ShortProjectionSR
is most adequate to reduce ‖bˆj‖2, j > 7. We ran the reduction with reduction
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Figure 6.2.: NTRU basis under ShortProjectionSR.
(N = 113, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.9)
factor γ = 0.9 throughout. The first iterations with target set T = { 8 } returned
within seconds. Already after the fourth iteration, the ratio ‖bˆ8‖2/‖bˆ9‖2 became
such that the chances for a sampled vector to replace b8 seemed very slim whence
we extended the target set to T = { 8, 9 } and in the following iterations gradually to
T = { 8, . . . , 12 }. After 17 iterations, the graph of ‖bˆj‖2 showed a distinct depression
around bˆ13 whence we had to insert 4 iterations with T = { 14, . . . , 18 } to reduce the
second peak at bˆ18. After that we could continue to reduce the vectors near b8. The
BKZ reduction in the 25th iteration resulted for the first time in a vector significantly
shorter than sq.
From this point on, every iteration inserted a short vector at the front of the basis
and pushed the peak of the Gram-Schmidt vector lengths one slot back whence we
chose the target sets { 9, . . . , 13 }, { 10, . . . , 14 } and so on. The 38th iteration finally
broke the instance; it resulted in 30s ≤ ‖bj‖ ≤ 70s for j ∈ { 1, . . . , 113 }.
Diagrams (a) and (b) in Fig. 6.2 show that the last BKZ reduction breaks the
basis down into two blocks of length N ; the first one consists of short vectors that
essentially reveal the NTRU trapdoor, the second one contains only vectors of length
100
6.2. NTRU
N 97 100 103 107 109 111 113
BKZ 5 5 5 8 8 8 11
ShortProjectionSR 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
Table 6.4.: Values of β that broke NTRU lattices.
≈ sq. The huge jump from ‖bˆN‖2 to ‖bˆN+1‖2 and ‖bN+1‖2 ≈ ‖bˆN+1‖2 indicate
that the two blocks generate almost orthogonal sublattices of LNTh,q . If necessary, few
PoolSR iterations with the search space Vc,B (where c = (c1, . . . , c2N ) and cj = 1 for
j ≤ N − 22, cj = 2 for N − 22 < j ≤ N , and cj = 0 else) further reduce the base
vectors b in the first block such that 3‖v‖ ≤ ‖b‖ ≤ 5‖v‖.
To break the same NTRU lattice with BKZ only, we had to increase the BKZ
parameter up to β = 11. The accumulated runtime for these BKZ reductions was
897 seconds. The total runtime until ShortProjectionSR broke the instance was more
than six times longer (5784 seconds). However, 90% of this time was spent on sam-
pling, only 582 seconds went into the intermittent BKZ reductions. Since sampling
can be easily distributed onto several machines with an efficiency near 1 (cf. Sec-
tion 3.7), an attacker can run a massively distributed variant of ShortProjectionSR
on cheap hardware. With approximately 20 nodes, such a reduction of our example
basis would probably run not longer than BKZ alone. We are not aware of any BKZ
variant that can exploit distributed computing resources in the same way.
There is no rigorous runtime bound for the BKZ algorithm; it is, empirically,
exponential in β, though. The values of β required to break NTRU with BKZ increase
rapidly with N . E. g., for an experiment with N = 129 we already had to reduce the
basis with β = 22 in more than 45 hours. Since the attack with ShortProjectionSR
requires smaller values of β (cf. Table 6.4), it seems likely that the gap between the
runtime of a BKZ only attack and the runtime spent on BKZ in a ShortProjectionSR
attack widens. Then a massively distributed ShortProjectionSR implementation may
actually break NTRU instances for large N in less time than BKZ (even though the
total number of CPU cycles spent in the attack may be larger).
We conclude this section with some remarks regarding the best strategy for attack-
ing NTRU lattices with ShortProjectionSR. In our experience, we succeeded faster in
breaking NTRU lattices if we chose the reduction factor γ = 0.90 rather than 0.99.
The fewer number of iterations outweighed the additional vectors we had to sample
in each round.
Second, it proved crucial to restrict the target set to the smallest indices one
could conceivably expect to succeed, even though this meant we several times almost
exhausted our search space (with umax = 22). If we instead chose a too large target
set, then we were likely to run into a situation as exhibited by Fig. 6.3. Here the
sampling time was consistently low, but the insertions beyond the peak of the Gram-
Schmidt vector lengths caused the length of the Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆj , j > 80,
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Figure 6.3.: Result of too opportunistic ShortProjectionSR.
to increase. This lowered the probability to find a sufficiently short replacement for
bˆ4 to the point where we did not observe any progress for the base vectors near the
front of the basis anymore. In the end we had managed to improve the mean of ‖bj‖2
by a factor 4, but the attack attempt on the NTRU instance had failed. However,
we could break this instance with smaller target sets.
6.3. Knapsack Lattices
From the early days of public key cryptography on, cryptosystems based on the
knapsack problem (also known as subset sum problem) were proposed as alternatives
to RSA. Even though the knapsack problem is NP-hard in the worst case, all knapsack
based cryptosystems were broken. Lattice basis reduction proved to be a key tool in
the cryptanalysis of knapsack based cryptosystems [Odl90, NS01].
We explain in the following section the knapsack lattice constructed by Coster et
al. [CJL+92]. We then describe in Sect. 6.3.2 how sampling reduction performs on
such lattices.
6.3.1. Knapsack Lattice Bases
We define (the search version of) the knapsack problem and describe how Coster et
al., based on earlier work by Lagarias and Odlyzko, turn it – for a certain range of
parameters – into an SVP.
Definition 18. The search version of the knapsack or subset sum problem is to find,
for given weights a1, . . . , an ∈ N+ and sum s ∈ N+, a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)t ∈
{ 0, 1 }n such that
s =
n∑
j=1
xjaj . (6.4)
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The quotient
d =
n
log2max{ a1, . . . , an }
(6.5)
is called the density of the knapsack (a1, . . . , an, s).
Given a knapsack problem (a1, . . . , an, s), Lagarias and Odlyzko [LO85] considered
the n+ 1 dimensional lattice generated by
BLO =

1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 0
Na1 Na2 . . . Nan Ns
 ∈ Z(n+1)×(n+1) (6.6)
where N >
√
n. Provided the density of the knapsack is d < 0.6463, they could
show that, with high probability, the embedded solution vector (x1, . . . , xn, 0)t of the
knapsack is a shortest vector in L(BLO).
Coster, Joux, LaMacchia, Odlyzko, Schnorr, and Stern [CJL+92] advanced on this
result and showed that the vector (x1− 1/2, . . . , xn− 1/2, 0)t is, with high probability,
a shortest vector in the lattice generated by
BCJLOSS =

1 0 . . . 0 1/2
0 1 . . . 0 1/2
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 1/2
Na1 Na2 . . . Nan Ns
 ∈ Q(n+1)×(n+1) (6.7)
provided d < 0.9408.
Okamoto, Tanaka, and Uchiyama [OTU00] proposed a knapsack based cryptosys-
tem to be used when the established cryptosystems can be broken in praxis by
quantum computers. (Actually, their system assumes the availability of quantum
computers for key generation.) Since the knapsacks in their system have density 1
and larger, they claimed their system to be secure against classical attacks.
However, it is mentioned in [CJL+92] that a minor modification of BCJLOSS allows
the solution of most knapsack problems with even larger densities by an SVP oracle
as long as the solution vector has low Hamming weight k := x1 + · · · + xn < n/2.
Oomura and Tanaka [OT03] give a sufficient condition that the knapsack solution
corresponds, with high probability, to a shortest lattice vector. This condition can be
numerically evaluated; suffice it to say that Okamoto’s, Tanaka’s, and Uchiyama’s
system is in fact vulnerable to lattice basis reduction attacks because the solution
vectors of the knapsacks involved have a very low Hamming weight.
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Figure 6.4.: Knapsack lattice basis under ShortProjectionSR
(n = 100, b = 102, k = 10, d = 0.9804, β = 5)
To solve knapsack problems with densities > 0.9408, we consider the lattice gen-
erated by
B′CJLOSS =

n 0 . . . 0 k
0 n . . . 0 k
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 . . . n k
nNa1 nNa2 . . . nNan nNs
 ∈ Z(n+1)×(n+1) . (6.8)
The target vector t = (nx1 − k, . . . , nxn − k, 0)t ∈ B′CJLOSS has length ‖t‖ =√
kn(n− k) and is likely to be a shortest vector.
6.3.2. Sampling Reduction of Knapsack Lattice Bases
We describe how Sampling Reduction – here ShortProjectionSR – performs if applied
to lattice bases of the form (6.8).
For our experiments, we generated knapsack instances and the corresponding lat-
tice bases as follows: We chose the number n of weights, the maximum bitlength b
of all weights, and the Hamming weight k of the solution vector x. We then picked
uniform random weights a1, . . . , an ∈R { 1, . . . , 2b−1 } and a uniform random solution
vector x ∈R { (y1, . . . , yn)t ∈ { 0, 1 }n y1+· · ·+yn = k }. From that we computed the
knapsack sum s =
∑n
j=1 xjaj . The expected density d of the knapsack (a1, . . . , an, s)
is n/b < d < n/(b− 1). In the construction of the lattice basis we always used
N = b√nc+ 1.
Depending on d and k, BKZ often fails to recover a shortest vector in the knapsack
lattices for moderate values of β, say β ≤ 15, if n ≈ 100. We therefore tested
Sampling Reduction for such knapsacks with 0.9 < d < 1.0.
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The example depicted in Fig. 6.4 on the facing page was generated with n = 100,
b = 102, and k = 10, resulting in the density d = 0.9804 and the squared target
vector length ‖t‖2 = 9×104. The red graphs show the Gram-Schmidt vector lengths
after BKZ reduction of the knapsack lattice basis according to (6.8) with (δ, β) =
(0.99, 5). They approximate a geometric sequence for the first 70 vectors only, then
they stagnate. The last Gram-Schmidt vector is extraordinarily long; it is even longer
than b1. We observed this behavior for all knapsack lattices.
It is clear, because of (2.2), that SSR as stated in Alg. 3 cannot find a vector shorter
than b1: We have for any sample v = Bˆ(ν1, . . . , νn)t that ‖v‖ ≥ νn‖bˆn‖ = ‖bˆn‖ >
‖b1‖. On the other hand, for the same reason the target vector t has to belong to
the lattice generated by [b1, . . . ,bn−1]: For any lattice vector v, bˆn contributes an
integral multiple. If v = Bˆ(ν1, . . . , νn)t is shorter than bˆ, then νn = 0.
We therefore sampled vectors from the search space Vc,B with cn = 0, cj = 1 for
j < n− 22, and cj = 2 else. PoolSR alone did never succeed in solving the knapsack.
The reduction stalled after few iterations. Interactive ShortProjectionSR, similar to
the reduction described in Sect. 3.6.2, often succeeded. In this particular example, we
started with reduction factor γ = 0.90 and target set T = { 1 }. We then gradually
increased T up to { 1, . . . , 16 } in the 23rd iteration. By then the graph of the Gram-
Schmidt vector lengths exhibited a bend near j = 20 and, for 20 < j < 60, ‖bˆj‖2 was
consistently about 10% larger than in the first iteration, cf. diagram 6.4(a). Since we
did not find vectors any more that could be inserted at the very front of the basis, we
replaced the reduction factor with γ = 0.70 and the target set with T = { j, j + 10 },
j = 20, 30, 40. By this we could straighten out the bend and thereby increase the
chance to find a vector shorter than b1. Finally, after two further reductions with
γ = 0.90 and T = { 1, . . . , 5 }, ShortProjectionSR found the target vector t. The total
runtime of the reduction was 1004 seconds.
BKZ alone did not find the target vector in the same lattice unless we increased β
to 30, when the reduction took 2500 seconds. We had to increase the BKZ parameter
to β > 25 for most knapsacks. The runtime advantage of ShortProjectionSR we have
seen here was not consistent throughout our experiments, though; in some instances,
BKZ was two to three times faster than Sampling Reduction.
As in Sect. 6.2.2, however, we claim that Sampling Reduction will have an ad-
vantage with a massively distributed implementation. In all experiments, the time
ShortProjectionSR spent on the intermittent BKZ reductions with small β was neg-
ligible compared to the sampling time. (In the example above it was always below
our timer resolution of 1 second.) The speedup of a distributed implementation will
therefore be near to proportional to the number of nodes.
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Sampling Results
We cannot print here the data for all of the more than 1000 experiments we ran with
the Sampling Reduction algorithms presented in Chapter 3. We therefore have to
restrict ourselves to a representative selection.
tBKZ is the time spent on the BKZ reduction in the respective iteration, tsample the
time spent on sampling. All times are in seconds.
The column umin refers to the the required search space size estimated by CSSSevent,
i. e., umin = −maxk∈T LogSuccessProbBound(`, k, umax, ‖b1‖2). In comparison, the
value log2#samples is the size of the search space that was actually searched.
If the algorithm is PoolSR, then m is the number vectors in the pool when the
sampling loop is left. p1 is the shortest, pm the longest pool vector.
The value e indicates at which column a sampled vector was inserted in Short-
ProjectionSR.
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A.1. Micciancio Attack Keys
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 29 29 0 7.00 9 1258.19 8.024 116×107
2 32 3 0 7.00 8 1242.74 6.851 578×107
3 38 5 1 7.00 11 1233.79 6.297 051×107
4 43 4 1 9.32 14 1232.34 6.228 787×107
5 46 2 1 8.58 14 1230.05 5.810 852×107
6 48 2 0 10.58 16 1220.92 5.387 898×107
7 51 2 1 12.81 18 1217.72 4.900 536×107
8 55 3 1 14.10 20 1212.87 4.728 519×107
9 61 4 2 13.43 21 1200.47 4.357 437×107
10 80 2 17 17.14 23 1197.25 4.067 387×107
11 209 3 126 20.01 25 1190.77 4.006 410×107
12 283 2 72 19.40 26 1186.68 3.951 408×107
13 307 3 21 17.44 26 1189.98 3.702 361×107
14 527 5 215 20.81 28 1181.78 3.572 570×107
15 550 2 21 17.35 29 1182.07 3.335 083×107
16 909 2 357 21.50 32 1177.41 2.761 356×107
Table A.1.: SSR of Micciancio key in dimension 160
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 16 16 0 7.00 12 1418.58 1.052 824×108
2 20 4 0 10.17 13 1409.20 9.544 766×107
3 28 7 1 9.00 19 1405.73 8.545 106×107
4 57 5 24 17.73 22 1392.34 8.213 067×107
5 64 6 1 13.00 23 1383.66 7.790 800×107
6 73 4 5 15.13 24 1381.06 7.700 596×107
7 82 7 2 14.40 24 1366.49 7.419 051×107
8 120 2 36 18.14 24 1361.69 7.294 028×107
9 139 5 14 16.90 24 1359.38 6.988 381×107
10 145 3 3 14.00 25 1355.22 6.785 586×107
11 270 7 118 19.83 26 1349.84 6.568 462×107
12 356 4 82 19.42 27 1344.23 6.488 152×107
13 408 4 48 18.46 27 1334.85 6.168 118×107
14 692 3 281 21.03 29 1338.41 6.076 426×107
15 701 2 7 15.62 29 1331.75 5.767 976×107
Table A.2.: SSR of Micciancio key in dimension 170
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 9 9 0 10.58 14 1591.76 1.298 191×108
2 14 5 0 9.32 13 1583.90 1.854 113×108
3 23 9 0 8.00 14 1577.43 1.821 594×108
4 42 19 0 7.00 14 1553.25 1.627 421×108
5 44 2 0 10.81 15 1555.50 1.581 667×108
6 49 5 0 8.00 16 1556.03 1.553 158×108
7 53 3 1 11.46 16 1546.33 1.507 239×108
8 57 4 0 9.81 17 1542.63 1.482 750×108
9 61 4 0 7.00 17 1540.79 1.405 675×108
10 65 4 0 8.58 19 1532.20 1.315 314×108
11 75 7 3 14.35 20 1528.57 1.295 805×108
12 83 2 6 15.14 20 1529.47 1.280 163×108
13 95 2 10 15.38 21 1527.13 1.245 358×108
14 100 4 1 12.93 21 1519.33 1.176 217×108
15 108 2 6 14.70 23 1512.20 1.052 046×108
16 206 4 94 19.07 27 1507.82 1.003 334×108
17 243 5 32 17.28 29 1506.56 9.797 483×107
18 394 1 150 19.60 29 1503.55 9.431 561×107
Table A.3.: SSR of Micciancio key in dimension 180
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 20)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 39 39 0 7.00 10 1783.72 3.734 055×108
2 68 29 0 7.00 7 1780.64 3.300 627×108
3 82 14 0 7.00 10 1771.53 3.337 847×108
4 92 10 0 7.00 9 1769.00 3.457 063×108
5 95 3 0 7.00 11 1760.61 2.280 664×108
6 117 10 12 15.60 23 1740.26 2.210 553×108
7 127 6 4 14.37 22 1725.20 2.158 735×108
8 142 7 8 15.03 22 1714.61 2.072 194×108
9 177 5 30 17.06 22 1711.03 1.929 402×108
10 218 3 38 17.21 25 1709.73 1.701 482×108
11 1176 3 958 22.00 29 1709.73 1.701 482×108
Table A.4.: SSR of Micciancio key in dimension 190
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 25 25 0 7.00 10 1980.28 5.767 064×108
2 48 22 1 9.32 11 1944.24 4.953 965×108
3 75 27 0 8.00 13 1922.24 4.701 614×108
4 84 9 0 8.00 12 1918.64 4.279 279×108
5 91 6 1 10.46 16 1914.87 4.167 087×108
6 107 15 1 9.32 16 1906.86 3.892 371×108
7 119 9 3 12.75 17 1901.38 3.089 206×108
8 246 5 122 18.81 25 1900.32 3.054 658×108
9 257 5 6 14.15 24 1884.88 3.021 978×108
10 273 10 6 14.51 25 1882.76 2.921 377×108
11 626 9 344 20.26 25 1871.16 2.838 058×108
12 890 8 256 19.87 26 1862.57 2.806 805×108
13 971 11 70 18.00 26 1856.74 2.493 063×108
14 2134 11 1163 22.00 30 1856.74 2.493 063×108
Table A.5.: SSR of Micciancio key in dimension 200
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
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Table A.6.: PoolSR of Micciancio key in dimension 180
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 20, poolsize 5, α = 25)
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Table A.7.: PoolSR of Micciancio key in dimension 180
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 20, poolsize 60, α = 1)
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Table A.8.: PoolSR of Micciancio key in dimension 180
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 20, poolsize 60, α = 25)
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Table A.9.: PoolSR of Micciancio key in dimension 200
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22, poolsize 60, α = 25)
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A.1. Micciancio Attack Keys
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 7 7 0 11.46 15 1595.04 1.751 650×108 1
2 30 22 1 9.32 18 1575.07 1.575 861×108 1
3 48 15 3 14.23 19 1556.51 1.382 076×108 1
4 60 6 6 15.01 21 1541.42 1.063 688×108 1
6 66 5 1 7.00 6 1538.83 1.063 688×108 21
7 69 2 1 7.00 8 1536.51 1.063 688×108 21
8 71 2 0 7.00 8 1535.49 1.063 688×108 21
9 76 5 0 7.00 7 1530.11 1.063 688×108 21
10 78 2 0 7.00 8 1529.53 1.063 688×108 24
11 86 7 1 7.00 10 1520.63 1.063 688×108 21
12 92 5 1 7.00 9 1523.77 1.063 688×108 24
13 95 3 0 7.00 10 1519.03 1.063 688×108 21
14 99 4 0 7.00 8 1518.52 1.063 688×108 23
15 103 4 0 7.00 9 1515.65 1.063 688×108 21
16 108 5 0 7.00 7 1514.26 1.063 688×108 21
17 114 5 1 7.00 10 1514.31 1.063 688×108 21
18 116 2 0 7.00 10 1506.42 1.063 688×108 23
19 120 4 0 7.00 11 1508.16 1.063 688×108 21
20 126 5 1 8.00 11 1509.53 1.063 688×108 21
21 129 3 0 7.00 9 1502.94 1.063 688×108 22
22 134 5 0 8.00 10 1505.63 1.063 688×108 21
23 139 5 0 7.00 11 1503.95 1.063 688×108 22
24 140 1 0 7.00 11 1507.95 1.063 688×108 21
25 142 1 1 8.00 12 1499.17 1.063 688×108 21
26 145 2 1 7.00 12 1497.89 1.063 688×108 25
27 151 5 1 7.00 12 1500.06 1.063 688×108 21
28 155 3 1 7.00 10 1494.81 1.063 688×108 21
29 159 4 0 7.00 10 1497.51 1.063 688×108 22
30 161 2 0 7.00 9 1501.10 1.063 688×108 22
31 164 3 0 7.00 8 1501.54 1.063 688×108 24
32 167 2 1 7.00 7 1491.51 1.063 688×108 21
33 170 2 1 7.00 12 1487.65 1.063 688×108 21
34 173 2 1 7.00 11 1492.92 1.063 688×108 23
35 176 3 0 9.00 12 1488.84 1.063 688×108 23
36 179 3 0 7.00 12 1486.83 1.063 688×108 25
37 182 3 0 8.00 12 1491.18 1.063 688×108 23
38 185 2 1 7.00 11 1489.21 1.063 688×108 25
39 187 2 0 8.00 12 1486.85 1.063 688×108 21
40 191 4 0 8.00 12 1484.88 1.063 688×108 22
41 194 3 0 7.00 13 1481.41 1.063 688×108 24
42 196 2 0 8.00 11 1483.49 1.063 688×108 25
43 199 3 0 8.00 17 1478.31 1.063 688×108 25
44 203 3 1 8.00 17 1477.33 1.063 688×108 21
Continued on next page
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
45 206 2 1 9.32 14 1481.25 1.063 688×108 21
46 209 3 0 9.81 15 1477.64 1.063 688×108 21
47 211 1 1 7.00 14 1477.19 1.063 688×108 24
48 214 3 0 7.00 15 1474.66 1.063 688×108 21
49 217 3 0 7.00 13 1471.61 1.063 688×108 22
50 219 2 0 7.00 12 1475.65 1.063 688×108 24
51 221 1 1 8.58 11 1477.20 1.063 688×108 25
52 224 2 1 10.46 15 1477.56 1.063 688×108 23
53 226 2 0 10.00 15 1479.34 1.063 688×108 21
54 229 2 1 9.00 16 1480.71 1.063 688×108 22
55 232 2 1 10.00 15 1471.95 1.063 688×108 23
56 234 2 0 8.58 13 1478.25 1.063 688×108 21
57 237 2 1 9.32 12 1474.84 1.063 688×108 25
58 239 2 0 11.09 15 1476.87 1.063 688×108 25
59 242 3 0 8.00 17 1470.74 1.063 688×108 22
60 243 0 1 9.58 17 1473.48 1.063 688×108 21
61 245 2 0 11.25 15 1474.68 1.063 688×108 24
62 247 1 1 10.00 18 1471.27 1.063 688×108 25
63 251 1 3 13.48 18 1473.12 1.063 688×108 23
64 253 2 0 9.58 19 1476.20 1.063 688×108 21
65 256 1 2 12.09 18 1469.01 1.063 688×108 22
66 260 2 2 12.93 18 1468.65 1.063 688×108 24
67 263 1 2 13.07 18 1469.15 1.063 688×108 25
68 266 2 1 9.32 19 1468.86 1.063 688×108 21
69 269 2 1 9.58 18 1464.79 1.063 688×108 25
70 272 2 1 12.17 19 1462.68 1.063 688×108 21
71 274 1 1 12.13 19 1467.06 1.063 688×108 25
72 277 2 1 10.00 19 1466.07 1.063 688×108 25
73 280 2 1 12.36 19 1462.32 1.063 688×108 23
74 281 1 0 7.00 19 1463.14 1.063 688×108 22
76 284 2 0 7.00 10 1460.20 1.063 688×108 43
77 286 1 1 7.00 10 1466.35 1.063 688×108 44
78 289 2 1 8.58 13 1463.70 1.063 688×108 42
79 291 1 1 9.58 14 1463.21 1.063 688×108 41
80 293 2 0 8.00 13 1464.51 1.063 688×108 41
81 294 1 0 8.00 14 1464.39 1.063 688×108 44
82 298 3 1 10.58 14 1466.47 1.063 688×108 45
83 301 2 1 10.70 17 1460.80 1.063 688×108 44
84 304 2 1 11.17 16 1463.15 1.063 688×108 41
85 307 3 0 10.58 17 1463.27 1.063 688×108 44
86 311 2 2 12.83 16 1462.04 1.063 688×108 45
87 313 2 0 9.58 20 1463.24 1.063 688×108 41
88 316 2 1 11.17 17 1456.24 1.063 688×108 41
Continued on next page
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
89 318 1 1 7.00 16 1460.44 1.063 688×108 42
90 320 1 1 10.46 16 1462.99 1.063 688×108 43
91 323 2 1 11.09 15 1457.83 1.063 688×108 45
92 326 2 1 12.39 19 1463.32 1.063 688×108 44
93 328 1 1 10.58 20 1460.17 1.063 688×108 42
94 332 3 1 11.70 19 1462.44 1.063 688×108 41
95 334 2 0 8.00 18 1463.91 1.063 688×108 44
96 336 1 1 11.17 17 1462.55 1.063 688×108 41
97 339 2 1 10.58 17 1463.49 1.063 688×108 43
98 342 2 1 12.61 18 1461.72 1.063 688×108 45
99 344 1 1 10.91 19 1461.50 1.063 688×108 42
100 347 2 1 11.32 18 1464.84 1.063 688×108 44
101 349 2 0 10.00 15 1460.92 1.063 688×108 44
102 351 1 1 8.00 13 1458.04 1.063 277×108 45
103 354 2 1 12.55 20 1463.76 1.063 688×108 42
104 356 2 0 9.32 18 1458.89 1.063 688×108 43
105 360 2 2 13.17 20 1461.21 1.063 688×108 45
106 363 1 2 12.39 20 1459.78 1.063 688×108 45
108 365 2 0 7.00 11 1461.22 1.063 688×108 62
109 367 2 0 7.00 11 1461.10 1.063 688×108 61
110 368 1 0 7.00 10 1454.86 1.063 688×108 62
111 369 1 0 7.00 12 1459.17 1.063 688×108 63
112 372 2 1 9.81 14 1460.09 1.063 688×108 65
113 373 1 0 8.58 15 1458.49 1.063 688×108 62
114 375 2 0 7.00 13 1456.71 1.063 688×108 63
115 376 0 1 8.58 16 1459.52 1.063 688×108 65
116 378 1 1 9.00 16 1464.69 1.063 688×108 61
117 379 1 0 7.00 13 1459.26 1.063 688×108 61
118 383 3 1 7.00 12 1457.38 1.063 688×108 61
119 384 1 0 8.58 13 1458.74 1.063 688×108 63
120 385 1 0 8.58 15 1462.37 1.063 688×108 65
121 388 2 1 9.81 17 1459.27 1.063 688×108 62
122 390 1 1 12.21 17 1459.58 1.063 688×108 63
123 391 1 0 10.17 16 1457.94 1.063 688×108 64
124 393 2 0 10.00 15 1452.87 1.063 688×108 65
125 395 1 1 12.46 19 1453.57 1.063 688×108 63
126 397 2 0 11.75 19 1455.92 1.063 688×108 63
127 400 3 0 8.58 18 1454.20 1.063 688×108 62
128 402 1 1 11.17 17 1455.88 1.063 688×108 63
129 404 2 0 10.58 17 1460.64 1.063 688×108 64
130 407 2 1 11.91 17 1456.36 1.063 688×108 65
131 411 1 3 13.39 20 1461.69 1.063 688×108 61
132 413 2 0 11.58 19 1456.93 1.063 688×108 65
Continued on next page
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
133 415 1 1 12.73 18 1453.63 1.063 688×108 61
134 418 1 2 12.67 18 1456.29 1.063 688×108 62
135 419 1 0 7.00 17 1456.42 1.063 688×108 63
136 422 2 1 11.75 18 1457.81 1.063 688×108 61
137 425 2 1 9.58 17 1456.27 1.063 688×108 65
138 426 0 1 10.91 19 1456.31 1.063 688×108 65
140 428 2 0 11.81 19 1456.81 9.221 797×107 1
141 460 2 30 17.22 24 1457.18 8.543 042×107 1
143 462 1 1 9.32 19 1451.36 8.543 042×107 23
144 469 2 5 14.40 19 1458.42 8.543 042×107 21
145 472 2 1 8.00 17 1453.20 8.543 042×107 21
146 475 2 1 11.17 17 1455.30 8.543 042×107 22
147 477 2 0 9.00 16 1455.77 8.543 042×107 23
148 480 2 1 9.81 16 1457.05 8.543 042×107 24
149 482 2 0 9.58 17 1459.16 8.543 042×107 25
150 483 1 0 8.00 19 1462.00 8.543 042×107 23
151 485 1 1 9.00 17 1454.99 8.543 042×107 25
152 487 1 1 10.00 20 1457.08 8.543 042×107 24
153 491 1 3 13.70 19 1455.89 8.543 042×107 25
155 494 1 1 10.46 16 1456.74 8.543 042×107 41
156 496 1 1 7.00 14 1457.50 8.543 042×107 41
157 497 0 1 11.86 18 1452.28 8.543 042×107 41
158 500 2 1 8.58 17 1460.92 8.543 042×107 42
159 504 2 2 13.13 19 1457.67 8.543 042×107 42
160 507 3 0 11.00 19 1460.43 8.543 042×107 43
162 510 2 0 9.00 15 1453.34 8.543 042×107 65
163 512 1 1 9.81 16 1454.69 8.543 042×107 61
164 513 1 0 9.81 15 1459.09 8.543 042×107 65
165 515 1 1 10.32 16 1457.88 8.543 042×107 62
166 516 1 0 10.17 15 1457.28 8.543 042×107 63
167 518 1 1 10.32 16 1454.11 8.543 042×107 64
168 519 1 0 11.25 16 1456.78 8.543 042×107 65
169 521 1 1 11.91 20 1456.40 8.543 042×107 63
170 522 0 1 11.00 19 1454.95 8.543 042×107 64
171 525 1 2 13.54 19 1458.41 8.543 042×107 65
Table A.10.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of Micciancio key in dimension 180
(δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 to 0.99, umax = 20 to 26)
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A.2. Micciancio Embedding Attacks
A.2. Micciancio Embedding Attacks
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 2 2 0 7.00 2 1585.44 2.260 091×108
2 2 0 0 7.00 13 1545.12 1.900 500×104
Table A.11.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 160
(‖m‖ = 1.0ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 2, γ = 0.99, umax = 20)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 3 3 0 7.00 2 1747.17 3.522 115×108
2 4 1 0 7.00 8 1700.64 1.103 100×104
Table A.12.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 170
(‖m‖ = 0.8ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 2, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 8 8 0 7.00 2 2060.26 1.066 702×109
2 11 3 0 7.00 4 1992.81 8.020 376×108
3 13 1 1 7.00 7 1968.42 7.934 961×108
4 13 0 0 7.00 7 1966.92 7.673 239×108
5 14 1 0 8.00 11 1956.13 6.509 493×108
6 16 1 1 8.00 14 1909.59 5.012 561×108
7 17 1 0 8.00 12 1883.93 5.478 531×108
8 17 0 0 8.00 13 1879.46 5.357 503×108
9 17 0 0 8.58 13 1880.48 4.813 114×108
10 19 1 1 11.95 16 1859.01 3.870 022×108
11 24 0 5 14.71 20 1842.16 3.271 083×108
12 98 0 74 18.53 24 1836.52 3.151 993×108
13 159 2 59 18.24 25 1836.58 2.996 763×108
14 200 0 41 17.84 26 1824.11 2.962 720×108
15 307 0 107 19.14 26 1811.09 2.898 377×108
16 354 1 46 17.94 26 1813.16 2.804 977×108
17 956 0 602 21.64 27 1808.07 2.572 906×108
18 1628 0 672 21.81 30 1782.53 2.410 850×108
Table A.13.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 180
(‖m‖ = 0.9ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 2, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
119
Appendix A. Sampling Results
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 19 19 0 7.00 4 2195.12 1.521 452×109
2 21 2 0 7.00 2 2177.22 1.170 514×109
3 22 1 0 9.32 10 2157.71 9.838 076×108
4 24 1 1 9.81 17 2160.96 9.721 575×108
5 25 1 0 7.00 17 2142.37 1.415 300×104
Table A.14.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 190
(‖m‖ = 0.8ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 2, γ = 0.99, umax = 20)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 5 5 0 7.00 8 2413.48 2.160 723×109
2 7 2 0 9.00 10 2376.01 2.086 536×109
3 8 1 0 8.00 10 2357.76 1.674 051×109
4 10 1 1 9.58 15 2351.36 1.649 850×109
5 12 2 0 9.81 15 2327.83 1.686 400×104
6 15 1 2 12.78 15 2329.52 1.509 569×109
7 18 1 2 11.95 15 2322.57 1.408 774×109
8 20 1 1 10.17 17 2308.05 1.325 006×109
9 22 1 1 10.00 17 2297.07 1.306 589×109
10 25 1 2 12.46 17 2301.46 1.224 039×109
11 40 2 13 15.52 19 2291.71 1.196 393×109
12 50 2 8 14.81 19 2255.54 1.182 914×109
13 52 1 1 10.00 18 2242.85 1.686 400×104
14 57 3 2 12.88 18 2218.24 1.686 400×104
Table A.15.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 200
(‖m‖ = 0.9ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 2, γ = 0.99, umax = 20)
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A.2. Micciancio Embedding Attacks
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 141 141 0 7.00 9 3323.45 7.962 240×109
2 226 85 0 7.00 9 3313.47 8.528 386×109
3 241 15 0 8.00 10 3312.48 7.108 489×109
4 267 26 0 9.81 16 3277.70 6.889 072×109
5 284 16 1 10.17 16 3261.70 6.485 753×109
6 299 13 2 11.09 16 3257.15 6.045 238×109
7 326 15 12 14.34 19 3246.07 5.653 133×109
8 356 24 6 13.43 21 3230.59 5.279 683×109
9 386 30 0 7.00 22 3224.99 5.199 523×109
10 521 28 107 17.56 22 3210.48 5.047 799×109
11 576 31 24 15.35 22 3204.75 4.988 587×109
12 627 35 16 14.75 21 3196.94 4.667 730×109
13 674 22 25 15.41 23 3182.53 4.564 027×109
14 849 25 150 18.05 23 3179.73 4.106 910×109
15 1051 8 194 18.41 27 3182.81 4.016 704×109
16 1430 15 364 19.36 28 3174.64 3.880 310×109
17 3539 15 2094 21.83 29 3164.84 3.787 200×109
18 5838 15 2299 22.00 30 3164.84 3.787 200×109
Table A.16.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 260
(‖m‖ = 1.0ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 114 113 1 9.81 12 3821.48 1.788 397×1010
2 240 126 0 7.00 10 3808.87 1.768 002×1010
3 290 49 1 9.58 14 3798.17 1.693 838×1010
4 314 23 1 8.58 15 3781.54 1.443 316×1010
5 382 37 31 15.52 20 3764.57 1.270 081×1010
6 480 29 69 16.68 23 3766.25 1.119 762×1010
7 981 24 477 19.47 27 3743.74 1.037 657×1010
8 3771 41 2749 21.99 29 3725.06 1.017 391×1010
9 5072 26 1275 20.91 29 3712.81 1.006 892×1010
10 5352 15 265 18.62 28 3712.17 9.860 259×109
11 6489 31 1106 20.70 29 3697.38 8.470 504×109
Table A.17.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 280
(‖m‖ = 1.0ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 100 99 1 7.00 9 3855.33 1.703 600×104
Table A.18.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 280
(‖m‖ = 0.6ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 127 126 1 7.00 9 4410.92 4.208 929×1010
2 219 91 1 9.81 13 4386.83 4.775 310×1010
3 244 25 0 8.58 13 4350.60 3.615 435×1010
4 315 70 1 7.00 14 4340.49 4.045 268×1010
5 384 68 1 9.00 13 4314.93 1.196 300×104
Table A.19.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 300
(‖m‖ = 0.5ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2
1 307 306 1 7.00 9 4374.40 4.625 981×1010
2 382 74 1 7.00 13 4362.17 4.310 512×1010
3 453 69 2 11.09 14 4342.12 3.828 078×1010
4 494 34 7 13.11 17 4334.06 3.719 217×1010
5 522 25 3 11.58 17 4339.92 3.085 304×1010
6 649 38 89 16.88 23 4300.39 3.052 493×1010
7 762 36 77 16.68 22 4301.31 2.845 876×1010
8 974 28 184 17.92 25 4291.62 2.755 454×1010
9 1107 25 108 17.15 26 4262.22 2.685 506×1010
10 1493 32 354 18.87 25 4258.41 2.571 275×1010
11 2575 23 1059 20.46 27 4247.94 2.529 258×1010
12 3292 32 685 19.82 26 4249.79 2.167 593×1010
Table A.20.: SSR of embedded Micciancio ciphertext in dimension 300
(‖m‖ = 1.0ρ, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.99, umax = 22)
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A.3. NTRU Lattices
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 13 13 0 8.00 10 1874.18 2.592 100×1010 4
2 21 8 0 7.00 12 1853.67 2.262 000×109 1
3 100 79 0 7.00 51 972.67 5.460 000×108 1
Table A.21.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 97, a = 0.602, c = 1.764, δ = 0.99, β = 4, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 12 11 1 8.00 10 1999.91 2.755 600×1010 8
2 17 4 1 8.58 13 1983.15 2.755 600×1010 8
3 30 10 3 13.17 19 1972.66 2.755 600×1010 8
4 300 7 263 19.61 27 1956.81 1.780 000×109 1
5 310 9 1 10.58 15 1932.35 1.780 000×109 10
6 314 3 1 7.00 17 1934.32 1.780 000×109 10
7 336 5 17 15.65 20 1923.90 1.780 000×109 10
8 428 16 76 17.95 22 1914.81 1.780 000×109 10
9 431 1 2 11.52 24 1909.06 1.780 000×109 2
10 436 3 2 11.09 23 1890.03 1.780 000×109 3
11 442 5 1 10.00 22 1878.69 1.780 000×109 4
12 445 2 1 7.00 20 1871.79 1.780 000×109 4
13 450 4 1 8.00 19 1844.46 1.780 000×109 6
14 527 76 1 7.00 17 1035.10 5.600 000×108 6
Table A.22.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 100, a = 0.602, c = 1.780, δ = 0.99, β = 3, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 31 31 0 7.00 5 2197.49 2.924 100×1010 6
2 40 9 0 7.00 11 2138.31 2.924 100×1010 6
3 51 9 2 12.17 17 2134.45 2.924 100×1010 6
4 58 4 3 13.04 20 2125.76 2.924 100×1010 6
5 74 6 10 14.73 22 2117.48 2.924 100×1010 6
6 90 7 9 14.49 21 2107.34 2.924 100×1010 7
7 112 4 18 15.60 24 2097.37 2.924 100×1010 7
8 857 7 738 20.96 27 2088.00 2.924 100×1010 6
9 969 4 108 18.18 26 2073.74 2.924 100×1010 8
10 1481 5 507 20.51 28 2075.49 2.924 100×1010 8
11 1625 4 140 18.61 29 2060.73 1.728 000×109 1
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
12 2564 7 932 21.31 28 2046.84 1.728 000×109 10
13 2902 2 336 19.87 27 2042.94 1.728 000×109 7
14 2915 4 9 14.49 20 2037.02 1.728 000×109 13
15 3107 10 182 19.05 26 2016.73 1.728 000×109 8
16 3121 4 10 14.54 23 2018.37 1.728 000×109 9
17 3134 1 12 14.96 22 2013.18 1.728 000×109 10
18 3262 3 125 18.39 28 1995.47 1.728 000×109 9
19 3300 3 35 16.63 26 1983.97 1.728 000×109 7
20 3436 5 131 18.48 28 1980.10 1.728 000×109 2
21 3595 6 153 18.81 29 1963.48 1.728 000×109 3
22 3719 4 120 18.41 28 1959.50 1.728 000×109 3
23 3725 3 3 12.21 27 1943.55 1.728 000×109 5
24 3739 2 12 14.98 26 1930.20 1.728 000×109 4
25 3753 5 9 14.58 28 1916.25 1.728 000×109 7
26 3758 4 1 7.00 27 1913.48 1.728 000×109 2
27 3765 4 3 12.17 26 1901.27 1.728 000×109 3
28 3770 3 2 9.81 27 1891.11 1.728 000×109 10
29 3778 6 2 9.58 26 1853.77 1.728 000×109 7
30 3786 7 1 7.00 25 1824.55 1.728 000×109 7
31 3965 78 101 18.08 25 1130.23 7.860 000×108 18
Table A.23.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 107, a = 0.602, c = 1.794, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 31 29 2 11.52 15 2145.43 3.168 400×1010 6
2 45 5 9 14.48 20 2139.03 3.168 400×1010 6
3 215 9 161 18.68 24 2120.67 3.168 400×1010 6
4 228 6 7 13.97 21 2113.66 3.168 400×1010 7
5 296 10 58 17.20 25 2113.98 3.168 400×1010 7
6 1176 20 860 21.08 29 2083.96 2.627 098×109 1
7 1192 6 10 14.58 20 2074.25 2.627 098×109 9
8 1250 15 43 16.81 23 2068.68 2.627 098×109 7
9 1263 8 5 13.44 23 2063.57 2.627 098×109 2
10 1295 8 24 15.91 25 2050.33 2.627 098×109 3
11 1307 9 3 12.36 25 2038.17 2.627 098×109 4
12 1337 26 4 12.88 21 2020.77 2.356 849×109 1
13 1347 8 2 9.00 20 2019.45 2.356 849×109 2
14 1352 3 2 8.58 20 2004.49 2.356 849×109 4
15 1362 9 1 7.00 25 1982.63 2.356 849×109 6
16 1371 7 2 7.00 23 1948.32 2.253 933×109 9
17 1512 139 2 7.00 21 1138.26 7.416 494×108 4
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
Table A.24.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 109, a = 0.601, c = 1.817, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 31 25 6 13.78 18 2258.24 3.276 100×1010 6
2 59 25 3 12.67 20 2216.02 3.276 100×1010 7
3 75 14 2 11.95 18 2213.62 3.276 100×1010 6
4 95 14 6 13.67 19 2193.44 3.276 100×1010 6
5 108 10 3 12.67 23 2174.75 3.276 100×1010 7
6 387 16 263 19.24 26 2163.23 6.302 000×109 1
7 705 10 308 19.48 25 2155.95 6.302 000×109 7
8 800 11 84 17.65 23 2152.74 6.302 000×109 8
9 864 21 43 16.63 22 2142.30 6.302 000×109 9
10 881 6 11 14.58 24 2138.24 6.302 000×109 9
11 1046 16 149 18.46 27 2122.98 6.302 000×109 7
12 1096 21 29 16.11 25 2118.87 6.302 000×109 8
13 1110 8 6 13.63 23 2114.00 6.302 000×109 9
14 1205 7 88 17.67 30 2098.99 3.190 000×109 1
15 1244 4 35 16.30 29 2089.57 3.190 000×109 2
16 1261 11 6 13.44 28 2071.35 3.190 000×109 3
17 1279 15 3 11.64 26 2052.30 3.190 000×109 3
18 1286 5 2 9.58 24 2044.98 1.734 000×109 1
19 1295 7 2 10.46 24 2026.04 1.734 000×109 5
20 1308 11 2 8.58 24 2025.75 1.734 000×109 4
21 1464 154 2 8.00 24 1172.03 8.120 000×108 4
Table A.25.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 109, a = 0.602, c = 1.789, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 43 42 1 8.58 11 2333.66 2.220 000×108 6
2 78 34 1 8.00 14 2314.82 2.220 000×108 6
3 104 25 1 10.17 16 2313.54 2.220 000×108 6
4 118 13 1 7.00 13 2315.38 2.220 000×108 7
5 136 16 2 12.00 16 2272.98 2.220 000×108 6
6 149 10 3 12.21 18 2268.83 2.220 000×108 7
7 168 14 5 13.44 22 2264.94 2.220 000×108 7
8 191 5 18 15.35 22 2253.02 2.220 000×108 6
9 221 19 11 14.57 20 2246.27 2.220 000×108 7
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
10 323 5 97 17.79 24 2240.23 2.220 000×108 7
11 502 12 167 18.56 26 2235.21 2.220 000×108 6
12 1316 3 811 20.87 27 2228.15 2.220 000×108 7
13 1416 5 95 17.74 30 2229.26 2.220 000×108 6
14 1561 7 138 18.31 28 2207.30 2.220 000×108 2
15 1698 10 127 18.17 27 2200.18 2.220 000×108 8
16 1709 5 6 13.64 33 2188.97 2.220 000×108 3
17 1765 6 50 16.82 32 2178.04 2.220 000×108 2
18 1923 11 147 18.38 31 2166.94 2.220 000×108 5
19 1939 11 5 13.04 30 2149.69 2.220 000×108 4
20 1953 9 5 13.25 29 2138.55 2.220 000×108 3
21 1959 4 2 10.32 28 2135.90 2.220 000×108 4
22 1976 10 7 13.63 27 2117.95 2.220 000×108 4
23 2011 29 6 13.29 27 2090.38 2.220 000×108 8
24 2019 6 2 8.00 25 2066.45 2.220 000×108 10
25 2177 156 2 7.00 24 1228.67 2.220 000×108 3
Table A.26.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 111, a = 0.600, c = 1.773, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 18 17 1 9.81 13 2372.39 3.648 100×1010 8
2 58 39 1 8.00 15 2345.47 3.648 100×1010 8
3 77 16 3 12.13 17 2340.82 3.648 100×1010 8
4 140 31 32 16.06 22 2319.27 3.648 100×1010 8
5 172 25 7 13.77 20 2304.01 3.648 100×1010 9
6 196 15 9 14.07 21 2302.15 3.648 100×1010 9
7 208 6 6 13.55 25 2296.52 3.648 100×1010 8
8 300 15 77 17.39 23 2284.07 3.648 100×1010 9
9 647 17 330 19.49 31 2273.18 3.648 100×1010 8
10 676 22 7 13.73 28 2254.74 3.648 100×1010 9
11 1133 13 444 19.98 27 2257.75 3.648 100×1010 10
12 1293 6 154 18.38 26 2250.05 3.648 100×1010 11
13 3004 6 1705 21.93 31 2250.35 3.648 100×1010 10
14 3034 15 15 14.86 24 2232.29 3.648 100×1010 13
15 3059 13 12 14.53 25 2226.57 3.648 100×1010 11
16 3250 8 183 18.70 27 2230.14 3.648 100×1010 12
18 5091 10 3 9.81 13 2224.74 3.648 100×1010 16
19 5098 3 4 11.75 16 2223.71 3.648 100×1010 17
20 5133 8 27 15.80 20 2220.73 3.648 100×1010 15
21 5150 6 11 14.22 22 2218.85 3.648 100×1010 17
22 5979 7 822 20.82 28 2212.83 3.648 100×1010 15
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
23 6093 12 102 17.82 29 2209.11 3.648 100×1010 13
24 6124 9 22 15.50 27 2210.34 3.648 100×1010 15
25 6896 13 759 20.70 31 2192.38 5.278 285×109 1
26 7002 7 99 17.74 30 2186.68 2.926 501×109 1
27 7112 9 101 17.80 30 2173.68 2.926 501×109 3
28 7262 12 138 18.24 29 2160.61 2.926 501×109 4
29 7327 7 58 16.98 27 2153.88 2.926 501×109 12
30 7346 10 9 14.04 26 2143.56 2.926 501×109 5
31 7360 5 9 13.83 26 2137.65 2.926 501×109 3
32 7385 5 20 15.32 26 2135.04 2.926 501×109 4
33 7393 4 4 11.46 26 2123.83 1.930 998×109 1
34 7416 7 16 14.94 26 2109.41 1.930 998×109 9
35 7439 20 3 10.46 25 2100.11 1.930 998×109 9
36 7448 6 3 8.58 24 2075.05 1.930 998×109 10
37 7460 9 3 9.81 24 2070.62 1.930 998×109 5
38 7612 149 3 8.00 23 1264.96 1.044 206×109 5
Table A.27.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of NTRU lattice
(N = 113, a = 0.591, c = 1.780, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
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A.4. Knapsack Lattices
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 0 0 0 8.00 14 458.56 6.220 000×105 1
2 0 0 0 8.58 13 452.72 6.220 000×105 2
3 0 0 0 8.00 17 452.58 5.300 000×105 1
4 0 0 0 12.75 20 449.21 5.300 000×105 2
5 13 0 13 18.40 25 450.99 4.800 000×105 2
6 13 0 0 10.46 23 449.55 4.800 000×105 3
7 52 0 39 19.86 26 452.31 4.800 000×105 3
8 56 0 4 16.75 22 445.79 4.800 000×105 5
9 57 0 1 14.42 25 443.72 4.160 000×105 1
10 83 0 26 19.21 24 449.44 4.160 000×105 5
11 143 0 60 20.42 29 444.41 4.160 000×105 2
12 146 0 3 16.36 28 445.05 4.160 000×105 3
13 148 0 2 15.98 27 442.51 4.160 000×105 4
14 154 0 6 17.19 25 442.27 4.160 000×105 5
16 338 0 1 15.15 24 437.38 4.160 000×105 6
17 342 0 4 16.50 24 438.49 4.160 000×105 8
18 365 0 23 19.06 29 437.14 4.160 000×105 6
19 383 0 18 18.72 26 440.60 4.160 000×105 8
20 454 0 71 20.63 27 440.51 4.160 000×105 8
21 469 0 15 18.44 24 436.79 4.160 000×105 9
22 487 0 18 18.61 25 435.32 4.160 000×105 10
23 487 0 0 7.00 19 439.15 4.160 000×105 27
24 487 0 0 10.17 18 434.32 4.160 000×105 27
25 487 0 0 8.58 22 432.41 4.160 000×105 22
26 487 0 0 8.00 21 432.93 4.160 000×105 25
27 487 0 0 10.70 22 434.02 4.160 000×105 21
28 487 0 0 10.58 22 431.40 4.160 000×105 27
29 487 0 0 9.81 21 430.97 4.160 000×105 30
30 487 0 0 7.00 25 430.20 4.160 000×105 22
31 487 0 0 9.32 26 431.79 4.160 000×105 24
32 489 0 2 15.44 23 431.91 4.160 000×105 30
33 495 0 6 17.25 27 430.54 4.160 000×105 30
34 510 0 15 18.43 30 431.50 4.160 000×105 26
35 571 0 61 20.41 30 427.38 4.160 000×105 27
36 571 0 0 13.36 25 430.60 4.160 000×105 33
37 571 0 0 13.13 24 430.35 4.160 000×105 39
38 571 0 0 8.58 27 429.44 4.160 000×105 33
39 571 0 0 13.82 26 428.85 4.160 000×105 40
40 571 0 0 13.63 27 428.53 4.160 000×105 38
41 571 0 0 8.58 27 426.04 4.160 000×105 34
42 676 0 105 21.03 33 430.30 4.160 000×105 31
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
43 676 0 0 12.21 26 424.39 4.160 000×105 32
44 676 0 0 8.00 26 426.04 4.160 000×105 36
45 676 0 0 11.09 24 426.01 4.160 000×105 37
46 676 0 0 9.32 22 429.38 4.160 000×105 38
47 676 0 0 9.58 24 427.10 4.160 000×105 39
48 676 0 0 13.66 27 424.43 4.160 000×105 40
49 676 0 0 13.51 29 424.65 4.160 000×105 34
50 676 0 0 12.36 29 424.18 4.160 000×105 36
51 676 0 0 13.04 28 422.81 4.160 000×105 37
52 676 0 0 11.64 33 420.62 9.000 000×104 31
53 676 0 0 10.70 31 423.56 9.000 000×104 40
54 677 0 1 15.10 33 422.66 9.000 000×104 37
55 677 0 0 13.02 34 421.24 9.000 000×104 39
56 677 0 0 8.58 33 422.86 9.000 000×104 40
Table A.28.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of CJLOSS lattice
(n = 100, density 0.935 k = 10, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 0 0 0 9.58 16 468.09 6.980 000×105 1
2 0 0 0 10.17 15 462.09 6.500 000×105 2
3 0 0 0 13.23 19 453.62 6.500 000×105 3
4 0 0 0 11.64 17 457.66 6.500 000×105 4
5 0 0 0 9.00 15 450.02 6.500 000×105 5
6 0 0 0 8.58 19 451.65 6.500 000×105 4
7 1 0 1 14.67 22 448.90 6.500 000×105 2
8 1 0 0 11.58 20 450.93 6.500 000×105 5
9 2 0 1 15.16 22 448.93 6.500 000×105 5
10 19 0 17 18.59 25 448.38 6.500 000×105 5
11 28 0 9 17.72 28 452.15 5.080 000×105 1
12 29 0 1 15.36 28 447.43 5.080 000×105 4
13 39 0 10 17.78 26 449.43 5.080 000×105 5
14 63 0 24 19.08 29 448.00 5.080 000×105 4
15 93 0 30 19.40 28 446.66 5.080 000×105 5
17 285 0 9 17.70 25 441.19 5.080 000×105 8
18 384 0 99 21.11 27 439.49 5.080 000×105 6
19 384 0 0 10.81 22 439.81 5.080 000×105 10
20 386 0 2 15.82 26 439.65 5.080 000×105 6
21 397 0 11 17.94 28 436.35 5.080 000×105 5
22 415 0 18 18.69 29 437.82 5.080 000×105 10
23 415 0 0 13.36 25 436.65 5.080 000×105 12
24 419 0 4 16.67 28 437.95 5.080 000×105 9
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iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
25 434 0 15 18.43 28 435.74 5.080 000×105 10
26 434 0 0 9.00 19 435.98 5.080 000×105 27
27 434 0 0 10.32 20 434.06 5.080 000×105 26
28 434 0 0 11.70 21 434.72 5.080 000×105 24
29 434 0 0 8.00 22 428.62 5.080 000×105 26
30 434 0 0 13.02 22 425.54 9.000 000×104 28
31 434 0 0 12.36 26 423.54 9.000 000×104 27
32 434 0 0 14.10 25 426.03 9.000 000×104 30
33 493 0 59 20.33 30 421.54 9.000 000×104 22
Table A.29.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of CJLOSS lattice
(n = 100, density 0.833 k = 10, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 0 0 0 9.00 15 460.02 7.225 000×105 1
2 0 0 0 9.32 22 453.52 5.900 000×105 1
3 0 0 0 11.52 21 456.48 5.900 000×105 2
4 41 0 41 19.87 28 450.85 5.295 000×105 1
5 41 0 0 9.00 19 453.25 5.295 000×105 4
6 44 0 3 16.09 23 450.16 5.295 000×105 4
7 46 0 2 15.89 22 451.20 5.295 000×105 5
8 46 0 0 10.58 16 446.92 5.295 000×105 7
9 46 0 0 8.00 14 451.32 5.295 000×105 8
10 46 0 0 7.00 16 445.54 5.295 000×105 9
11 46 0 0 13.73 19 449.39 5.295 000×105 8
12 46 0 0 9.00 18 448.36 5.295 000×105 9
13 47 0 1 14.79 24 452.44 5.295 000×105 8
14 50 0 3 16.11 22 445.47 5.295 000×105 9
15 87 0 37 19.66 26 448.63 5.295 000×105 7
16 88 0 1 14.69 25 445.80 5.295 000×105 8
17 90 0 2 15.39 27 449.01 5.295 000×105 8
18 123 0 33 19.53 30 443.85 5.295 000×105 2
19 147 0 24 19.10 26 441.68 5.295 000×105 6
20 152 0 5 16.83 25 438.85 5.295 000×105 8
21 189 0 37 19.73 28 443.18 5.295 000×105 3
22 189 0 0 11.95 20 441.29 5.295 000×105 25
23 189 0 0 9.32 22 443.79 5.295 000×105 30
24 189 0 0 10.32 25 437.48 5.295 000×105 21
25 189 0 0 10.00 21 436.69 5.295 000×105 28
26 189 0 0 10.32 23 433.94 5.295 000×105 29
27 191 0 2 15.67 23 438.09 5.295 000×105 22
Continued on next page
130
A.4. Knapsack Lattices
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
28 191 0 0 7.00 22 434.52 5.295 000×105 25
29 193 0 2 15.71 24 439.25 5.295 000×105 23
30 193 0 0 10.46 23 437.85 5.295 000×105 30
31 193 0 0 11.64 24 432.96 5.295 000×105 24
32 193 0 0 13.93 23 431.68 5.295 000×105 25
33 193 0 0 12.00 21 430.76 5.295 000×105 26
34 193 0 0 14.00 24 431.57 5.295 000×105 28
35 202 0 9 17.74 27 432.23 5.295 000×105 29
36 202 0 0 10.17 23 430.68 5.295 000×105 37
37 202 0 0 7.00 26 433.53 5.295 000×105 38
38 203 0 1 14.59 31 432.52 5.295 000×105 37
39 203 0 0 13.21 31 431.13 5.295 000×105 34
40 204 0 1 14.86 30 427.92 5.295 000×105 38
41 204 0 0 14.10 31 429.87 5.295 000×105 40
42 205 0 1 15.31 34 429.88 5.295 000×105 40
43 205 0 0 14.34 37 427.10 5.295 000×105 33
45 389 0 0 12.81 31 431.90 5.295 000×105 45
46 390 0 1 14.59 45 428.51 5.295 000×105 47
47 390 0 0 13.19 44 427.65 5.295 000×105 48
49 578 0 0 14.02 43 425.58 5.295 000×105 49
50 578 0 0 10.32 46 426.38 5.295 000×105 50
51 652 0 74 20.67 45 428.24 5.295 000×105 42
52 656 0 4 16.67 25 426.76 5.000 000×105 4
53 669 0 13 18.26 27 427.78 5.000 000×105 5
54 751 0 82 20.85 30 424.83 4.745 000×105 2
55 752 0 1 14.42 24 428.28 4.745 000×105 8
56 760 0 8 17.58 25 424.52 4.745 000×105 8
57 761 0 1 14.23 24 425.51 4.745 000×105 10
58 765 0 4 16.54 28 425.29 4.745 000×105 9
59 768 0 3 16.36 27 425.94 4.745 000×105 10
60 777 0 9 17.62 29 429.58 4.745 000×105 4
61 781 0 4 16.63 26 425.57 4.745 000×105 10
62 798 0 17 18.59 30 431.37 4.745 000×105 9
63 798 0 0 11.25 31 423.54 4.745 000×105 5
64 826 0 28 19.29 29 421.27 4.745 000×105 6
65 837 0 11 18.03 27 422.15 4.745 000×105 7
66 839 0 2 15.82 26 424.00 4.745 000×105 6
67 843 0 4 16.67 26 422.93 4.745 000×105 9
68 844 0 1 14.51 24 425.10 4.745 000×105 10
69 852 0 8 17.47 27 424.92 4.745 000×105 8
70 865 0 13 18.17 28 418.32 4.745 000×105 9
71 865 0 0 11.17 24 425.28 4.745 000×105 26
72 865 0 0 10.46 24 421.97 4.745 000×105 29
Continued on next page
131
Appendix A. Sampling Results
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
73 865 0 0 13.61 23 422.79 4.745 000×105 23
74 865 0 0 13.39 25 424.22 4.745 000×105 21
75 865 0 0 11.25 24 422.16 4.745 000×105 28
76 866 0 1 15.11 28 420.29 4.745 000×105 28
77 868 0 2 16.01 27 420.83 4.745 000×105 25
78 868 0 0 13.49 25 420.57 4.745 000×105 30
79 874 0 6 17.06 28 417.45 4.745 000×105 24
80 874 0 0 13.11 26 419.63 4.745 000×105 29
81 876 0 2 15.91 26 417.56 4.745 000×105 25
82 876 0 0 7.00 26 421.36 4.745 000×105 26
83 878 0 2 15.61 27 422.37 4.745 000×105 27
84 878 0 0 12.43 25 418.32 4.745 000×105 33
85 878 0 0 11.09 23 417.25 4.745 000×105 34
86 878 0 0 7.00 26 415.59 4.745 000×105 37
87 878 0 0 10.58 26 417.48 4.745 000×105 39
88 880 0 2 15.59 31 416.07 4.745 000×105 33
89 881 0 1 15.04 30 418.88 4.745 000×105 40
90 883 0 2 15.65 32 418.00 4.745 000×105 34
91 883 0 0 9.32 30 414.63 4.745 000×105 35
92 883 0 0 14.01 28 418.05 4.745 000×105 36
93 883 0 0 13.11 27 419.24 4.745 000×105 37
94 885 0 2 16.01 34 415.98 4.745 000×105 40
96 1069 0 2 16.05 36 417.19 4.745 000×105 43
97 1069 0 0 13.21 37 416.96 4.745 000×105 44
98 1069 0 0 11.09 34 415.94 4.745 000×105 45
101 1265 0 0 11.70 30 414.88 4.745 000×105 44
102 1265 0 0 9.58 30 416.29 4.745 000×105 45
103 1265 0 0 13.30 30 418.24 4.745 000×105 39
104 1265 0 0 11.64 29 417.01 4.745 000×105 40
105 1265 0 0 8.00 31 417.76 4.745 000×105 41
106 1265 0 0 11.39 30 417.23 4.745 000×105 42
107 1265 0 0 10.58 30 415.89 4.745 000×105 43
108 1265 0 0 8.00 30 416.23 4.745 000×105 44
109 1265 0 0 9.32 28 414.38 4.745 000×105 44
110 1265 0 0 14.13 37 416.24 4.745 000×105 45
111 1265 0 0 9.00 36 414.82 4.745 000×105 46
112 1265 0 0 7.00 33 415.66 4.745 000×105 47
113 1265 0 0 8.00 34 416.20 4.745 000×105 49
114 1265 0 0 8.58 45 417.49 4.745 000×105 50
115 1265 0 0 8.00 39 417.66 4.745 000×105 48
116 1265 0 0 8.58 41 412.88 4.745 000×105 49
117 1265 0 0 7.00 43 416.58 4.745 000×105 50
118 1265 0 0 13.02 52 416.97 4.745 000×105 45
Continued on next page
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A.4. Knapsack Lattices
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
119 1268 0 3 16.37 54 416.32 4.745 000×105 48
120 1268 0 0 14.34 53 413.29 4.745 000×105 50
122 1457 0 0 12.09 1000 415.61 4.745 000×105 54
123 1457 0 0 8.00 1000 416.52 4.745 000×105 59
124 1457 0 0 8.58 1000 416.13 4.745 000×105 55
125 1457 0 0 10.91 1000 415.96 4.745 000×105 51
126 1457 0 0 11.09 1000 416.28 4.745 000×105 57
127 1462 0 5 17.00 1000 416.33 4.745 000×105 60
129 1650 0 5 17.02 1000 414.06 4.745 000×105 51
130 1652 0 2 16.03 1000 414.03 4.745 000×105 51
131 1657 0 5 16.85 27 415.98 4.745 000×105 7
132 1657 0 0 11.86 25 410.80 4.745 000×105 8
133 1657 0 0 10.91 24 416.90 4.745 000×105 9
134 1706 0 49 20.08 28 415.59 4.745 000×105 10
135 1706 0 0 11.95 30 416.36 4.745 000×105 9
136 1717 0 11 18.02 28 417.95 4.745 000×105 10
138 1906 0 0 7.00 21 415.30 4.745 000×105 17
139 1906 0 0 13.46 21 413.90 4.745 000×105 19
140 1906 0 0 11.17 20 416.04 4.745 000×105 20
141 1907 0 1 14.41 22 412.97 4.745 000×105 13
142 1907 0 0 10.70 24 412.69 4.745 000×105 20
143 1907 0 0 7.00 24 416.69 4.745 000×105 19
144 1907 0 0 11.17 24 411.94 1.275 000×105 1
Table A.30.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of CJLOSS lattice
(n = 100, density 0.833 k = 15, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
1 0 0 0 8.00 13 444.17 5.860 000×105 1
2 0 0 0 7.00 18 447.17 4.900 000×105 1
3 0 0 0 8.00 22 443.26 4.140 000×105 1
4 0 0 0 10.70 16 445.47 4.140 000×105 3
5 1 0 1 14.91 21 440.24 4.140 000×105 2
6 10 0 9 17.76 23 438.31 4.140 000×105 4
7 10 0 0 13.44 22 438.06 4.140 000×105 5
8 25 0 15 18.45 25 435.62 4.100 000×105 4
9 26 0 1 14.55 23 437.21 4.100 000×105 4
10 162 0 136 21.60 29 440.02 4.100 000×105 5
11 166 0 4 16.44 23 439.70 4.100 000×105 7
12 169 0 3 16.37 23 435.96 4.100 000×105 8
13 174 0 5 16.87 28 438.46 4.100 000×105 7
14 174 0 0 13.82 22 439.51 4.100 000×105 10
15 175 0 1 14.73 27 433.96 4.100 000×105 8
Continued on next page
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Appendix A. Sampling Results
iter ttotal tBKZ tsample log2#samples umin log2 odef(B) minj ‖bj‖2 e
16 177 0 2 15.60 26 441.02 4.100 000×105 9
17 192 0 15 18.39 27 436.72 4.100 000×105 10
18 299 0 107 21.17 31 438.52 4.100 000×105 7
19 317 0 18 18.56 25 434.34 4.100 000×105 12
20 320 0 3 16.25 24 437.37 4.100 000×105 13
21 324 0 4 16.36 23 433.00 4.100 000×105 8
22 326 0 2 15.64 29 433.73 4.100 000×105 9
23 365 0 39 19.76 28 430.62 4.100 000×105 13
24 370 0 5 16.77 27 431.91 4.100 000×105 14
25 370 0 0 9.81 21 430.63 4.100 000×105 30
26 370 0 0 13.60 22 429.37 4.100 000×105 23
27 370 0 0 11.25 22 427.01 4.100 000×105 27
28 370 0 0 8.00 22 430.42 4.100 000×105 28
29 370 0 0 12.13 20 427.86 4.100 000×105 29
30 371 0 1 14.38 25 427.54 4.100 000×105 30
31 387 0 16 18.36 29 425.77 4.100 000×105 23
32 387 0 0 13.07 24 427.50 4.100 000×105 32
33 387 0 0 12.52 25 426.79 4.100 000×105 35
34 387 0 0 11.09 25 426.65 4.100 000×105 37
35 388 0 1 15.01 27 424.63 4.100 000×105 38
36 395 0 7 17.33 28 421.77 4.100 000×105 39
38 583 0 0 8.58 41 425.50 4.100 000×105 45
39 583 0 0 11.39 49 421.64 4.100 000×105 49
40 583 0 0 13.38 48 424.32 4.100 000×105 50
42 769 0 0 9.32 34 422.41 4.100 000×105 48
43 769 0 0 8.00 34 423.04 4.100 000×105 50
44 769 0 0 7.00 36 423.82 4.100 000×105 44
45 769 0 0 8.00 31 422.76 4.100 000×105 45
46 769 0 0 8.58 36 421.76 4.100 000×105 46
47 769 0 0 11.64 38 420.16 4.100 000×105 41
48 769 0 0 7.00 34 421.25 4.100 000×105 50
49 769 0 0 7.00 35 422.16 4.100 000×105 41
50 769 0 0 8.00 31 422.52 4.100 000×105 46
52 981 0 22 18.91 28 422.39 4.100 000×105 5
53 1004 0 23 19.01 30 421.08 9.000 000×104 1
Table A.31.: Interactive ShortProjectionSR of CJLOSS lattice
(n = 100, density 0.980 k = 10, δ = 0.99, β = 5, γ = 0.90 , umax = 22)
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